concept denotes, the puzzlement over how to form a proposition about a meaning ensues. Searle's hypothesis regarding Russell's second argument has the additional merit of simultaneously offering an explanation as to why Russell thought that Frege's theory made "the King of France is bald" nonsense.

The difficulty in evaluating Searle's claim lies in the fact that when expressions, their meanings, and their denotations are carefully distinguished, and the various possible interpretations of certain other difficult expressions such as "proposition," "denoting complex," and "about" are sorted out, it becomes possible to supply for each sentence of Russell's argument an interpretation which makes the sentence correct. Of course, in the repaired version certain sentential transitions signaled by "thus," "this leads us to say," etc., become inexplicable, but this is to be expected in an argument with (now) true premises leading to a false conclusion. Further, there are often a number of different interpretations each of which would correct some part of Russell's argument and which relocate the non-sequiturs. Thus the complete justification of any analysis of Russell's argument clearly awaits a fully annotated version of the two pages. (Although it is probably not ultimately crucial, it is annoying to discover that the two most accessible reprints of *On denoting*, in XIV 184 and XXV 332, differ from one another and from the original in their use of quotation marks and displayed material. In XXV 332 it is claimed that Russell sanctioned the changes therein.)

While awaiting the work of the scholars, the attempt to 'correct' Russell's argument provides an unsurpassed exercise for students of Frege's theory and the principles of mention and use.

DAVID KAPLAN

RONALD J. BUTLER. *The scaffolding of Russell's theory of descriptions.* **The philosophical review,** vol. 63 (1954), pp. 350–364.

Butler gives a generally accurate account of Russell's 1903 semantical theory as given in **Principles of mathematics** and shows in some detail how the theory of *On denoting* can be viewed against this background. This article along with J. W. Reeves's *The origins and consequences of the theory of descriptions* (**Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,** vol. 24 (1934), pp. 211–230) provide a most useful historical accompaniment to *On denoting*.

On the question of Russell's second argument against Frege (see the preceding review), Butler proclaims the radical view that Russell's conception of 1903, retained in *On denoting*, that propositional constituents are entities of the world (universals, etc.) and not merely the names of those entities "left no room for distinguishing the sign from its referent. His logical tools forced him to refuse recognition of the distinction between use and mention." Russell's inattention to the distinction certainly makes it harder to reconstruct his theory confidently and may even have led him at places to draw unwarranted conclusions (as possibly in the argument against Frege), but it seems an exaggeration to claim that no plausible reconstruction of his theory can be made in accord with current canons of mention and use. Given this view of the author's, it is not surprising that he agrees with Church in analyzing Russell's argument. But in his own reconstruction of Russell's attempt to show that there is no valid distinction between meaning and denotation, Butler appears to require both the identification of a sign with its denotation (referent) and also the identification of a sign with its meaning. From these two the result follows easily. Though a peculiar theory emerges from either alone, the identification of meaning and denotation is not immediately obtainable.

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P. T. GEACH. *Russell on meaning and denoting.* **Analysis** (Oxford), vol. 19 (1959), pp. 69–72.

Geach claims to explain what he terms "the odd irrelevance" of Russell's criticism of Frege in the passage discussed by Searle (see above). The explanation is that "Russell has excusably, but wrongly, conflated Frege's distinction between *Sinn* and *Bedeutung* with his own distinction between what an expression 'means' and what it 'denotes', as expounded in *The principles of mathematics*." To establish that Russell's 1903 theory differs radically from that of Frege, Geach argues that Frege's "*bedeuten, Bedeutung*" should be equated with Russell's 1903 use of "mean, meaning" rather than with Russell's "denote, denotation" as has commonly been supposed. He further claims that there is really nothing in Frege that quite corresponds to Russell's "denotation."

The reviewer finds Geach's arguments on these points unconvincing. In presenting them