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Wilson begins by defending a version of Davidson’s claim that the logical form of action sentences involves quantification over events. This argument is interesting insofar as it is different from the usual arguments from adverbial modification. Wilson asks us to consider

1) Bill turned on the light.

and

2) The movement of Bill’s hand turned on the light.

It seems that the form of words ‘turned on the light’ has the same sense in (1) and (2), and yet it also may seem that ‘turned on the light’ says some-
thing different of Bill than of the movement of his hand. In order to solve
this puzzle, Wilson focuses on a large class of verb phrases which he calls
‘Agent to Event (A-E) reducible’. A verb phrase (to $\Phi$) is directly A-E reduc-
ible, according to Wilson, just in case it exemplifies the pattern:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Ag (the agent)} & \text{ is } \Phi \text{ing } \leftrightarrow \text{Ag is performing an acting which is } \Phi \text{ing.} \\
\text{Ag } \Phi \text{d } & \leftrightarrow \text{ performed an action which } \Phi \text{d.} \\
\text{Ag will } \Phi & \leftrightarrow \text{Ag will perform an action which will } \Phi \text{ (p. 22).}
\end{align*}
\]

A verb phrase is indirectly A-E reducible if and only if it exemplifies a
related pattern (p. 25).

The verb phrase ‘turned on the light’ is A-E reducible:

1) Bill turned on the light.

is equivalent to

3) Bill performed an action which turned on the light.

If this equivalence holds, the puzzle can be resolved as follows. The intu-
itive difference in sense is captured since ‘turned on the light’ in (1) means
something like, ‘performed an act which caused the light to turn on’,
whereas ‘turned on the light’ in (2) means something like, ‘caused the light
to turn on’ (p. 23). The intuitive sameness of sense is explained by the
claim that (3) is the ‘underlying form’ or proper analysis of (1); at the level
underlying (1), ‘turned on the light’ occurs in just the same way as in (2)—
it is a predicate applicable to events.

With A-E reducible verb phrases, ‘Ag $\Phi$d’ is equivalent to ‘Ag per-
formed an act which $\Phi$d’. And, Wilson argues, the form of this latter statement is

\[4) (\exists e) (\text{Ag performed } e \& e \Phi \text{d}).\]

But of course (4) is merely a modified version of the Davidsonian account
of action-sentences (p. 28). Wilson seeks to defend this sort of approach to
action sentences against Judith Thomson’s arguments that ‘perform’
doesn’t bear the sort of relation to the concept of ‘action’ presupposed by
(4) (Chapter III).

There is a broad sense of ‘performing an act’ in which one can be said to
perform an involuntary act of sneezing (p. 82). But, as Wilson points out,
philosophers have generally been interested in a more full-blooded sense
of action—a sense in which action is contrasted with ‘mere behavior’. (Wilson
uses ‘act’ and ‘action’ for the minimal notion, and ‘Act’ and ‘Ac-
tion' for the full-blooded concept.) Wilson addresses the difficult question of what one has to 'add' to action to get Action. Wilson attacks 'causalist' approaches to answering this question—the approaches which contend that Action is action caused in the right sort of way by intentional states (desires and beliefs, 'pro-attitudes', intentions, volitions, etc.), and he offers a different answer to the question. This answer agrees that Action is intentional, but claims that this intentionality does not arise in virtue of the causation of action by intentional states.

Wilson considers Davidson's account of action. He starts with

\[ D_1 \) b is an Action of Ag's if and only if Ag performed b and b was intentional. \]

Since we need to understand what it is to say de re of an item of behavior that it was intentional, Wilson considers the following Davidsonian development of (D1), where the term '(I)s' is a substitutional quantifier whose substitution class is the class of action predicates:

\[ D_2 \) b is an Action of Ag's if and only if Ag performed b & ( \exists b) ( \Phi b & Ag intentionally \Phi'd) [or, according to Davidson's suggestion, it was intentional of Ag that he \Phi'd]. \]

Wilson presents the following argument that Davidson's suggestion that the form of

5) Ag intentionally \Phi 'd.

is

6) It was intentional of Ag that he \Phi'd.

is unacceptable. In the course of this argument, Wilson introduces his crucial notion of 'act-relational (AR) intention' as indispensible to understanding 'acting intentionally'. Wilson claims that

7) Ag intentionally turned on the light.

entails

8) Ag performed an act intentionally which turned on the light.

and

9) Ag performed an act which was intended to turn on the light.
(but not vice versa). Further, (8) and (9) are logically independent, and all three sentences entail

10) Ag performed an act.

Wilson’s argument is that Davidson’s strategy of parsing (7) as

11) It was intentional of Ag that he turned on the light.

fails to capture the relationships between (7), (8), (9), and (10) in a suitable way (pp. 87–90). That is, if (7) is understood as (11), it is hard to see how (8) and (9) are to be interpreted, using a form such as (11), so as to preserve the intuitive logical relationships. Suppose, for instance, that we parsed (9) as

(9*) ( ∃ e) (Ag performed e & it was intentional of Ag that e turned on the light).

Now if (11) is the form of (7), then ‘it was intentional of Ag that he turned on the light’ must entail that the agent successfully turned on the light. But then (9*) wouldn’t be equivalent to (9).

Taking a cue from (9), Wilson claims that (7) should be understood as

12) ( ∃ e) (Ag performed e & Ag intended e to turn on the light & e turned on the light).

This involves the act-relational (AR) locution

13) Ag intended e to Φ.

An (AR) intention is not a general intention—an intention that the event, whichever one occurs, have a certain property; rather, it is directed toward a particular event. (AR) intention is analogous to de re belief. Wilson argues that through the use of (AR) intention and analyses such as (12), we can capture the relationships among (7), (8), (9), and (10) (p. 90).

Wilson employs the notion of (AR) intention to illuminate a wide variety of issues in the theory of action. His account of Action is

14) b is an Action if and only if Ag performed b and ( ∃ Φ), (Ag intended b to Φ) (p. 92).

Also, Wilson claims that since such forms as
15) Ag Φ’d in order to ψ.
    Ag Φ’d for the purpose of ψ-ing.

tenail

16) Ag intentionally Φ’d.
    Ag intentionally ψ’d,

the notion of (AR) intention will also be crucial to interpreting our *explanation* of action. Thus, (15) can be understood as

17) ( ∃ e) (Ag performed e & Φ e & Ag intended of e that it, by Φ-ing, would promote his ψ-ing).

When explaining actions, in Wilson’s view, the notion of (AR) intention is crucial, and (AR) intention cannot be reduced to causation by prior general intentional states (Chapter VIII). That is, Wilson’s claim is that a form such as

13) Ag intended e to Φ

cannot be analyzed in terms of a general intention about the future; this claim parallels the thesis of the irreducibility of *de re* to *de dicto* belief. Wilson thus elaborates a noncausal, ‘teleological’ model of action explanation (Chapter VII).

Wilson’s argument that (AR) intention is a necessary component of an analysis of ‘acting intentionally’ bears considerable weight in the overall scheme. But I am not convinced by the argument. Even if Wilson is correct that Davidson’s suggestion (‘The Logical Form of Action Sentences’) that the form of

7) Ag intentionally turned on the light.

is

11) It was intentional of Ag that he turned on the light.

fails to capture the logical relationships between such sentences as (7), (8), (9), and (10), it is not clear that we need to adopt Wilson’s parsing of (7) in terms of (AR) intention. Why can’t we adopt an analysis of (7), along Davidsonian lines (‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’), in terms of appropriate causation by pro-attitude and belief pairs? Such an analysis may preserve
the required logical relationships and be at least as plausible an account of (7) as Wilson’s (12).

Consider the following sort of account of (7):

18) ( ∃ e) (Ag performed e & e turned on the light & ((i) Ag had a pro-attitude toward some state of affairs S, (ii) Ag believed that his turning on the light would constitute or promote S, & (iii) this pro-attitude and belief pair caused, in an appropriate way, e.))

With this sort of understanding of (7) and given obvious parallel accounts of the other sentences, it appears that the logical relationships between (7), (8), (9), and (10) are preserved. Thus, it is not clear to me that Wilson’s argument establishes that we need the notion of (AR) intention in order to give an account of acting intentionally (and thus of action explanations).

Of course, (18) has various problems. First, there will be cases in which e turned on the light in a ‘non-standard’ way, and one might deny here that the agent intentionally turned on the light. Wilson discusses similar sorts of examples (pp. 117–118). It is rather unclear what to say about such examples, but it is important to note that, insofar as such examples pose problems for (18), they pose the same sort of problems for Wilson’s (12).

Second, ‘appropriate causation’ is vague. This is a significant and well-known problem for the causal theorist. It is controversial whether this sort of problem is fatal to causal theories. Perhaps Wilson is assuming that no account of ‘appropriate causation’ is forthcoming, and that any interpretation of ‘acting intentionally’ which uses this notion is question-begging. Then his argument could be understood as being conditional in form: if this assumption is true, then (AR) intention is required in order to validate the intuitive logical relationships. One’s view of Wilson’s argument will then depend on an assessment of the assumption.

This is a subtle and complicated book containing much intricate,

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2Wilson suggests this sort of view about ‘acting intentionally’ in Chapter VIII, though he is here considering the reduction of (AR) intention to general intentional states. Indeed, at least one of his arguments concerning (AR) intention depends on the result (claimed to have been established previously) that ‘acting intentionally’ is not reducible (pp. 194–195).
provocative argumentation. I believe that Wilson’s defense of Davidson’s thesis about quantification over events is more convincing than his argument for the conceptual priority of (AR) intention.

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THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM. By SAMUEL SCHEFFLER.

The Rejection of Consequentialism is an intelligent, substantive, and challenging book. In the final analysis it is a frustrating book as well, but if it does not deliver all it promises it is nonetheless a discussion suggestive enough to merit very close attention.

Scheffler has two projects. His greatest endeavor is critical. He wants to evaluate two major schools of ethical thought: consequentialism, on the one hand, and on the other those theories which are founded on what he calls agent-centered restrictions, including what are more popularly called rights. Having investigated both the arguments for those, and popular criticisms advanced against each, Scheffler suggests that we reconsider the rejection of consequentialism—not to the extent of accepting consequentialism, but to the extent of rejecting agent-centered restrictions on essentially consequentialist grounds. Scheffler’s second project, supported by this critical investigation, is to advance a theory which incorporates the positive features of consequentialism while acknowledging those constraints upon consequentialism Scheffler discovers to be justified. This “hybrid” theory is in Scheffler’s final estimation (Chapter 5) superior to both consequentialist and agent-centered views, and its advantages (and limitations) make it the most intriguing feature of the book.

Moral theories which are based on agent-centered restrictions deny that it is always morally permissible to create the best overall state of affairs open to one, because a particular individual may have to be violated in an impermissible way for this optional state to be achieved. Scheffler argues that this familiar criticism of consequentialism, although not without intuitive appeal, is in fact ungrounded. Say that the reason we do not want an individual A to be sacrificed for the sake of society as a whole is that this sacrifice involves an infringement on a right held by A, the right to liberty, perhaps. If the effect of this infringement on A’s right to liberty, however, is to prevent other infringements—for example on others’ rights to liber-