idea, although popular, signals most often a retreat from the challenge of metaphor. To address it, the combination of great subtlety and deviance, metaphorical content needs to be relocated: the use of the term ‘metaphor’ must be related to our situational sense-making activities, viewed as an elliptical expression for the activity. If we accept the reconceptualization process as involved in the purpose-related derivation of a metaphorical content, it can still be claimed that the product of this process, the content, is logically posterior to it. In fact, there is nothing metaphorical about the content itself. To overcome and explain the challenge (deviance and subtlety) of metaphor as a legitimate language game, the theory of metaphor must use the situational and interactive sense-making activity as a basic and inevitable component. In closing, in spite of my reservation on the cogency of its central position on the ‘location-problem’, Nogales’s book is a valuable contribution to the contemporary philosophical debate about the role of metaphor.

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Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will is a systematic development and defence of a particular kind of libertarian, agent-causal view of free action and moral responsibility. It builds upon and extends Timothy O’Connor’s previous influential and provocative work on these subjects. Agent-causal views are frequently thought to be mysterious, and even their most visible recent proponents, such as Roderick Chisholm and Richard Taylor, seem to have distanced themselves from the view in their later work. But in part because of the work of Timothy O’Connor (as well as Randolph Clarke), agent-causation is again centre-stage as an important libertarian strategy.

In Chapter 1 O’Connor defends the ideas that moral responsibility requires the sort of freedom that involves alternative possibilities, and that causal determinism’s truth would rule out such freedom. To defend the first claim, O’Connor discusses Frankfurt’s examples (which come originally from John Locke) in which it appears that an agent is morally responsible for some behaviour which he could not have avoided. He offers various considerations against this conclusion, which I shall not discuss here. (I discuss O’Connor’s views in ‘Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Agent-Causation: A Reply to O’Connor’, manuscript, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside.)
In defence of the second claim—that causal determinism is incompatible with the sort of freedom that involves alternative possibilities—O'Connor considers the 'modal' argument for incompatibilism. The modal argument employs a 'transfer of powerlessness' principle such as this: If S cannot so act that P would be false, and S cannot so act that 'If P, then Q' would be false, then S cannot so act that Q would be false. (This is only one version of the relevant sort of modal principle.) O'Connor argues that although various interpretations of the modal principle do not issue in its validity, there is an interpretation of the principle which makes it valid (pp. 13–14). Further, he notes that, on the pertinent interpretation of its constituents, one can construct a sound argument for the conclusion that causal determinism rules out freedom (in the sense that involves alternative possibilities) without employing a modal (or 'transfer of powerlessness') principle (pp. 14–15).

In Chapter 2 O'Connor discusses various indeterministic accounts of freedom and responsibility, such as those of Ginet, Nozick, McCall, and Kane. Ginet does not require a causal link between prior states of the agent and his volitions, and thus O'Connor concludes that, on Ginet’s account, an agent may not have control of the volition. Although the other theorists are willing to countenance indeterministic causation of the volition or choice by subsequent states of the agent, O'Connor insists that this is not sufficient to secure the sort of control that is linked to moral responsibility. What is required, according to O'Connor, are the distinctive ontological resources of agent-causation.

Having criticized more traditional agent-causal theories—offered by Reid, Chisholm, and Taylor—in Chapter 3, O’Connor lays out the elements of his agent-causal theory in Chapter 4. On O’Connor’s account, causation is understood in a ‘realist, non-reductive’ fashion. That is, causation is taken to be a real relation in the world that cannot be reduced to (for example) facts about constant conjunction or counterfactuals. In a case of agent-causation, we have a species of the same relation of causation as relates events; the difference is that the first relatum is an agent, rather than an event. Further, agent-causation is a different species of the genus, causation, because it cannot be understood (as event-causation can) as a function directly from circumstances to an effect. Rather, having the properties that ground an agent-causal capacity enables the agent freely to determine an effect (within a certain range). What is directly agent-caused, on O’Connor’s account, is an ‘immediately executive intention’, and the agent’s act of causing this intention is (by its very nature) an uncaused event. (O’Connor thus disagrees with Taylor’s view, according to which the agent-causal event—the agent’s causing the effect in question—can be caused (pp. 49–55).)

If the agent-causal event cannot be caused, and the states of having various reasons do not, as events, cause the agent’s decision (or the formation of an immediately executive intention), the problem arises of how to explain the relationship between the agent’s reasons and his decision (and subsequent
Surely we think that an agent (who is free and morally responsible) should be understood as acting on the basis of his reasons, and what can this mean, if the relationship in question is not to be understood causally?

O'Connor gives a noncausal account of the relationship between reasons and the decision; the account employs materials developed in previous work by George Wilson and Carl Ginet. On this account, roughly speaking (and oversimplifying somewhat), the agent acts while having a certain desire and believing of his action that it will (best) satisfy that desire. Having the desire does not cause the formation of the relevant intention; rather, the agent has a de re belief that his action will (best) satisfy the desire, and the action is ‘initiated (in part) by (the agent’s) own self-determining causal activity, the event component of which is the-coming-to-be-of-an-action-triggering-intention-to-so-act-here-and-now...’ (p. 94). O'Connor believes that reasons do not cause actions, but they are ‘structuring conditions on purposive action’ (p. 95). O'Connor thinks that reasons structure purposive action in the sense that they give agents a certain objective, but indeterministic propensity to generate a certain sort of intention in given situations (p. 97).

Finally, in Chapter 6 O’Connor explores the relationship between his account of agent-causation and views about the mind (and metaphysics). He here disputes the assumption of many ‘naturalists’ that agent-causation is inconsistent with the ‘emerging scientific picture of the world’. O’Connor distinguishes the plausible claim that macrophysical phenomena arise out of and are causally sustained by microphysical phenomena from the more contentious principle that all higher level phenomena are constituted by more fundamental, lower-level phenomena. It is important for O'Connor to argue against the latter claim (the ‘Constitution Thesis’), because if it were true, ‘it (would be) simply an illusion that I (a macrophysical object) am freely and directly controlling the course that my process of deliberation takes. The direct action all takes place “down below”’ (p. 109). O'Connor rejects the Constitution Thesis, arguing for a kind of ‘emergentist’ metaphysics, which allows for ‘top-down causation’ by an agent.

There are various points in the book where I find O'Connor’s discussion highly suggestive but nevertheless not completely satisfying. One of the central criticisms of agent-causation was originally developed by C. D. Broad and recently defended by Carl Ginet. On the agent-causal picture, an agent is alleged (sometimes) to stand in the causal relation to an event; on O'Connor's approach, this event is an immediately executive intention. Suppose that the immediately executive intention e is formed at time t. It seems utterly mysterious how a continuant—an individual who exists over a longish duration of time (say, eighty years)—can cause an event to occur at a particular time t; what seems to be required is a change in the continuant, or a state of the continuant, which would be some sort of event. Alternatively, it seems mysterious how invocation of a continuant, rather than a change in or state of that continuant, can explain the timing of the formation of the intention, i.e., that the
intention gets formed specifically at time \( t \). This problem about the time of the intention, or some version of it, has caused many philosophers to doubt the coherence of agent-causation.

O'Connor has an intriguing reply to this problem. The first and crucial step in his reply is to distinguish a concrete event \( e \) which occurs at \( t \) from the fact that \( e \) occurs at \( t \) rather than some other time \( t_1 \). O'Connor contends that there is no concrete event of \( e \)'s occurring at \( t \) rather than \( t_1 \), and hence that there is no need for an explanation of such an event. As he puts it, 'There is no reason to hold that corresponding to every contrastive fact about a contingent occurrence there is a distinct "contrastive event", where an event is understood to be a concrete entity' (p. 76). O'Connor claims that invocation of the agent can indeed (help to) explain why the concrete event \( e \) occurs at \( t \), and further that the agent-causationist is in no worse position with regard to explaining the contrastive fact than the proponent of event-causation. (To support the latter contention, O'Connor adverts to certain phenomena from quantum mechanics.)

For my purposes, the important point is O'Connor’s distinction between the concrete event of \( e \)'s occurring at \( t \) and the contrastive fact that \( e \) occurs at \( t \) rather than \( t_1 \), and his contention that invocation of the agent can help to explain the concrete event, even if it cannot explain the contrastive fact. The suggestion seems to be that those who worry about the timing problem are failing properly to distinguish the concrete event from the contrastive fact, or perhaps they are mistakenly thinking that there can be contrastive concrete events. But whereas I accept the distinction between the concrete event and the contrastive fact (and, for the sake of argument, the contention that there are no concrete contrastive events), I do not believe that the timing worry issues from failing to make the distinction in the relevant context (or from some other sort of mistake). I do not conflate the concrete event with the contrastive fact, nor must I believe that there are contrastive concrete events. Nevertheless, I do not see how a continuant, rather than a change in or state of that continuant, can be the cause of the concrete event of \( e \)'s occurring at \( t \). In my view, this problem is the most pressing difficulty with agent-causation, and O'Connor does not, in the end, assuage the worry.

Another problem. O'Connor criticizes Ginet for allowing that there can be control of a volition, absent a causal relation between prior mental states (reasons, let us say) and the volition. On O'Connor’s view, however, although the volition (or ‘immediately executive intention’) is caused (by the agent), the agent’s causing this intention, the ‘agent-causal event’, is not itself caused. So Ginet worries that, on O'Connor’s own view (according to which there is no control without causation), there is no control of the agent causal event. In reply, O'Connor points out that there is a structure to this event which is not present in Ginet's volition, and further that phenomenological features of the volition are not sufficient to secure control (p. 59).

But I don’t see how these ruminations address the worry. Granted, phe-
nomenological features (the 'actish quality') are not sufficient to secure control. That is admittedly a problem for Ginet’s view, but then the problem for O’Connor’s remains. And the mere fact of structure would help to explain how on O’Connor’s view (but not Ginet’s) there can be control of the volition (or immediately executive intention); but this does not, as far as I can see, entail that there is control of the agent-causal event itself (the agent’s causing that intention). But isn’t this what Ginet is worried about in his ‘tu quoque’ argument? And isn’t it reasonable to worry about this? (That is, isn’t it reasonable to worry about it, given what O’Connor has said about Ginet’s view, and O’Connor’s contention that there is no control without causation?)

O’Connor argues that, by its very nature, the agent-causal event cannot be caused. He concludes that it is pointless to ‘raise the question’ of what causes it. But why not also (or instead) conclude that by its very nature it cannot be controlled? Isn’t this absence of control a problem at this point? Don’t we want to control our causings of our volitions? Perhaps O’Connor would say that, as long as the agent controls the formation of the immediately executive intention, it does not matter that he fails to control his causing of that immediately executive intention. But he does not explicitly say this, and it is not obvious that this does not matter.

There are other places where I would have benefited from more elaboration. For example, on O’Connor’s view, an emergent property (very roughly speaking) ‘adds something’ distinctive to the properties of an object—something not already contained in the microproperties of the object. But it is also the case, on O’Connor’s view, that an emergent property is a necessary consequence of certain base-level properties. Now an obvious and important problem arises: why not simply dispense with the emergent properties, and simply employ the base-level properties, because the potentialities of the emergent properties are just those of the base-level properties ‘at one remove?’ (p. 112).

I find O’Connor’s reply to this objection surprisingly quick. He seems to suggest that there are essentially pragmatic reasons not to dispense with the emergent properties—reasons of simplicity in our explanations, and so forth. Perhaps his view does not depend in the end on merely pragmatic considerations, but O’Connor’s defence of emergent properties here is quite compressed. A rather important point is here treated a bit too breezily in the text, with substantive argumentation relegated to a footnote.

Also, the discussion of emergent properties proceeds at a somewhat dizzying level of abstraction. It would have been useful to have been presented with some examples of emergent properties that are not as contentious as ‘free will’ and ‘consciousness’. Indeed, I did not notice that O’Connor offered any other examples of emergent properties. Would it not be odd if free will and consciousness were the only emergent properties?

Despite my impression that some crucial points went by surprisingly quickly, I have considerable admiration for this book. (It is, I suppose, at least
in part a good thing that I was left at various points with the desire that the author have said more; I sometimes have quite the opposite reaction!) The book is intelligent throughout. O'Connor is unafraid to defend an unfashionable view, and to do it in a bold and imaginative way.

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David Oderberg's Moral Theory defends inviolable rights, the principle of double effect, a significant distinction between acts and omissions, and the sanctity of human life. A companion volume, Applied Ethics, applies this theory. Oderberg aims to present a (much-needed) alternative to works such as Singer's Practical Ethics.

Chapter One replies to sceptical worries about morality. Scepticism based on an alleged fact-value gap relies on a question-begging view of reality. Relativism fails because the relativist, who claims that 'x is wrong' means 'I disapprove of x', can neither explain disapproval without invoking the notion of wrongness nor explain judgements such as 'x is permissible'. Non-cognitivism fails because it cannot capture moral inferences involving unasserted contexts. Free will is assumed and so hard determinism is ruled out. These arguments (or assumptions) are presented confidently, although those sympathetic to the worries have familiar responses.

Chapter Two begins the presentation of Oderberg's theory. The good is the central notion; x's good is what fulfils x's nature. For humans, life, knowledge, social living, work and play, the appreciation of beauty, and religious belief and practice are goods. Rights are inviolable claims against others to things needed for one's good. (Since rights are inviolable, neither consequentialists nor Ross can capture them.) Any apparent conflict of rights is to be handled by invoking principles such as 'it is always permissible to sacrifice a part to save the whole (individual)' or 'the moral law takes precedence over (merely) positive law' or 'the more important, urgent or necessary law prevails' (78–81).

This is unconvincing.

(i) Oderberg uncritically invokes 'natural appetites or 'proper end(s)' (37, 86). He writes of 'the moral law which is imposed on human beings for the fulfilment of their nature' or 'perversion(s) of rational being's nature' (83, 181). 'Happiness is ... a state of a person caused by that person's living ... in accordance with his nature as a human being' (159). Consequentialism is 'fundamentally inhuman' (x). He ignores the long tradition of worries about the normative force of appeals to our natures (such as Mill's 'Nature'). He also