



# Animalism

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## Abstract

Among your closest associates is a certain human animal – a living, breathing, organism. You see it when you look in the mirror (go ahead; take a look). When it is sick, you don't feel too well. Where it goes, you go. And, one thinks, where you go, it must follow. Indeed, you can make it move through sheer force of will. You bear, in short, an important and intimate relation to this, your animal. So too rest of us with our animals. Animalism says that this relation is nothing short of identity. According to animalists, we do not only coincide with or constitute or inhabit or otherwise hang out with these close associates, our animals: we are them. In this article, I offer an opinionated take on what animalism might be and situate it against contemporary rivals. Then, I outline a simple case for animalism. Finally, I sketch non-standard routes for animalists to take in light of standard challenges. My goal in all of this is to open up some new avenues of animalist thinking.

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## 1. Introduction

Among your closest associates is a certain human animal – a living, breathing, organism. You see it when you look in the mirror. Go ahead; take a look. When it is sick, you don't feel too well. Where it goes, you go. And, one thinks, where you go, it must follow. Indeed, you can make it move through sheer force of will. You bear, in short, an important and intimate relation to this, your animal. So too the rest of us to our animals. Animalism says that this relation between us and our animals is nothing short of identity. According to animalists, we do not only coincide with or constitute or inhabit or otherwise hang out with these close associates, our animals: we *are* them.<sup>1</sup>

In this article, I offer one take on what animalism might be and then situate it against contemporary rivals. Next, I outline a simple case for animalism. Finally, I outline non-standard routes for animalists to take in light of standard challenges. My goal in all of this is to open up some new avenues of animalist thinking.

## 2. Animalism

Animalism may be stated with pleasing brevity: 'we are animals'. Put that way, it may seem hard to deny. But animalism is controversial. Indeed, it is a minority report among late 20th and early 21st century Anglophone philosophers. We can see why by examining its content more carefully. And perhaps the best way to do *that* is to explain, in order, what those three words mean.

We The doctrine is about human persons, those things to which we ordinarily refer with our personal pronouns. Among human persons are those things we sometimes call 'non-cognitivists', 'teenagers', 'politicians', 'foreigners', 'heterosexuals', and more. You are a human person. So am I. Animalism, note, is *only* about human persons. Thus, it does not imply that non-human persons (if such there be) are animals. Animalism, furthermore, is neutral about whether all human animals are human persons. For all

animalism says, some human animals may not be human persons or even persons of any kind at all.

Are Animalism says that each of us is *identical* to a human animal. The relation we enjoy with our respective animals is nothing short of classical identity – reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. Accordingly, everything true of you is true of your animal, and vice versa. One way to test animalism, then, is to examine whether we have all the properties our animals have, and vice versa. If our animals have properties we lack or vice versa, then animalism is false. Though animalism is a thesis about what we are (identical to), animalism, as conceived here, is neutral with respect to whether we are *essentially* or *necessarily* or *fundamentally* animals. Compare: *x is identical to some student* is neutral with respect to whether *x is essentially a student* and whether *x is necessarily a student*.<sup>2</sup>

Animals The things we are identical to are *human* – with a distinctive evolutionary history and certain biological features (like DNA) – but *animals* nonetheless – typically able to move about relatively freely and endowed with sophisticated sensory and nervous systems.<sup>3</sup> On these points about human animals, animalists speak with one voice. But there are two important dimensions of disagreement among animalists about the nature of human animals:<sup>4</sup>

Matter question Are human animals wholly material beings?

Persistence question Do human animals have strictly biological persistence conditions?

Most contemporary animalists say ‘yes’ to the matter question.<sup>5</sup> We may, following Patrick Toner, call this conjunction of animalism with materialism about human animals ‘Latter-Day Animalism’.<sup>6</sup> Latter-Day themes prevail among contemporary animalists. But it was not always so. For Aristotle was an animalist if ever there was one, and according to Aristotle (arguably) and (some of) his disciples, human animals are not wholly material beings. They are instead compounds of *form* and *matter*, where *form* here is not wholly material (although it may depend for its existence on some wholly material item or items).<sup>7</sup>

Most contemporary animalists also say ‘yes’ to the persistence question. According to these animalists, a human animal lasts across an interval just in the case that its ‘purely animal functions – metabolism, the capacity to breathe and circulate one’s blood, and the like – continue’<sup>8</sup> across that interval. We may, following Eric Olson, call this theory about the persistence of animals the ‘Biological Approach’.<sup>9</sup> Animalism stated so far (‘we are animals’) is neutral about the Biological Approach. It is compatible with that approach and with its denial. Most contemporary animalists, though, endorse the Biological Approach.<sup>10</sup> It is unsurprising, then, that many arguments against animalism target that conjunction. Clearly, though, such arguments need not tell against versions of animalism that do not include the Biological Approach (a point animalism’s defenders and critics sometimes both seem to miss).<sup>11</sup>

Animalists who are not materialists may consistently reject the Biological Approach and indeed, may consistently endorse a range of theses about what it takes for a human animal to persist. This much is unsurprising. But the rejection of the Biological Approach among Latter-Day Animalists is of greater interest. In these latter days, it stems from two main motivations: anti-criterialism and a conviction that human animals can outlast their own deaths. According to anti-criterialists, there are no informative criteria of identity over time, and so there are thus no purely biological criteria of identity over time for human animals either.<sup>12</sup> The view that human animals can outlast their own deaths is not as strange as it may initially sound; it can also be

described as the view that human animals, upon dying, turn from *living animals* into *dead animals*. So, on this view, it's possible that we exist after our own deaths, not as disembodied spirits or whatnot, but as corpses.<sup>13</sup> There are other avenues by which Latter-Day Animalists might arrive at the rejection of the Biological Approach, and I will treat them in more detail below.

### 3. Generic Animalism

Thus a brief statement of animalism and a few major fault lines amongst philosophers who endorse it. Now a few quick remarks about another way to think about animalism and its content.

So far, I have implicitly treated 'we are animals' as equivalent to this *universal* statement: 'for every  $x$ , if  $x$  is a human person, then  $x$  is identical to a human animal'. This is not the only way to read 'we are animals'. Indeed, other readings are both compelling and fruitful. Here is one suggestion: treat 'we are animals' as a *generic*. More carefully, generic animalism, as we may call it, is the thesis that it is a generic truth that we are animals. What are generics? A fine question, but a difficult one.<sup>14</sup> Start with this sentence: 'Buddhists are way into meditation'. This first sentence is, let us suppose, true. So far so good. But is it equivalent to 'for every  $x$ , if  $x$  is a Buddhist,  $x$  is way into meditation'? It does not appear to be. For the second sentence might be false (some Buddhists might *not* be way into meditation) even if the first sentence is, as we have supposed, true. The first sentence could be true, somehow, even if not all Buddhists are way into meditation (similarly, 'ducks lay eggs' may be true even if not all ducks lay eggs, 'mosquitos carry dengue fever' may be true even if only a very few mosquitos carry that virus, and so on). We are now positioned to observe one curious property of generics: they admit of exceptions. Generic animalism, accordingly, may admit of exceptions without threat to its truth; generic animalism is consistent, for example, with the thesis that there are human persons who are not human animals. There's more to be said here, about generic animalism, rival conceptions or formulations of animalism, and their relation to the various arguments for and against animalism. I shall leave them unsaid and simply note that generic animalism is a live option for animalists and that it appears to enjoy a certain dialectical resilience; in particular, it is not susceptible to defeat by counterexample.

### 4. Alternatives

Animalism is a minority report among late 20th and early 21st century Anglophone philosophers. What, then, are its rivals? What theses do philosophers endorse in its stead? Here is a non-exhaustive list of alternatives:

- (i) Pure dualism: we are wholly immaterial souls, distinct from any animal.<sup>15</sup>
- (ii) Moderate dualism: we are wholly immaterial souls, but we inherit certain properties from our animals and are only in a secondary and derivative sense animals.<sup>16</sup>
- (iii) Union dualism: we are amalgams: part material animal and part immaterial soul.<sup>17</sup>
- (iv) Constitutionalism: we are constituted by but distinct from human animals.<sup>18</sup>
- (v) Brainism: we are brains, each of us a proper (spatial) part of some human animal.<sup>19</sup>
- (vi) Partism: we are maximal sums of thought-supporting spatial and temporal parts, each of us a proper spatial and temporal part of some human animal.<sup>20</sup>

Some of these views are mutually consistent; but each contradicts the central claim of animalism. I have not listed personal nihilism (the view that human persons are nothing at all and that we do not exist) as a rival to animalism for this reason: *there are no human persons* is compatible

with every human person is a human animal (compare: *there are no unicorns* is compatible with *every unicorn is a mammal*).<sup>21</sup>

### 5. The Case for Animalism

Thus, what animalism is and what it is not. Why think that it is true? One argument for animalism goes as follows:

Suppose for *reductio* that animalism is false; you are a person but not an animal. Surely human animals exist and think, though. And what would your animal think but exactly your thoughts? (You think, after all; the mental supervenes on the physical, and you are a physical duplicate of your animal.) So your animal thinks, among other things, that it is a person, and has exactly the same reasons and evidence for thinking this that you do. But unlike you, your animal is wrong. It is not a person. But then you do not *know* that you are a person, for you and your animal are exactly alike with respect to reasons and evidence. So if animalism is false, you cannot know you are a person. But surely we can know that we are people, and so animalism is not false. It is true.<sup>22</sup>

This is one formulation of the Thinking Animal Argument (or more carefully, a formulation of the Thinking Animal Argument together with sub-arguments for its key premises). It is the leading argument for animalism. To its already extensive discussion, I add two notes. First, the Thinking Animal Argument will have little force for those who do not affirm materialism about human persons. It is primarily an argument from materialism to a species of materialism. Pure dualists, for example, have traditionally denied that material objects can think at all (and so deny that your animal can think either). They reject, then, a premise of the Thinking Animal Argument. Dualists of other kinds have also typically insisted that the mental does not supervene on the physical and thus reject another motivation for the Thinking Animal Argument. Second, the epistemic principles underlying the Thinking Animal Argument or its sub-arguments are obscure and require defense. The defender of the Thinking Animal Argument would do well to specify, for example, the precise sense in which the animal and the person are in the same evidential state – no simple task.<sup>23</sup> It is consistent with these notes, of course, that the Thinking Animal Argument might be vindicated on other grounds – perhaps it could be defended without appeal to materialism or controversial epistemic principles.

Another argument for animalism exploits the apparent fact that animalism is a consequence of evolutionary theory. If we are *not* animals, then neither are our parents (or grandparents, or great-grandparents...), in which case the standard evolutionary theory about our origins is false. But that theory is not false, says the Animal Ancestors Argument, and so animalism is, in fact, true.<sup>24</sup> The argument is intriguing and raises questions about how to best extract good metaphysics from our best science – all fascinating but beyond the scope of this article.<sup>25</sup>

Thus, two leading arguments (or better, families of arguments) for animalism. I will now present and briefly defend a third.

There are intimate and obvious associations, correlations, or links between human persons and human animals. Our animals are ever with us. We see them in mirrors. Our fates are intimately tied together – one obvious way to do benefit or harm to a human person is to do benefit or harm to her animal. When our animals go unfed, we feel hunger. When they lie down and fall into deep sleep, we go unconscious. When they wake up, so do we. When we hope for rain, the eyes of our animals brighten, and their heads turn towards the clouds above. The list goes on. Let us call this long list of correlations between human persons and their animals ‘the association’. The association is helpful in understanding the content of animalism. It is also

evidence for the truth of the doctrine. Or so I shall argue in the remainder of this section.<sup>26</sup> The Association Argument unfolds as follows:

Data The association holds.

Evidence If the association holds, then animalism is probably true.

Conclusion Therefore, animalism is probably true (from Data and Evidence).

We have already observed the intuitive case for Data. The case is resilient and can be easily tested. Go ahead: take a walk. I predict that your human animal will be there with you. Expose your human animal to a virus. I predict that *you* will suffer. Give your human animal a rigorous workout. I predict that *you* will benefit. These examples support this more general point: in the business of everyday life, we are to be found exactly where our human animals are to be found, and the things they enjoy or suffer are enjoyed or suffered by their associated human beings. The case for Data, then, is strong indeed. The association certainly *seems* to hold.

The gap from the association to animalism is not wide. Here is just one way to bridge it. There is plausibly some explanation or account of *why* the association holds. When making sense of the association, we need not throw up our hands in despair. We may, instead, offer a metaphysical theory (or, if you like, tell a metaphysical story). Here are some stories, each corresponding to one of the six non-animalist views outlined above:

- (i) The association holds because wholly immaterial human persons inhabit or are embodied in human animals, and embodiment guarantees the right kinds of correlations.
- (ii) The association holds because we *inherit* properties from our animals (like *being sick* or *weighing 62 kilograms*), and vice versa (like *hoping for rain*) in such a way as to guarantee the correlations we observe.
- (iii) The association holds because our animals are, in fact, proper parts of us, and parthood guarantees certain intimate relations or correlations.
- (iv) The association holds because we are constituted by our animals, and when *x* is constituted by *y*, there will inevitably be intimate correlations between *x* and *y*.
- (v) The association holds because we are proper (spatial) parts of our animals, and parthood guarantees certain intimate relations or correlations.
- (vi) The association holds because we are proper (temporal) parts of our animals, and parthood guarantees certain intimate relations or correlations.

These six stories all enjoy some degree of explanatory power. Each, when supplemented with the perfectly crafted auxiliary metaphysical theory about embodiment, constitution, property inheritance, or the intimacy of parthood, can plausibly claim to explain or aid in the understanding of *why* the association holds. But none is so simple or as powerful as the story animalism offers: *the association holds because we are (identical to) our animals*. Though the accounts may be tied in explanatory power, animalism is the victor when it comes to simplicity. Animalism needs no abstruse theory of embodiment, constitution, property inheritance, or the intimacy of parthood to explain why the association holds; it deploys only simple numerical identity. The things that happen to us happen to our animals (and vice versa) because we are our animals and they are us.

Compare: there are many associations between Samuel Clemens and Mark Twain. When one shows up for a book signing, the other does too. Donations to Twain's favorite causes turn out to be donations to Clemens' favorite causes. To speak to one is to speak to the other. What could possibly explain these correlations? We could opt for a complicated conjoined twin theory, a parthood theory, a constitution theory, an embodiment theory, and so on. Or we could instead conclude that Clemens is (identical to) Twain. Though the theories are perhaps tied for

explanatory power (each can say *why* Clemens shows up at all of Twain's book signings), the identity view clearly has a powerful boost in the theoretical race by virtue of its simplicity.

The same simplicity considerations show that, in light of the association, animalism has a powerful advantage over its rivals. The association is evidence for animalism; and indeed, it is *strong* evidence, so if the association holds, animalism is probably true. So I conclude that Evidence is true.<sup>27</sup>

Paul Snowden has recently dismissed reasoning like this on two grounds. First, denying animalism does not involve 'postulating real extra entities with extra causal roles'.<sup>28</sup> Absent postulating such extra causal structure, rival explanations of the association incur no ontological penalties and thus are not sliced by Ockham's Razor. Second, it is unclear whether simplicity considerations should play any role in metaphysical theorizing. I agree with Snowden's second point: it is indeed unclear just how simplicity should figure into metaphysical theorizing. So it is with appropriate trepidation that I deploy it here and only argue that the association makes animalism *probable*. As for Snowden's first criticism, it is not as promising. For a great many anti-animalists do, in fact, posit extra causal roles for persons distinct from animals. Baker and Shoemaker, for example, think that only persons (and not animals) are capable of (i.e., have the power to or occupy the causal role of bringing about) certain kinds of thought.<sup>29</sup> Pure dualists often say the same. So non-animalists *do* posit extra causal structure in the world.

Does animalism *simpliciter* follow from Data and Evidence? Not quite. For explanatory power and simplicity are not the only theoretical virtues. And animalism may yet have fatal flaws. The most we can conclude, then, is that animalism is probably true. And that is the conclusion of the Association Argument.

Before moving on, note two things. First, the Association Argument neither presupposes nor supports the Biological Approach. It is, in fact, neutral about what it takes for a human animal to last over time. By my lights, this is good, since I below argue against the Biological Approach. Second, the Association Argument does not officially take a stand on materialism about human persons. It suggests only that we are animals but does not (absent auxiliary premises about what human animals are like) suggest that we are also wholly material beings. The Association Argument, then, is ecumenical in ways that some other arguments for animalism are not.

## 6. Animalism without Biology

Much of the late 20th and early 21st century Anglophone literature on animalism has focused on exotic cases in which a human person and her animal apparently part ways. We find discussion of cases in which a human person outlasts her animal, or in which a human animal outlasts its person, or in which a human person pre-exists her animal, or in which a human animal pre-exists its person. The literature is filled to the brim with brain transplant cases, fission cases, fusion cases, and more.<sup>30</sup> Two tendencies reign: first, a cases-first method (more contentiously, an *exotic-cases-first* method)<sup>31</sup> and second, allegiance to the Biological Approach – a conviction that (whether we are human animals or not) the continuation of purely animal functions is necessary and sufficient for the persistence of a human animal. Surprisingly, little is said about the precise connection between animalism and the Biological Approach beyond the occasional suggestion that the two are identical.<sup>32</sup>

Others have said much about what might be wrong with a cases-first method; I can add little to that discussion.<sup>33</sup> But I will here sketch an argument against the Biological Approach. The argument will begin with a case (with due apologies, of course, to scholars cited in the previous footnote):

Your cerebrum is removed from your skull and skillfully implanted into a nearby human animal whose cerebrum has recently been annihilated. The creature resulting from the

implantation claims to be you and claims to have all your memories, beliefs, and so on. It appears to be a living, breathing human animal. And a living, breathing animal remains where you once were. Its brain stem is intact, but it has no cerebrum. Its purely animal functions – such as breathing and metabolizing – continue.<sup>34</sup>

What can we learn from this case? What conclusions should we draw from reflecting on it? Here is one tempting reply:

Transplant Were your cerebrum transplanted (as above), you'd go with it.

I won't say anything about the case for or against Transplant, except that many have found it overwhelmingly plausible. I will, note, though, that Transplant *alone* doesn't bear on animalism. It requires supplementation to do that. For example,

Link If the Biological Approach and Animalism are true, then Transplant is false.

Link is also tempting. For if the Biological Approach is true, then no animal is transported by the transplant operation. The animal with which the case begins still exists, brain stem intact, and continues to exist even without its cerebrum (much as an animal can continue to exist even after losing a kidney or appendix). Adding animalism to the mix suggests that, since you *are* the untransported animal, you do not, after all, go with your cerebrum (contra Transplant). So it seems that if we accept both the Biological Approach and Animalism, we must reject Transplant.

With Link in hand, we can now construct some interesting arguments from the transplant case. For Transplant, Link, and the Biological Approach together imply the falsity of animalism.<sup>35</sup> An intriguing thought. What should the animalist say about it? To date, most animalists have sought out ways to reject Transplant. They deny that you go with your cerebrum, and the denial is sometimes motivated by animalism itself.<sup>36</sup> That is one option. I wish to now highlight other animalist options here. The animalist need not resist the powerful intuitive case for Transplant. She may, instead, use the transplant scenario to argue against the Biological Approach. For Link, Transplant, and animalism together imply that the Biological Approach is false. This 'flipped' argument should not, of course, convince anti-animalists (it takes animalism as a premise). Nonetheless, it might have utility nonetheless in bringing to light this striking (and heretofore underappreciated) fact: animalists are not wedded to the Biological Approach and may even have reason to reject it.<sup>37</sup>

The flipped argument seems to have something going for it. First, it allows the animalist to simply *grant* a powerful class of intuitions according to which we go where our cerebra go. Second, it allows the animalist to deploy the method of cases, a typical tool of her opponent. We may express the point as this rhetorical question: if cases are indeed a good way to figure out what it takes for us to persist, then why could we not use cases (like the transplant scenario above) and thereby discover that the animals to which we are identical do *not*, after all, have strictly biological persistence conditions?

### 7. Three Paths Forward

I have thus far suggested a case for animalism and have shown that the animalist may have reason to bid farewell to the Biological Approach. But questions remain. What would animalism minus the Biological Approach amount to? What might the animalist say about what it takes for one of us to last over time, if it is not a matter of the continuation of purely biological processes?

The above questions arise most pointedly, note, only on the assumption of criterialism. If there are *not*, after all, informative criteria of identity over time, then there may be no principled answers to these questions about the persistence of animals. But criterialism is a majority view,

and it may be helpful to explore animalist variations that are compatible with it. In the remainder of this article, I will trace three paths forward, three possible replies to these questions, each in the form of a brief speech.

Path 1 Psychological animalism We are animals. But we are not just any animals. We are *rational* animals; a specification of our nature must involve our capacity to think. And so our criteria of identity over time involve our capacities for thought and the particularities of our mental lives. Accordingly, we last over time just in the case that our capacity for thought is maintained and our mental lives maintain sufficient continuity over time. Proponents of ‘psychological’ accounts of personal identity over time were correct about the criteria but wrong insofar as they thought those criteria were incompatible with animalism. What they should have said is not that animalism is false but rather that the animals to which we are identical (perhaps surprisingly and perhaps unlike non-human animals) have psychological criteria of identity over time. We may apply the view with pleasing results. For example, since the resulting creature in the cerebrum transplant case has sufficient psychological continuity with you, you *are* the resulting creature, even though the case involves disruption of purely animal biological processes.<sup>38</sup>

Path 2 Disjunctive animalism We are indeed animals, and we are rational animals. Any good account of our criteria of identity over time must take both our animality *and* our rationality into account. The correct way to do this is to posit *disjunctive* criteria of identity over time. We last if and only if *either* sufficient biological continuity is maintained *or* sufficient psychological continuity is maintained. This hybrid or disjunctive view correctly incorporates insights from the Biological Approach and insights from purely psychological approaches – it is thus a middle way between two extremes. And it is fully compatible with the view that we are animals. We are simply animals of a special kind, a kind that has disjunctive criteria of identity over time.<sup>39</sup>

Path 3 Protean animalism We are animals of a special kind. What sets us apart from other items in nature (and perhaps from other animals) is our ability to project our identities and interests into the future. Indeed, our criteria of identity over time are *constituted* by the projections we make or our disposed to make. The mistake made by both psychological and biological theorists about our identity over time is this: they are in search of objective, mind-independent criteria. But our criteria are not mind-independent. They instead crucially depend on *our* minds and our dispositions to identify with or take interest in future creatures. We are *sometimes* inclined to make such identifications or take such interests along biological lines, and we are *sometimes* inclined to do so along psychological lines; so the criteria governing our identity over time are similarly flexible. This much the Disjunctive Animalist gets right. But were we to, instead, be inclined to *only* identify with creatures who were psychologically continuous with us in some strict sense, well, then our criteria of identity over time would be strictly psychological. In this way, though we are identical to animals, the animals to which we are identical are protean and capable of taking on a great many forms organic or otherwise.<sup>40</sup>

There’s much to be said about the three paths described above. Each will face pointed questions, for example, about what happens to the human animals we are when we die or when our cerebrum are removed or transplanted, in addition to the usual puzzles about fission and fusion. Any final theoretical reckoning must tackle these and related questions.

Animalists and non-animalists alike, it seems, have plenty to think about. Their animals may have some thinking to do too.



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## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Recent defenses of animalism include Árnadóttir (2013), Bailey (2014, 2015), Ayers (1991), Belshaw (2010), Blatti (2007b, 2012), Hershenov (2001), Licon (2012, 2013, 2014), Liao (2006, 2010), Mackie (1999a, 1999b), Merricks (2001b), Olson (1997b, 2002c, 2004, 2007b, 2008, 2009, 2014, forthcoming), Snowdon (1990, 1995, 1996, 2003, 2014a, 2014b), Toner (2011, 2014), van Inwagen (1990), and Yang (2013, 2015). Blatti (2014) surveys arguments for and against. Johansson (2007) and Toner (2011a) discuss how to best formulate animalism.

<sup>2</sup> For a helpful treatment of something's being *necessarily* F versus its being *essentially* F, see Fine (1994).

<sup>3</sup> For more on animals and their distinctive features, see Tollefson (2007), sections I–II.

<sup>4</sup> There are yet other dimensions along which to divide animalists. For a helpful taxonomy and guide to such dimensions, see Thornton (MS 2).

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, Bailey (2014): 475.

<sup>6</sup> Toner (2014) reserves 'Latter-Day Animalism' for contemporary non-hylomorphic forms of animalism. But note: what really unites the figures Toner has in mind (Merricks, Olson, and van Inwagen) is not their rejection of hylomorphism (Merricks, for example, doesn't say a word about form and matter). It is instead their allegiance to materialism about animals.

<sup>7</sup> It is unclear whether Aristotle himself thought we were wholly material or not, but many contemporary hylomorphic theorists, at least, classify their view as a kind of non-materialist animalism. Toner (2011a) offers a clear and accessible presentation of hylomorphic animalism. See also Hershenov (2008, 2011), Oderberg (2005), and Toner (2011b, 2014). For helpful discussion of hylomorphic animalism and its bearing on questions about life after death, see Thornton (MS 1), Van Dyke (2007, 2009, 2012). For more on contemporary hylomorphism, see Brower (2010, 2014), Fine (1999), Jaworski (2014), Johnston (2006), Koslicki (2008), Oderberg (2007), and Rea (2011).

<sup>8</sup> Olson (1997b): 16.

<sup>9</sup> It is sometimes unclear whether Olson takes the Biological Approach to be about what it takes for *us* to last over time or what it takes for *human animals* to last over time. I will exclusively use 'the Biological Approach' in the latter sense.

<sup>10</sup> It is unclear how animalism relates to the so-called 'bodily criterion of personal identity', because it is unclear whether there is such a criterion or what human bodies are supposed to be. See Johnston (2006), Long (1964), Montero (1999), Thomson (2008), Tye (1980), and especially Olson (2006) and van Inwagen (1980).

<sup>11</sup> One exception is Snowdon (2014a), 172: 'All animalism tells us is that our persistence conditions are the same as those of the animal we are, since those things are the self-same thing. We get from this claim a theory of our persistence conditions only if we can articulate a theory of animal persistence and apply it to ourselves (or a theory for animals of the kind we are). But clearly there are disagreements about animal persistence, just as there about personal persistence. If this is correct, we can also see that it is a mistake in debates about animalism to assume that the views on animal persistence that are often accepted by animalists are themselves definitive of animalism'.

<sup>12</sup> Merricks (1998). See also Duncan (2014), Olson (forthcoming), Pruss (2012), and Zimmerman (1998).

<sup>13</sup> Árnadóttir (2010), Baker (2000): 207–208, Belshaw (2010), Feldman (2000): Ch. 6 and (2000), Hershenov (2001), Olson (2004), and Shoemaker (1999a, 1999b).

<sup>14</sup> For more on generics, see Leslie (2008), (2012).

<sup>15</sup> Many philosophers endorse either moderate or pure dualism. Which disjunct they opt for is not always clear. See Barnett (2010), Braine (1992), Foster (1991), Hart (1988), Hasker (1999, 2010), Meixner (2004, 2010), Nida-Rümelin (2010, 2013), Plantinga (2006, 2007), Popper and Eccles (1977), Taliadro (1995, 1997), Unger (2004, 2006), Warner (1994), and Zimmerman (1991, 2010, 2011). See also all the papers in Smythies and Beloff (1989) and Baker and Goetz (2011).

- <sup>16</sup> Lowe (2010) and Meixner (2010): 436–437. I call this version of dualism ‘moderate’ because it allows that we in fact have physical properties like extension in at least some sense. For helpful discussion of Lowe’s moderate dualism, see Olson (1998a).
- <sup>17</sup> Swinburne (1997): 145.
- <sup>18</sup> Baker (2000), Corcoran (1998, 1999, 2006), Johnston (1987, 2007), and Shoemaker (2008).
- <sup>19</sup> Brainists include McMahan (2002): 88–94, Parfit (2012), Searle (1983): 230, and Tye (2003): 142. Cagey endorsements of brainism can be found in Nagel (1986): 40–41 and Persson (1999): 521–533. Puccetti (1973) says we are each cerebral hemispheres. For further discussion, see Burwood (2009), and Hershenov (2005a).
- <sup>20</sup> Hudson (2001). For a similar view according to which we are sums of psychologically continuous temporal parts of organisms (but distinct from those organisms), see Lewis (1976), Perry (1976), and the essays in Perry (2002).
- <sup>21</sup> On personal nihilism, see Stone (1988, 2005) and Unger (1979a, 1979b).
- <sup>22</sup> See Olson (1997, 2002, 2003, 2007) and Snowdon (1990). Ayers (1991) and Carter (1988, 1989) defend closely related arguments. For critical discussion, see Blatti (2014), section 3.2, Markosian (2008), Noonan (1998, 2001, 2010, 2012), Sutton (2014), Yang (2015), and Zimmerman (2008).
- <sup>23</sup> See Brueckner and Buford (2009) and Yang (2013).
- <sup>24</sup> Blatti (2012). For critical discussion, see Gillett (2013).
- <sup>25</sup> Daly and Liggins (2013).
- <sup>26</sup> Precursors to the argument articulated here, each of which emphasizes the simple intuitive appeal of animalism or views in the neighborhood, can be found in Hershenov (2005a): 31, Kaczor (2010): 4–5, Merricks (2001): 85–86, Murray and Rea (2009): 264, Olson (1997): 95–97, Snowdon (2014), Chapter 4, Taylor (1997): 46, van Inwagen (2007): 246–247, and especially Licon (2014).
- <sup>27</sup> Evidence and Conclusion require qualification; perhaps a *ceteris paribus* clause will do.
- <sup>28</sup> Snowdon (2014b): 81.
- <sup>29</sup> See Baker (2000, 2007), and Shoemaker (2008).
- <sup>30</sup> For a helpful taxonomy of and replies to a host of such ‘disassociation’ cases, see Snowdon (2003, 2014), Chapters 6–11.
- <sup>31</sup> Aptly characterized by Olson (2002): ‘The usual practice is to start with a question such as what our identity over time consists in, and canvass our opinions about a range of fictional ‘test cases’ (is it the same person?). The view that does best by those opinions is then taken to answer the question’. See also Hudson (2007): 217.
- <sup>32</sup> See, for example, Blatti (2014), Section 1, who notes that ‘animalism’ has often been treated as interchangeable with the ‘biological criterion’ or ‘the biological approach’. In the same article, Blatti seems to endorse the identification of animalism with the Biological Approach: ‘It is precisely our capacity for thought that animalists deny is essential to us; on the contrary, animalists say, each of us was once a non-thinking fetus and each of us may yet become a non-thinking persistent-vegetative-state patient’. See also Parfit (2012): 12, who seems to treat the Biological Approach as an obvious consequence of animalism: ‘When Animalists entered this debate, their main claim was that such psychological criteria of identity are seriously mistaken, because we are human animals, so that our criterion of identity must be biological’.
- <sup>33</sup> See, for example, Gendler (2002), Johnston (1987), van Inwagen (1997), Wilkes (1988), and Snowdon (2014), Chapters 6–11.
- <sup>34</sup> For an interesting exchange concerning the role of the brainstem in cases like this, see Olson (forthcoming c) and Tzinman (forthcoming); see also Belshaw (2010).
- <sup>35</sup> For arguments along these lines, see Duncan (forthcoming), Johnston (2007), Parfit (2012), and Shoemaker (2008).
- <sup>36</sup> See, for example, Olson (1997b): 7ff and 42ff.
- <sup>37</sup> For intriguing and probing discussion of something like this flipped argument and related issues, see Madden (MS), especially pp. 38–40.
- <sup>38</sup> For an innovative and interesting development and defense of a view in this neighborhood (‘Psychologically Serious Animalism’), see Sharpe (2015). For critical discussion, see Olson (1997b): 109–11.
- <sup>39</sup> Disjunctive animalism is inspired by Langford (2014). Langford thinks that his disjunctive view about our criteria of identity over time suggests that our nature is to be bio-psycho-continuers. Absent allegiance to the Biological Approach, though, it’s unclear why Langford’s criteria – and some of his arguments for and defenses of those criteria – cannot be adopted within an animalist framework too.
- <sup>40</sup> Protean animalism is inspired by Johnston (2010); Johnston takes his ‘protean’ view to be incompatible with animalism. But once allegiance to the Biological Approach is dropped, this alleged incompatibility simply doesn’t seem to hold. For extensive citations to and probing critique of views in the neighborhood, see Olson (1997d) and Merricks (2001). See also Schechtman (2014b).

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