



Varieties of Use and Mention by Newton Garver

Review by: David Kaplan

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NEWTON GARVER. *Varieties of use and mention. Philosophy and phenomenological research*, vol. 26 no. 2 (1965), pp. 230–238.

The author discusses two unusual ‘uses’ of expressions. The first is the use of a word within its own quotation name. He argues that the component word cannot be considered an ‘arbitrary index’, as we might consider the subscripts in the two signs of addition: “+_o” and “+_o”, for cardinal and ordinal numbers respectively. Instead the component word is used in the manner in which the argument expression is used with a functional expression.

The reviewer would agree that there is something of a functional nature about quotation marks, as is immediately clear from the fact that we ‘understand’ quotation names that we have never seen before. This functional nature is presumably a consequence of the fact that all quotation names are understood by means of the single semantical rule: *the result of enclosing an expression A in quotation marks is a standard name of A*. But the failure to point out the significant differences between such a rule and the rule for a true functional expression (e.g., “∇”), seems, to the reviewer, an omission as serious as the failure to point out the differences between quotation names and the arabic numeral names for the first ten numbers.

The second use of expressions discussed by the author is in connection with meaning-statements, such as:

The meaning of “punctual” is – on time.

He argues that such statements should be understood as identities, with what follows “is –” used to refer to its own meaning. Failure to recognize this use, the author claims, has been responsible for certain fallacious arguments purporting to prove that meaning-statements cannot be identities. The analysis is made explicit by introducing a symbolic abbreviation for “the meaning of” and rewriting the meaning-statement to:

The meaning of “punctual” = //“on time”//.

The utility of the new symbolism is further demonstrated by tackling a portion of Russell’s argument against Frege (see above). Like Church, the author finds no deeper confusion beneath the confusions of mention and use. Fans of Russell’s argument will consider this discussion a useful first step in the right direction.

Other writers who have discussed Russell’s argument have each introduced their own notational devices for the meaning of a phrase. Thus, using the notation of Garver, Butler, Searle, and the reviewer respectively, we have //“punctual”// = *punctual* = §punctual § = ^mpunctual^m. It would be well to standardize what is clearly a useful notation. But perhaps this awaits standardization of the notion. It should be noted that Garver’s double slanted lines stand for a true function from expressions to meanings, whereas an expression enclosed by asterisks, squiggles, or m’s exhibits that peculiar use common to the components of quotation names.

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BERTRAND RUSSELL. *My mental development*. A reprint of IX 82. *Ibid.*, pp. 37–50. 10—J.S.L.