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# HUMAN BEINGS AMONG THE BEASTS

BY

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**Abstract:** In this article, we develop and defend a new argument for animalism – the thesis that we human persons are human animals. The argument takes this rough form: since our pets are animals, we are too. We'll begin with remarks on animalism and its rivals, develop our main argument, and then defend it against a few replies.

For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them: as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath. (Ecclesiastes 3:19)

## 1. *Introduction*

In this article, we develop and defend a new argument for animalism – the thesis that we human persons are human animals. The argument takes this rough form: since our pets are animals, we are too. We'll begin with remarks on animalism and its rivals, develop our main argument, and then defend it against a few replies.

There are many objections to animalism.<sup>1</sup> We will not, in this article, present or evaluate those objections.<sup>2</sup> Our goal, instead, is to point towards some novel and fruitful lines of evidence that support animalism.

## 2. *Animalism*

We each have a close life-long association with a human animal. These human animals are not hard to find. Look down and you'll probably catch sight of yours. You might even detect its boundaries by closing your eyes and concentrating (proprioception). We feed these animals each time we eat (sometimes too much). And we need them to do many interesting things

in the material world; you'll never go skydiving without one, for example. But how, precisely, do we relate to these animals? Of all the answers on offer, animalism is perhaps the simplest. It says that we are *identical* to them.<sup>3</sup>

Among philosophers these days, animalism is a minority view. Favored alternatives include the theories that (i) we are mere parts of animals (brains, cerebral hemispheres, and proper temporal parts of animals), (ii) animals are mere parts of us (that, e.g., we are compounds of material animals and immaterial souls or that we are composed of our animals and various elements of the external world that make up our extended minds), (iii) we are wholly immaterial souls inhering in living animal bodies, and (iv) we are distinct from but constituted by animals (as a statue is distinct from but constituted by a lump of clay).<sup>4</sup>

### 3. *The argument from beasts*

If you have had the pleasure of communion with a non-human animal or two – especially a mammalian pet – you have probably attributed various mental states to those creatures (henceforth, ‘beasts’).<sup>5</sup> Dogs believe and even know some things. If you have a dog and love her dearly, for example, she probably knows that and loves you too. Dogs also display affection, boredom, dismay, or curiosity. Some cats scheme; others dislike people. Some birds are fussy. These ascriptions of mentality to beasts are tempting – and maybe even irresistible.

We succumb to temptation. Beasts, we think, know, feel, perceive, and enjoy a rich mental life of cognition, perception, and emotion. To say this is not anthropomorphic, retrograde, or otherwise intellectually naughty. Vibrant animal mentality is real.

This animal mentality can tell us something – not just about beasts but about ourselves. The *Argument from Beasts*, as we'll call it, uncovers a surprising consequence and goes like this<sup>6</sup>:

- P1. Our canine pets are the primary bearers of their mental states.
- P2. Our canine pets are higher mammals.
- C1. Therefore, some higher mammals are the primary bearers of their mental states. (from P1 and P2)
- P3. Either (a) all higher mammals are the primary bearers of their mental states or (b) no higher mammals are the primary bearers of their mental states.
- C2. So all higher mammals are the primary bearers of their mental states. (from C1 and P3)
- P4. Human animals are higher mammals.
- C3. So human animals are the primary bearers of their mental states. (from C2 and P4)

P5. We are the primary bearers of our mental states.

C4. So we are human animals. (from C3 and P5)

We offer five clarifying points before defending the premises.

First, a word on 'primary'. Some speak of non-derivative and derivative ways of having properties. Certain items have properties in a primary or non-derivative sense, we are told, while other things enjoy those properties only derivatively or by proxy. Plausibly, your forearms are sunburned in the primary or non-derivative sense; and so you are yourself sunburned, but in the secondary and derivative sense. You are sunburned by proxy and only because you are related to your forearms in some special way (parthood, for example). If this distinction holds up, we maintain that canine pets are the *primary* bearers of their mental states; they do not have those states only derivatively or by proxy. Similarly, we maintain that *we* are the primary bearers of *our* mental states; we do not have those states only derivatively or by proxy.<sup>7</sup>

Second, read 'are' (in 'are the primary bearers', 'are higher mammals', or 'are human animals') as expressing *identity*. So the conclusion is indeed animalism in its full glory, and it is inconsistent with the rivals noted earlier.

Third, to be a bearer of a mental state is to have that state or to be in it. When you are angry, you bear the state *being angry*; when you know that Sydney is a city, you are a bearer of the state *knowing that city is a city*; and so on.

Fourth, we speak of *the* primary bearers of mental states. We thus assume that, in cases involving human beings and beasts, there is indeed some unique primary bearer of each mental states. We do *not* assume, note, that there is some unique bearer *simpliciter* of each of our mental states (for all we have said, a mighty host of beings might bear some mental state in a secondary or derivative sense). Nor do we assume that this uniqueness assumption must hold in all other cases.

Finally, we have focused on canines. They present compelling and obvious examples of beasts who think and feel. Dogs are our friends. We often regard them as family members. And they have a lengthy and unique history of co-evolution alongside human beings. That said: if you are not a dog person but instead love beasts of another kind, we recommend that, to see the argument in its strongest form, you replace 'canine' as required (e.g., with 'feline').

Now for some explanation and defense of our premises.

#### ***4. Premise 1. Our canine pets are the primary bearers of their mental states***

This is the most important premise. We'll advance it in two ways.

First, the premise is *prima facie* plausible. You know that canine pets have mental states. The only question to settle, then, is whether they are the *primary* bearers of those states. Consider the dog who looks at you with total adoration. Does she bear the state *adoring you* by proxy or only because she is related to some *other* item which bears that state in the primary and non-derivative sense? No. That item that adores you in the non-derivative sense is none other than your beloved pet.

These considerations give strong support to Premise 1. But we think our second line of evidence is even better.

Think of the various peculiar and intimate ways in which we relate to canine pets. Though they are not people, we extend to them special regard; and we address them much in the way that we do other people. For example, we give them proper names; it is appropriate and natural to do so. And we address them quite seriously in the second person. We love them, and they love us; they show up in our family portraits. We enjoy their company and they enjoy ours. We even engage in cognitive companionship – joint attention.<sup>8</sup>

Now four cases:

- Canine: You spend years with a dog and come to love him. He loves you too. You call him by name, and when you call, he looks at you with total devotion and care. You regard him as a member of your household and insist that he appear in all family portraits. When he dies, you weep, and whenever his birthday rolls around, you light a candle in his memory. If you are especially optimistic and given to speculation about an afterlife, you may even harbor this secret hope – that in the fullness of time you two shall meet again.
- Car: You spend years working on and driving around your first car – a 1972 Datsun 240z, perhaps. You just love that car and spend an entire summer carefully cleaning it of rust and water damage. You even take selfies with your car and upload them to social media with captions like ‘just chilling, me and my baby’. Your 240z, of course, has a name – and you sometimes speak to it.
- Robot: You receive an intriguing Christmas present: a rudimentary robot that connects you 24/7 to another human person (this robot is, in effect, a webcam with a dedicated internet connection). Speak to the robot, and that person will hear what you say, and vice versa. Though you and that person never meet, you come to regard her as a close friend. And though the robot itself bears no mental states in the primary sense, you find yourself addressing the robot in the second person, bidding it goodnight before sleeping. Eventually, you give it a name and think of it as a dear friend.

**Brain:** Suppose for this case that, though brains have no mental states in the primary and non-derivative sense, they do have mental states derivatively – exactly the mental states their host persons have in the primary and non-derivative sense.<sup>9</sup> You are a neurosurgeon, and you often encounter other people's brains. Sometimes you speak to those brains, and you find yourself ascribing to them states of knowledge, regret, shame, pride, and so on ('It's too bad, dear brain on the operating table, that you don't know much about surgery, or you would understand what I'm doing to you right now. I'm sure you approve, though, and will be thankful for the treatment.').

Here are judgements about the first two cases and a hypothesis to explain them. Your behavior in Canine is perfectly above board. It is good and right and appropriate to address dogs in the second person, to call them by name, and even to use personal pronouns in reference to them. It is, furthermore, perfectly good and right to regard them as genuine companions and even as family members. Dogs deserve our love. To know this, one need only live with one. It is, by contrast, rather peculiar to extend this kind of regard to an unthinking item, as in Car. To be sure, you can do all this as a game of *make believe* – or something like that. But you cannot rightly do so in full seriousness.

We can explain this difference between Canine and Car with this Mind Hypothesis: dogs, unlike cars, are the bearers of various mental states. Dogs, for example, *listen to*, *care for*, *are curious about*, or *sad for* us. And because dogs enjoy these mental states (whether in the primary or secondary sense), it is good and right to engage with them as intimates. Note that the hypothesis that cars are not people does not explain the asymmetry between these cases, since dogs aren't people either.

The behavior on display in Robot may be harder to evaluate. Since you have encountered a genuine friend only by means of communication through a robot, it may well be natural to regard that robot with affection and even to address it in the second person. This behavior is rather more *serious* and less like *make believe* than it is in Car. But there's still a mistake here. To think of the robot as a friend is to miss the mark; for it is the human person who is your friend. The robot is merely a vehicle or proxy for this relationship. It has no non-derivative or primary mentality of its own and so is not an appropriate object of intimate regard.

The behavior on display in Brain is also mistaken. Even though the brains you operate on have mental lives, that mentality is derivative from that of their host people. It is, then, funny, inappropriate, or unserious to address one of those brains or to ascribe to it various mental states. We think this is so even if the surgery is performed *sans* anesthesia.

The Mind Hypothesis cannot alone explain the difference between Canine, on the one hand, and Robot and Brain, on the other. For in all three cases, the objects of your affection and regard and the items you address in the second person display mentality (though this is more clear in Brain than in Robot). We must supplement the hypothesis to explain the difference. Perhaps this will do: dogs, unlike the robot or the brain, are the *primary* bearers of mentality.

We can connect this all to Premise 1 as follows. If Premise 1 is false, then the regard and intimacy we extend to dogs is either like Car (if dogs don't have mental states at all) or like that in Robot or Brain (if the mentality dogs have is at most derivative and secondary). That is to say, if Premise 1 is false, then the regard and intimacy we extend to dogs would be *funny*, *inappropriate*, or somehow *unserious*. But, as reflection on Canine shows, it is not. And so Premise 1 is not false; it is true.

### 5. *Premise 2. Our canine pets are higher mammals*

We take this to be a truth of biology. Dogs are mammals. And, by virtue of their evolutionary history, sophisticated nervous systems, general intelligence, and capacity for pain and pleasure, they qualify as *higher* mammals.

### 6. *Premise 3. Either (a) all higher mammals are the primary bearers of their mental states or (b) no higher mammals are the primary bearers of their mental states*

We may reason here from shared biology to a shared metaphysics. Though our brains are remarkable indeed, the difference between those brains and those of higher mammals is one of degree and not kind. It would be extremely implausible if dogs were (as we have argued earlier) the primary bearers of mental states but felines were not. It would be similarly implausible, we think, if dogs were the primary bearers of mental states but human animals were not. These considerations support the all or nothing approach encoded in Premise 3.

We do not, to be clear, claim that small biological differences never make for significant mental or metaphysical differences of *any* kind. Perhaps, for example, the brains of dogs are, despite their biological similarity to human brains, unable to support self-conscious experience.<sup>10</sup> But this hypothesis alone does not undermine the case we have given for Premise 3. Our claim is more specific. We say that having a more sophisticated biological organ – a brain – does not somehow expel primary subjecthood from an animal. To be sure, a human brain can do things a canine brain cannot; but it is implausible to think on that count that canines are the primary bearers of their

mental states and human animals are not.<sup>11</sup> Rather, animals that are similar with respect to brain sophistication – sophistication of the kind that supports subjective experience, intentionality, and problem solving, say – will be similar with respect to primary subjecthood.

It is consistent with our premise, of course, that human beings are special – set apart from the rest of nature – along a variety of metaphysical and moral dimensions. We have seemingly unparalleled capacities, after all, for thought, feeling, and speech; these capacities may well make us especially valuable and deserving of regard and respect.

### **7. *Premise 4. Human animals are higher mammals***

This premise, like Premise 2, is a truth of biology.

### **8. *Premise 5. We are the primary bearers of our mental states***

It may turn out that we have certain physical properties (like *having a mass*) in only a derivative sense.<sup>12</sup> But saying the same about our mental properties is much less plausible. It seems (to us, at any rate) forcefully clear that we think in a primary sense. And so do you. More generally, if there is an ordering to the numerically distinct things thinking our thoughts, we come first. We enjoy a kind of priority. So Roderick Chisholm<sup>13</sup>:

... I may be said to hope for rain only in virtue of the fact that my present stand-in hopes for rain. I borrow the property, so to speak, from the thing that constitutes me now. But surely that hypothesis is not to be taken seriously. There is no reason whatever for supposing that I hope for rain only in virtue of the fact that some other thing hopes for rain – some stand-in that, strictly and philosophically speaking, is not identical with me but happens to be doing duty for me at this particular moment.

If there are thus two things that now hope for rain, the one doing it on its own and the other such that its hoping is done for it by the thing that now happens to constitute it, then I am the former thing and not the latter thing.<sup>14</sup>

We think Chisholm is exactly correct here, and his point is not limited to *hoping for rain*. More generally, we exhibit our mental states in the primary and non-derivative sense.

### **9. *Objections***

We now consider two objections.

Objection 1:

Dogs aren't animals and thus aren't higher mammals. *Canines*, to be sure, are higher mammals – and thus animals. But dogs aren't. Dogs are, instead, *constituted by* but *distinct from* canine animals. Dogs are not special in this respect, incidentally. They relate to their animals just as we relate to ours. Premise 2, then, is false.<sup>15</sup>

Reply: the dog/canine dualism on display here is intriguing. But we think it is mistaken. First, we note that it is only a reply available to a certain kind of anti-animalist – a constitution theorist. Other deniers of animalism will have to look elsewhere to find a convincing reply to our argument. Second, it certainly *seems* as though dogs are higher mammals. Dogs have hair, give birth to live young, have a certain evolutionary history, and so on. It seems implausible, on the face of it, to deny all this. The defender of dog/canine dualism replies:

Oh, I don't deny the obvious facts of science. Certainly *something* in the neighborhood of every dog has hair, gives birth to live young, has a certain evolutionary history, and so on. Science tells us all that. But science can't dictate to us the proper metaphysics of dogs, and to insist that it is *canines* rather than *dogs* who have these features is not to deny any part of science proper.<sup>16</sup>

Reply: we have no *decisive* objection to this theory. One cannot always, after all, easily read metaphysics off of a scientific claim. But we note that the theory at hand comes at a price. First, we wonder what it is, exactly, for one item to constitute another. What, precisely, is this relationship that dogs and canines are said to enjoy? Introducing such abstruse metaphysical theory into our account of dogs and their nature comes at a price. It trades off against *ideological* parsimony. Second, the theory at hand posits *two* dog-like things in the vicinity of every canine. This is an unattractive consequence for philosophers committed to *ontological* parsimony. Absent powerful arguments for this constitution theory, then, we think it reasonable to hypothesize that dogs are canines and that, accordingly, dogs are higher mammals.

It would be dialectically inapt to present parsimony considerations as positive evidence on behalf of our premises. Inapt in this sense, at least: such considerations would provide no new evidence for animalism. But this is not what we have done. We have, instead, presented parsimony considerations in opposition to an objection to our premises. We acknowledge that this way of replying to the objection may not be persuasive to all convinced anti-animalists. But it could still give a neutral audience sufficient reason to move towards agnosticism about the target objection, or even to reject it.

Is there a significant neutral audience for whom our argument may have traction? We think so. Consider our claim that dogs are animals. There are some – convinced anti-animalists among them – who will deny as much. But a sizable group of philosophers who don't have strong views about personal identity or ontology will nonetheless agree with us that dogs are animals. This is a key target audience of our argument. And our argument can bring that audience to a new conclusion. Neutral spectators might have



thought that, though dogs are animals, we are not. Our argument challenges this thought by charting a new path from the animality of dogs to the animality of human persons.

Objection 2:

The Argument from Beasts has, roughly, a mentality move (slogan: ‘dogs are primary thinkers’) and a mammal move (slogan: ‘dogs are mammals’). But these moves cut against each other. For once the anti-animalist has good reason to accept one move, she has equally good reason to reject the other. Upon learning that dogs are primary thinkers, the anti-animalist should deny that dogs are mammals. Alternatively: upon learning that dogs are mammals, the anti-animalist should deny that dogs are primary thinkers. No anti-animalist should, in any case, accept both moves. And so the argument is dialectically infelicitous.

Reply: there’s a sense in which we must agree with this objection. For it points out a general and undeniable feature of valid arguments. When some premises  $p$  and  $q$  imply a conclusion  $c$ , there will always be an equally valid argument proceeding from not- $c$  and  $p$  to not- $q$ . But despite the fact that valid arguments may always be flipped in this way, they still have some uses. Here are three.

First, they expose the implications of accepting various premises or denying various conclusions. Even when they do not convince, they still clarify various logical connections. The Argument from Beasts points to a heretofore hidden cost of denying animalism: denying one or more plausible – or at least, reasonable – premises about mentality and mammals. Second, they can persuade neutral audiences to accept the conclusions. Even if no anti-animalist will accept all of our premises, the case we have made for them shows that they – and the conclusions they entail – can be reasonably accepted by those not already committed to rejecting animalism. Third, they can give audiences (whether neutral or otherwise) reason to increase confidence in their conclusions, thereby coming closer to, if still a bit short of, full confidence, belief, or acceptance. You might be such a reader. We consider our argument successful if you lean more towards animalism now than you did before reading this article.

## 10. Conclusion

Our argument is valid; and the premises are true. So, too, is animalism. We are, then, identical to human animals. What follows from all this, and why is our conclusion of interest?

Though animalism says something about what we are, it leaves many things unsaid. It does not speak to whether human animals themselves are wholly material; it is consistent with animalism that we each *have* or *are* an immaterial soul or Aristotelian form.<sup>17</sup> And animalism does not specify whether human animals have biological or psychological criteria

of identity over time, or no criteria of identity over time at all.<sup>18</sup> Animalism leaves open the question of whether animals can persist despite dying; and it does not say whether human animals are *essentially* animals.

The position supported by our main argument – call it *mere animalism* – is neutral along these dimensions.<sup>19</sup> But the Argument from Beasts is of significant interest for several reasons. First, it advances mere animalism without commitment to controversial theses about our materiality or persistence over time. Those who have doubts about whether we have criteria of identity over time or who harbor dualist sympathies, for example, need not recoil at our conclusion. Mere animalism is capacious and inviting, even to anti-criterialists and dualists of various kinds.<sup>20</sup> Second, and in spite of its modesty, mere animalism is still a minority view and one that conflicts with a variety of theories about what we are. If our argument is sound, for example, we can rule out the views that we are brains, or proper temporal parts of animals, or persons that are distinct from but constituted by animals. Third, mere animalism may be united with other ambitious theses to advance a more exciting research program. Mere animalism in conjunction with the view that ‘anything is an animal *must* be an animal’, for example, would entail not only that we are animals but also that we could not exist without being animals, a controversial thesis indeed.<sup>21</sup>

Here is a somewhat speculative metaphilosophical point. The Argument from Beasts exploits connections and similarities between human beings and the beasts. These connections and similarities have not been much explored by analytic philosophers. We think they deserve more careful attention. One lesson from the Argument from Beasts – this follows even if it is not sound or maximally convincing, we note – is that we may shed light on our own nature (and on our place in nature) by further reflection on beasts. Suppose, for example, that criterialism is indeed true. And suppose that beasts have purely biological criteria of identity over time. Would these theses support the view that *we* enjoy such criteria too? We think this is a question worth pursuing and of interest to animalists and non-animalists alike.

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> So Olson (1998), pp. 396–397: ‘I imagine that most philosophers could easily rattle off half a dozen arguments against “Animalism”, as the view that you and I are animals is sometimes called. Here are a few favorites: (i) If you were an animal, you would be identical with your body (or at any rate with some human body). But no human body can think or feel or act, as you can. (ii) Persons and animals have different persistence conditions: the organism that is your body could outlive you (if you lapsed into a persistent vegetative state), or you could outlive it (if your brain were transplanted and the rest of you destroyed). But a thing cannot outlive itself. (iii) Persons and animals have different criteria of synchronic identity: any human animal could be associated with two different persons at once (as cases of split personality). Thus, no person is an animal. (iv) These experiences – the ones I am having now – are essentially mine. But they are only contingently associated with any particular animal. Hence, I have a property that no animal has.’

<sup>2</sup> For standard answers to the standard objections, see Olson (1997, ch. 5), Olson (2007, ch. 2), and Snowdon (2014, chs 6–11). Bailey and van Elswyk (forthcoming) categorize and give a non-standard *generic* reply to eight standard objections to animalism. Yet other defenses appear in Bailey (2014) and Yang (2015).

<sup>3</sup> ‘Animalism’ is from Snowdon (1990). Recent surveys include Bailey (2015a), Blatti (2019), Blatti and Snowdon (2016), and Thornton (2016). Recent arguments in favor of animalism appear in Bailey (2016), Bailey (2017), Blatti (2012), and Thornton and Bailey (forthcoming). On the importance of animalism, see Duncan (forthcoming) and Bailey *et al.* (forthcoming).

<sup>4</sup> For more on what animalism rules out, see Blatti (2019, sect. 1.1) and Bailey (2015a, pp. 867–870).

<sup>5</sup> We will speak of ‘mental states’; some may prefer ‘mental properties’; nothing hangs on the difference.

<sup>6</sup> Olson (2018, sect. 7) turns related considerations about beasts and their mental properties into an argument for animalism. Our argument improves on Olson’s. First, we deploy the special relationships we have with beasts to support our premises; Olson does not. Second, our argument does not rely on epistemic problems arising from non-animalist views – on which, see Yang (2013).

<sup>7</sup> For extensive discussion of this distinction and citations to relevant literature, see Bailey (2015b). Perhaps, though, there is nothing to this distinction, in which case we have two points. First, without that distinction, some standard anti-animalist moves collapse. Anti-animalists can no longer agree with the apparent biological reality, for example, that we are animals in *some* sense by saying we are animals in a merely secondary and derivative sense, as in Shoemaker (2008). Anti-animalists – think here of the brainist or constitutionalist, for example – may have trouble accommodating other apparent truths too, like *you are more than four feet tall* if we do not have properties like *being more than four foot tall* derivatively and by being suitably related to living animals, as in Baker (2000, p. 99). It is no wonder anti-animalists introduce and lean on the distinction, then; eliminating it makes things *worse* for the anti-animalist, not better. Second, we may elide ‘primary’ altogether in our argument, and we invite skeptical

readers to do so when reciting or evaluating our argument. Luckily, the defenses we offer of our premises are not at war with this reformulation.

<sup>8</sup> Itakura (2004).

<sup>9</sup> The brainist need not balk at this supposition. First, it does not follow from brainism alone that brains have mental states in the primary and non-derivative sense. So we are not, for the purposes of this case, supposing that brainism is false. Second, the structure of our argument in this section is not 'suppose that brains have no mental states in the primary and non-derivative sense; from that supposition, derive the truth of animalism and thus the falsity of brainism'. Rather, our argument has this structure: 'suppose that brains have no mental states in the primary and non-derivative sense; that supposition offers insight into a puzzling case, which insight supports a premise, which premise is compatible with both brainism and animalism but when combined with *other* premises gives support to animalism over its rivals'.

And if our use of the Brain case does not succeed with brainists, it may yet succeed with other audiences (agnostic audiences, for example, or constitutionalists). Finally, even if this particular case for P1 – the case that proceeds by reflection on Canine, Car, Robot, and Brain, that is – is unconvincing, we think the premise enjoys independent support.

<sup>10</sup> Thus, Baker (2003, p. 2): 'Merely sentient beings, like dogs (that are conscious without being self-conscious) have subjective perspectives, but they are not aware of themselves as having subjective perspectives .... But persons, unlike nonhuman animals (as far as we can tell), also can have conscious experience of their thoughts and attitudes (e.g., that they are hoping that there's no danger over there).' We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing this objection and bringing our attention to Baker's article.

<sup>11</sup> A related claim would seem far more convincing and might indeed undermine Premise 3; namely, since human brains can do things dog brains cannot do, human animals (unlike canines) are the primary bearers of their mental states. To accept this, though, is to accept C3 and in due course the conclusion of the Argument from Beasts.

<sup>12</sup> As on, for example, views according to which we are wholly immaterial beings who merely *inherit* the material properties of our animals.

<sup>13</sup> For more on this point, including a positive argument for Premise 5, citations to relevant literature, distinctions, and applications to other debates, see Bailey (2015b).

<sup>14</sup> Chisholm (1976, p. 104).

<sup>15</sup> We owe this objection to correspondence with Jeff McMahan.

<sup>16</sup> For discussion of whether animalism is a consequence of evolutionary theory, see Blatti (2012) and Gillett (2013).

<sup>17</sup> Thornton (2019).

<sup>18</sup> See, *inter alia*, Bailey (2015a, p. 874), Madden (2011, 2016), Olson (1997), and Sharpe (2015).

<sup>19</sup> This is Olson's (2015) 'weak animalism'. On other varieties of animalism, see Thornton (2016).

<sup>20</sup> For one animalist's version of anti-criterialism, see Merricks (1998). On dualist-friendly animalism, see Thornton (2019).

<sup>21</sup> Thornton (n.d., MS). The points in this paragraph are also made in Thornton and Bailey (forthcoming, sect. 4).

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