desire—though not one in the wide sense. Schueler shows that there is a sense of the term ‘desire’ such that one can act without a desire. But this does not show that there is no sense of the term for which it is both true and nontrivial that action only occurs via the operation of a desire. Thus, it is not at all clear that the Humean must choose between the wide sense of ‘desire’ and Schueler’s “desires proper.” Certainly there is logical space for the Humean to construct a concept of desire on which it is both true and nonanalytic that all actions are the result of desires. The Humean might then go on to claim that all reasons come from this kind of desire.

Although I do not think that Schueler’s book is as devastating to Humeanism as he thinks, it certainly is among the most sophisticated and sustained attacks on the Humean position currently available. Indeed, it is far too rich and complex to do it justice in a short review. Schueler has many useful things to say about the taxonomy of desires, the place of desire in practical reasoning, the practical syllogism, the relation between explanatory and justificatory reasons, and the nature of belief-desire explanation. Particularly interesting is his claim that in many contemporary Humean theories one’s beliefs about one’s desires—rather than the desires themselves—seem to be doing the real work in explaining action. And he offers detailed and useful commentary on much of the contemporary literature relevant to the Humean-Anti-Humean controversy, including work by Alvin Goldman, Daniel Dennett, Bernard Williams, Donald Davidson, Stephen Schiffer, Mark Platt, Fred Dretske, Michael Smith, Philip Pettit, and Thomas Nagel. While I recommend caution about Schueler’s anti-Humean conclusions, I certainly do recommend reading his book.

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This careful and thoughtful book seeks to defend the compatibility of causal determinism with moral responsibility. Wallace begins by giving an account of the stance of holding another (or oneself) morally responsible. In light of this account, he goes on to ask what kinds of agents are appropriately held responsible. He argues that the best way to pursue this question is to ask what kinds of agents are fairly held morally responsible. Wallace contends that the incompatibilist’s basic point is that it is unfair to hold an agent morally responsible unless he possesses “strong freedom of the will,” which involves “the availability of a range of alternate possibilities, holding fixed the laws of nature and the facts about the past” (p. 3). Wallace rejects this contention. He argues that we can explain why we withhold ascriptions of moral responsibility without appealing to the principle that moral responsibility requires strong freedom of the will (and thus alternative possibilities, robustly understood). Wallace presents a systematic explanation of our practice of exempting and excusing agents from moral responsibility, and he points out that this explana-
tion does not imply that causal determinism is inconsistent with moral responsibility.

I shall now go through the overall argument in slightly more detail. Wallace gives a highly nuanced characterization of the stance of holding people morally responsible. Here he builds on the work of P. F. Strawson (in Strawson's landmark essay, "Freedom and Resentment"). Wallace contends that holding people morally responsible involves being susceptible to the "reactive emotions" in dealing with them. But Wallace characterizes these reactive emotions more narrowly than does Strawson. Whereas Strawson thinks of these attitudes as the wide array of emotions involved in interpersonal relations, Wallace limits them to resentment, indignation, and guilt. Wallace claims that his narrower construal of the reactive attitudes is preferable to the wider Strawsonian construal because only on the narrower construal can one understand how these emotions "hang together as a class" (p. 12). More specifically, Wallace argues that the attitudes of resentment, indignation, and guilt are linked by related propositional objects: episodes of guilt, resentment, and indignation are all caused by the belief that an expectation to which one holds a person has been breached. And these expectations have a moral character: "the reactive attitudes are explained exclusively by beliefs about the violation of moral obligations (construed as strict prohibitions or requirements), whereas other moral sentiments are explained by beliefs about the various modalities of moral value" (p. 38).

Holding someone responsible, then, is understood in terms of "susceptibility" to the reactive emotions (so understood). But Wallace's account does not strictly require that one actually have the reactive emotion to hold someone responsible. Rather, holding someone responsible involves the belief that the person's commission of a moral wrong would make a reactive attitude appropriate (p. 83). Not only does the stance of holding someone morally responsible include a susceptibility to the reactive emotions, but it also typically involves the application of moral sanctions which serve to express these emotions.

But how is being responsible related to the stance of holding someone responsible? Wallace contends that an agent is morally responsible insofar as it is fair to hold him morally responsible. Thus, it is crucial to engage in what Wallace describes as a normative inquiry into the conditions of the fairness of the adoption of the stance of holding someone morally responsible.

In order better to understand the circumstances in which we hold people responsible, Wallace considers our practices of excusing agents and also exempting them from responsibility. When we excuse an agent, we are saying that, although he is a morally responsible agent (and thus can in principle be held accountable for his behavior), he is not appropriately held responsible in a particular context. When we exempt an agent from responsibility, this is a more global judgment: we are saying that the agent does not have the general characteristics in virtue of which he can be held accountable for any of his behavior. Wallace will argue that neither the correct account of excuses nor the correct account of exemptions implies that causal determinism rules out moral responsibility.

In canvassing the various sorts of situations in which we would be inclined to excuse a person, it is tempting to suppose that they can be systematized by the principle that an agent cannot be held morally responsible unless he has
alternative possibilities available to him. But Wallace argues that a different explanation of the excuses is available—one that more adequately explains the force of excuses over a broad range of cases. According to this approach, excuses serve to show that an agent has not really done anything morally wrong; that is, they show that an agent has not intentionally violated some moral requirement that we accept (p. 127). And it is surely unfair to blame someone if he has not done anything wrong in the first place (p. 135). Wallace argues that all of our concrete judgments of excuse can be accounted for in this way, insofar as “the accepted excuses all indicate the absence of a culpable choice” (p. 149). Wallace says, “Excuses function not by defeating the freedom of our choices, but by indicating the absence of an ordinary choice whose content violates the moral obligations to which we are held” (p. 149). But, if this is the way excuses function, there is no reason to think causal determinism, in itself, rules out moral responsibility.

Wallace further contends that we exempt agents from responsibility when they don’t possess certain general capacities: the capacities to grasp moral reasons and control behavior in light of them. These capacities—the powers of “reflective self-control”—give the agent a certain kind of “normative competence” (p. 162). Wallace argues that our inclinations to exempt agents from moral responsibility are best explained by reference to the lack of the powers of reflective self-control. But insofar as an agent need not actually have the opportunity to exercise these powers, in order to be a morally responsible agent, causal determinism (in itself) need not rule out morally responsible agency (pp. 154–94).

Perhaps the greatest strength of this admirable book is its detailed, subtle, and nuanced account of the stance of holding someone morally responsible. Further, Wallace’s compatibilistic account of the excuses and exemptions is insightful and highly suggestive. The book is elegantly written, and it repays careful study.

In the very limited space I have, I do wish to raise a question. Let us suppose that a motive, or perhaps a value, is produced in an agent via direct electronic stimulation of his brain. Imagine, for example, that a particular value, different from the agent’s previous value, together with a disinclination to reflect on it in the short term, is electronically “implanted” in an agent, and that the agent performs some morally wrong act as a result. Of course, this is a very abstract and brief description of the case, and such cases are controversial in various ways. But it at least seems to me that this kind of case presents a prima facie problem for Wallace’s approach to excuses. This is because the agent (arguably) intentionally does something morally wrong—and thus, presumably, evinces a morally objectionable choice of some sort—and yet he also appears not to be morally responsible for his behavior (in the short term, at least).

Wallace says the following about this sort of case:

The imaginary cases must involve more than the mere implantation of a motive in the agent’s psyche—that alone would no more undermine responsibility than the influence of (say) television or peer pressure on the genesis of our desires. The imaginary cases must therefore be ones in which some further factor is present, and this factor seems to be that the implanted motive is supposed to lead to action in a way that
Wallace thus treats such “imaginary cases” on the model of exemptions, rather than excuses; they involve, as it were, temporary or “local” exemptions. On his approach, if the cases involve the implantation of motives without impairing the agent’s powers of reflective self-control, the agent can be held responsible. But if the cases involve impairment of the powers of reflective self-control, the agent is (temporarily) exempted from moral responsibility.

But in the case I briefly described above, there need be no impairment of the powers of reflective self-control. I suggested that a certain value (and perhaps an associated desire or motive), together with a short-term disinclination to engage in reflection, might be implanted in an agent. If so, it would appear to me that (in the short term) we would not hold him morally responsible for the behavior that results from the stimulation of his brain, although it is neither the case that he fails to exhibit a morally objectionable choice in his actions nor that his general powers of reflective control are impaired. What is implanted are certain inputs to his reflective capacities, but this does not imply any sort of impairment of those capacities.

Wallace also suggests that he might handle the sort of case I have proposed along the lines of his treatment of hypnosis, which he describes as a kind of disengagement of the powers of reflective self-control (pp. 175, 198). But if disengagement is merely separation or lack of access—and not impairment—then clearly Wallace cannot claim that disengagement, in itself, implies lack of moral responsibility. This is because a crucial element of Wallace’s compatibilistic view is that morally responsible agency simply requires certain general powers and not the opportunity to exercise them (i.e., access to those powers). Indeed, this raises a quite pressing question for Wallace: if he treats hypnosis as a responsibility-undermining disengagement from the powers of reflective self-control, then why shouldn’t he also say that any agent who acts unreflectively in a deterministic world is not morally responsible? After all, he has conceded that it is plausible that determinism would imply that such an agent would not be able to exercise his general powers of reflective self-control. Why isn’t this disengagement of the same sort putatively involved in hypnotism?

I agree with Wallace’s view that moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities. But, in addition to skepticism about his account of exemptions, I disagree with his further claim that we can explain excuses solely in terms of the failure to display morally objectionable choices. In the imaginary case sketched above, it seems to me that there are features of the history of the behavior—aspects of the electronic stimulation of the agent’s brain—that show that the agent did not possess the kind of control of his behavior that grounds moral responsibility. Whereas this sort of control need not imply the possession of alternative possibilities, it does require that the history of the relevant behavior be of a certain sort.

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