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### Child Labor: A Normative Perspective

The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that more than 246 million children are engaged in labor. Although the incidence of child labor has been falling globally, it is doing so unevenly, and in some areas it appears to be on the rise.<sup>1</sup> In many countries in South Asia and Africa the percentage of working children falls within the 20 to 60 percent range.

The widespread existence of child labor has provoked both popular outrage and legislative initiatives aimed at banning the sale of all products made by children. But developing economies, and many economists, have cautioned against universally proscribing child labor. They argue that such bans will be inefficient and will hurt poor families and their children. Some economists have voiced concern about paternalistic interference with family strategies that may have evolved rationally in the context of poverty and inadequate education systems. Others point out that because child labor is itself heterogeneous, ranging from light work delivering newspapers after school to child prostitution, uniform policies may undermine the ability to target its worst forms. There is thus considerable debate as to whether establishing and enforcing a uniform worldwide set of standards for dealing with child labor is desirable.

Against the background of this debate, this chapter explores the normative issues posed by child labor. In the first section I briefly consider the conceptual problems of defining who is a child for the purposes of identifying child labor. The second section explores several considerations that make child labor morally problematic, considerations that turn on all four of the parameters I presented in chapter 4: weak agency, vulnerability, and extreme harm to the individual child and to society.<sup>2</sup> Guided by these considerations I defend a position distinct from both

those who argue that all child labor should be abolished immediately and those who argue that we must accommodate it. I argue that the worst forms of child labor, including child prostitution and the use of children as bonded laborers, should be unconditionally prohibited. Other types of child labor may need to be tolerated under certain circumstances, at least in the near future, even as efforts are made to eradicate them. Legal toleration, however, does not imply indifference, and states and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can protect and promote the interests of children in many ways. In particular they can take broad social measures to improve outcomes for children, especially by ensuring that all working children are educated.

Child labor cannot be addressed without considering our moral and political values; they are implicated in the questions we ask about child labor, in the data we seek, and in our policy design. Moreover whatever policies are adopted will involve trade-offs among different values. Policymakers need to make explicit the values they want to promote and the trade-offs they are willing to accept. In this chapter I take the most important values at stake to be preventing extreme harms to children and to society and I suggest how those values might guide policy and research.

### WHAT IS A CHILD?

Many countries define childhood in terms of chronological age; others take into account social factors. In some African countries, for example, ten-year-old apprentices and brides are no longer assumed to possess all the characteristics that industrial countries bundle together into the status of “child.” They may be eligible for marriage but not entitled to make decisions independently of their parents. Different countries invoke different age thresholds of adulthood; even within countries such thresholds can diverge: one age for voting, another for employment, another for military service. Finally, the category of child admits for heterogeneity: three-year-olds have dramatically different capabilities than fifteen-year-olds.

What is the normative basis of modern society’s view of childhood? The concept of a child, implicit in virtually all our moral and legal practices, is that a child is a person who is in some fundamental way

not developed, but rather developing.<sup>3</sup> Because of this undeveloped condition adult parents or surrogates are needed to act on children's behalf. Parents or surrogates are thus given special obligations, including the obligations to protect, nurture, and educate children. These obligations are paternalistic, because adults feel bound to fulfill them whether or not the children in question consent to be protected, nurtured, or educated.

Adults feel justified in treating children paternalistically because children have not yet developed the cognitive, moral, and affective capacities to deliberate and act competently in their own interests.<sup>4</sup> At the same time children have legitimate claims to have their interests considered; they are not simply tools. Children are not yet full persons, but they are persons.

## NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF CHILD LABOR

What are the normative dimensions of child labor? Child labor raises moral concerns because of the weak agency of children (and sometimes of their parents), its connections to underlying vulnerabilities, and especially its potential for extremely harmful outcomes for children themselves, and for society.

### Weak Agency

Children cannot be assumed to have full agency. They lack the cognitive, moral, and affective capacities of adults, and they seldom have the power in the family to make decisions about how to allocate their time.<sup>5</sup> Parents are usually the primary decision makers for children, especially very young children, exercising authority and control over most aspects of their children's lives.

Consider the contrast with ideal labor markets, in which workers and employers are fully rational agents who transact on their own behalf with perfect information. As Jane Humphries has pointed out, there is no *infans economicus* responding to market signals; most children are put to work by their parents.<sup>6</sup> This gap between chooser and chosen for in the labor market for child labor opens up the possibility that those

children's interests will be discounted. Surrogate decision making is a morally fraught arena, especially in the case of young children, who often cannot even articulate their own interests. Moreover such surrogate agency sometimes breaks down, as in the case of parents who lose custody of children they have abused, exploited, or neglected. Families are not homogeneous entities but intimate associations whose members have heterogeneous interests. We cannot simply assume that the head of household functions as a benevolent dictator in the interests of the family as a whole.

Child labor also differs from ideal labor markets in that the decision maker may lack important information regarding the consequences of his or her choice. The costs of child labor can extend far into the future, having, for example, long-term adverse effects on the child's health. It is not clear that these costs are taken into account, even by well-meaning parents. Lack of information may be especially important if the parents are themselves from very poor or despised social groups. As Dreze and Gazdar point out, "The ability of parents to assess the personal and social value of education depends, among other things, on the information they have at their disposal. If their entire reference group is largely untouched by the experience of being educated, that information might be quite limited."<sup>7</sup> It is noteworthy that children in bonded labor tend to have parents who were also bonded laborers.<sup>8</sup>

In calculating the costs and benefits of children's labor for their families, we should note that children are not analogous to other resources that might be exchanged on the market. Children's market value to their families is not only exogenously determined by supply and demand, but is also determined by the choices parents make. Parents decide how much of their own resources to devote to their children, affecting the skill level and productivity of child laborers. And children affect their own net cost; as adults, they make choices about their commitments to their aging parents.

Agency problems (surrogate decision making, ignorance, uncertainty about the future costs and benefits of educating one's children) may be typically associated with child labor. But even if those choosing child labor were fully informed and chose voluntarily, child labor would not necessarily be morally justified. If the background circumstances and options poor children and their parents face are unjust, the option chosen does not by some mysterious process suddenly become just. A key

input for the moral assessment of an action depends on one's views about the moral legitimacy of the socially available choices an agent faces. In other words, whether a choice confers legitimacy depends on other conditions besides its being voluntary. I now turn to consider those other conditions.

### **Asymmetric Vulnerability**

Child labor may be particularly objectionable because of the vulnerabilities that underlie it. These vulnerabilities may be present in exchanges between children and their employers or in the situation of the family itself. The family's vulnerability is likely to be a factor in child labor markets; the majority of parents of child laborers are in a precarious position, often one step away from destitution. They are also likely to be uneducated and illiterate. Child labor then appears as a symptom of an objectionable degree of vulnerability. In some countries caste and ethnic divisions may compound these vulnerabilities.

Child labor can also produce, reflect, and perpetuate unequal vulnerability *within* families. Some families may sacrifice a working child for the sake of other children or family members. They may, for example, keep girls out of school to care for younger children while the mother works outside the home.<sup>9</sup> This extreme bias in favor of some children within a family over others is morally troublesome.

Child labor may also reflect power and resource inequalities between mothers and fathers. A growing body of evidence suggests that mothers have a stronger preference than fathers for investing in their children's welfare, including education.<sup>10</sup>

### **Extremely Harmful Outcomes**

The nature of the damage generated by child labor markets depends on the form of child labor. Many international protocols (including the ILO's Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention 182 and the Sanders Amendment, considered by the U.S. Senate in 1997) view forced labor as one of the worst forms of child labor. But forced labor is not a useful category for distinguishing the most harmful forms of child labor from others. Parents make paternalistic decisions on behalf of their children

that can include “forcing” children to go to school. Given the weak agency of children, it follows that almost all child labor (and child education) is forced. It is therefore not possible to identify what is harmful about child labor without a fuller theory of children’s interests.

Children have two kinds of interests, which, following Amartya Sen, I referred to earlier as *welfare interests* and *agency interests*.<sup>11</sup> As I defined them in chapter 4, welfare interests concern a person’s overall good; agency interests concern his ability to set and pursue his own goals and interests. Both children and adults have these interests, but they possess them in different ways and to different degrees.

Consider welfare interests first. A child’s present welfare interests include shelter, food, health, education, bodily integrity, and a stable, loving relationship with his or her parents (or other caregivers). Children need parents to protect and provide for these interests because they cannot yet provide for them themselves. Because of a child’s vulnerability and weak agency, the state needs to play a crucial role in serving as a backstop to protect children against parental abuse and neglect. Of course, the state must do more than serve as a backstop against abuse because parents cannot provide all of the things that their children need by themselves, for example, a clean environment. The well-being of children, like that of adults, depends in good measure on the nature of social institutions.

An adult’s welfare interests are different. First, adults are not dependent on others in precisely the same way children are. Given appropriate background conditions and institutions, adults are assumed to have the capacity to make choices that enable them to provide for their own welfare: to obtain nourishment, health, and shelter; to find gainful employment; and to exercise a range of their capabilities. Second, adults’ welfare is shaped by their own values, by what they care about and how they want to live. An adult’s welfare cannot be viewed as completely separable from her conception of value and purpose. An atheistic adult, for example, will likely get little welfare from mandatory religious instruction.

Very young children have few immediate agency interests.<sup>12</sup> But unlike other dependent and vulnerable people (e.g., people with severe cognitive disabilities), in reasonably favorable conditions children will develop the capabilities to set goals for themselves and to choose and act in accordance with their own values. As they develop, children’s interest

in exercising their agency grows, although given their lack of competency and experience societies still reasonably set legal bounds on it.

Adults, by contrast, have a significant interest in exercising their agency, in being participants in decisions that affect their lives. They reasonably find it offensive to be treated as children. They willingly allow others, such as political leaders, to make decisions on their behalf only with their consent. Corrupt and despotic institutions, which prevail in many of the world's poorest states, are serious obstacles to the achievement and exercise of adult agency.

Although the interests of children and adults differ, children are also developing into adults. Any theory of children's interests must look at those interests dynamically, as contributing to the development of their interests as adults.

On the individual level, harms can be defined in terms of negative effects on a child's present or future (adult) agency and well-being interests. In particular one can define a level of *basic* agency and well-being interests, the failure to satisfy which would be abusive to children or stunt the development of crucial adult capabilities. Child labor that violates children's basic interests would constitute extreme harm.

It is important to distinguish this "basic interests" standard from the "best interests" standard that some children's advocates have proposed for judging child labor. The best interests standard suffers from two major problems. First, because there is no widely shared view of exactly what constitutes a child's *best* interests, parents can interpret the standard in radically different ways.<sup>13</sup> Broad consensus is much more likely to be reached on a basic interests standard.<sup>14</sup>

Second, the best interests standard assumes that parents (which in practice usually means mothers) are mere instruments for optimizing their children's interests and do not count independently. From a moral point of view, this is just wrong. There is no inherent injustice in family structures that assume that children must make some contribution to the well-being of their families as a whole or to other family members. Some trade-offs among interests within the family are acceptable and are, at any rate, inevitable. Work performed by children might thus be acceptable under certain conditions and given certain restrictions.<sup>15</sup>

On the social level, child labor can also generate extreme harms. No society can be indifferent to how children are raised and educated because these factors affect the nature of its future members. Uneducated,

illiterate, and passive adults will not be able to contribute much to social development or play a role in responding to social problems. The presence of child labor may inhibit the long-term productive development needed to help the poor move out of their desperate circumstances or to raise up the wealth of a nation.

Child labor can undermine the possibility of a society of equals. Uneducated, illiterate adults will often form a servile social caste, excluded from participating in society's main institutions. Indeed Myron Weiner has argued that in India child labor is itself a symptom of objectionable hierarchy and not poverty; because most of India's labor force come from the lower classes and is involved in performing menial tasks, the upper-class elite has not thought that education for poor children was necessary. Moreover uneducated children grow up to be adults who cannot demand their rights.<sup>16</sup>

In the language of chapter 4, the case for viewing child labor as a noxious market rests on all four of my parameters: weak agency, vulnerability, extreme individual harm, and extreme social harm. Child labor is also likely to have dynamic effects that shape and perpetuate individuals and societies of a certain type where some people are simply used and discarded by others. It is worth underscoring that the children caught up in child labor and who live in extreme poverty around the globe are innocent. They have done nothing to deserve their situation.<sup>17</sup>

## POLICY IMPLICATIONS

What should be the response to child labor that scores poorly along these normative dimensions, manifesting weak agency on the part of children or their parents, vulnerability within and between families, or extremely harmful outcomes for children or society? One approach, taken by some activists and NGOs, is to define *all* child labor as a violation of the rights of the child and to call for its immediate abolition. In this framework drawing distinctions between kinds of child labor—hazardous versus nonhazardous, bonded versus non bonded, part time versus full time—is considered pointless because anything short of full-time formal education for children is seen as a threat to children's basic interests.<sup>18</sup>



Although this approach offers little guidance on how it could be implemented—a serious concern in the context of weak states and a weak global order—it nevertheless has an important policy function. Rights, especially legal rights, create, legitimate, and reinforce social understandings about what people deserve.<sup>19</sup> Articulating rights for children may thus have positive effects on children's welfare by reinforcing the idea that children have a claim on the state, society, and ultimately on the international community for their protection.

Assessing the practicality of abolishing child labor by strictly enforcing legal sanctions is difficult because we do not really know whether there are cases in which child labor is an unavoidable reality for some poor countries. Debate continues over the extent to which child labor is caused by poverty and underdevelopment or by policy failures, including failures arising from social and political inequality.

Children's education, rather than child labor, has been linked to economic development. China, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan (China) all made rapid economic progress while promoting basic education. *Banning child labor and thus restricting the labor market may raise the wages of adult workers enough to make children's work unnecessary.*<sup>20</sup> If this is true, then allowing child labor may make many poor families worse off than an available alternative. We do not yet know the limits of the possible in poor countries themselves or what the industrial countries might do to eradicate child labor if they really had the will.

Given resource constraints and the likely need for trade-offs between values, blanket prohibitions on child labor face two important challenges. First, in some contexts bans on all child labor may drive families to choose even worse options for their children. Children are better off attending school part time than not at all; they are presumably better off working in factories than as prostitutes or soldiers. Policymakers must thus take care to combine legislation or efforts to ban all child labor markets with policies designed to protect children from worse outcomes on the black market.

The second objection to immediate bans on all child labor stems from the recognition that child labor is often a symptom of other problems that will not be eliminated simply by banning child labor. Such problems include poverty, inadequate education systems, discrimination within families, ethnic conflicts, inadequately protected human rights, and weak democratic institutions. Blanket legislation against all

child labor may do nothing to address the underlying problems. Additionally many children who do not work do not attend school. Many of these “nowhere” children are likely to be girls who work in the home, helping with chores and child rearing.<sup>21</sup> A focus on enforcing legislative solutions banning child labor may not solve the problems that such children face and may direct scarce resources away from other methods of improving children’s lives.

The framework I adopt provides the basis for a somewhat different approach. When we examine children’s labor from the perspective of weak agency (especially in the form of parental ignorance and adaptive preferences), vulnerability, and extreme harms, not all work performed by children is equally morally objectionable. Some work, especially work that does not interfere with or undermine their health or education, may allow children to develop skills they need to become well-functioning adults and broaden their future opportunities. Indeed in some countries, given the deficiencies of the public education system, some children work to earn the tuition for private education.<sup>22</sup>

Child labor is most objectionable where it clearly violates children’s basic interests. The miserable conditions of abuse that children suffer in some kinds of work cannot be seen as being in a child’s basic interests, present or future. According to the most recent study by the ILO, 171 million working children—two-thirds of all working children—are routinely exposed to health risks, violent abuse, and probable injuries. Millions of children are beaten, raped, harassed, and abused, suggesting that more than economic motivations are driving employers (often the children’s parents). Indeed children’s lives might be much better if only the bloodless impersonal economic motives of an ideal market were at issue. An estimated 8.4 million children are caught in what the ILO refers to as “unconditional worst” forms of labor, including slavery, trafficking, debt bondage, participation in armed conflict, prostitution, and pornography.

Eliminating these forms of child labor should be the highest priority. Even if under some circumstances children have to work, at least in the short term, there is no reason they should suffer the kind of abusive treatment that underlies such practices. No state, NGO, family, lending agency, or consumer can justify participating in activities in which the basic interests of children are completely disregarded, in which children are treated with contempt, their lives disposed of as carelessly as the contents of a trashcan.

Two other considerations should also be used to determine how harmful a child labor practice is. First, children who work and do not go to school will likely lack the capacities that they need—literacy, numeracy, broad knowledge of personal and social alternatives, communication skills—to effectively exercise their agency as adults. One central benefit of education is the ability of an educated person to choose in a more informed way. Education thus deeply influences the quality of a person's life. For example, the ability to read documents and newspapers can help oppressed people demand their rights; it can be especially important to women. Empirical investigations by Murthi, Guio, and Dreze indicate that female literacy is a crucial variable in empowering women in the family and lowering birth rates.<sup>23</sup> Thus even child labor that is not immediately harmful can be very harmful in terms of the child's future well-being and agency interests as an adult.

Second, significant third-party harms can result from child labor. Child labor can lead to an illiterate and minimally productive workforce, reduce adult wages, undermine health, and lead to a passive and ignorant citizenry. It can lead to some people being put in circumstances in which they are entirely dependent on others for basic survival and thus vulnerable to abuse, exploitation, and contempt. It props up a world of servility and humiliation, where the lowly cower and the mighty are arrogant and disdainful. All of society is harmed by such outcomes.

These two types of harm—to the child's future interests as an adult and to society as a whole—are costs that parents may not take into account in making their decisions about how to allocate their children's time. This is especially so in the case of harms to society; few people may be aware of these implications, and even if they are they may not give such considerations much weight in the context of their individual decision making. The discrepancy between parents and children's short-term interests and children's and society's long-term interests suggests two main routes for intervention.

First, where child labor reflects the weak agency of children or their parents, action could be taken to try to increase both parties' agency. This could be accomplished by providing more information to parents about the true social and individual costs of child labor and the benefits of education, strengthening the intrafamily decision-making process to bolster the mother-child axis (since data suggest that mothers are more likely to attend to their children's interests than are fathers), or requiring

that parents sign agreements with their children's employers about the limits on the terms of work, agreements backed up by law.

Second, interventions could aim at changing the external context of family decision making, tackling head-on the underlying poverty that leads to child labor. A widely cited example of a promising intervention is Mexico's Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación, which provides cash transfers to mothers whose children attend school. Other strategies include strengthening the education system, restricting children's work days to a limited number of hours so that they can attend school at least part time, encouraging measures (training, organizing) to raise adult wages, and providing credit to poor families.<sup>24</sup>

It is worth reflecting on the environment in which much child labor thrives: crushing poverty, weak states, poor education systems, ethnic conflicts, massive inequalities, and lack of democratic institutions. How much of South Asia, which has the highest absolute numbers of working children, has functioning labor markets? How much of the economy is characterized by bonded labor, serfdom, debt peonage, and the near monopoly pricing of unskilled labor?

Even if one grants that in some circumstances children must work, there is no doubt that children are vastly worse off than they would be if laws created and enforced genuinely free markets, including the right to exit from employment and restrictions on monopoly and monopsony, with perhaps the state stepping in as a source of credit to poor families. Developing and strengthening democratic political and economic institutions is likely to be an essential component in the process of ending child labor.

In the absence of broad changes in policy and commitment, different interventions will lead to different trade-offs between values. For example, imposing a uniform and egalitarian educational system in a country may discriminate against children who are at greatest social and economic disadvantage. Some families may simply not be able to afford to send their children to school full time. But allowing some children to attend school part time undermines a commitment to educational equity and perhaps perpetuates caste and geographic inequalities. Tolerating child labor in some countries will give rise to worries about unfair competition in the international context. When considering various policy tools it is thus extremely important to be explicit about which values are being favored.

## CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter I have used my framework to argue for a position between the absolutists who want to immediately abolish all forms of child labor and the contextualists who seek to accommodate it.<sup>25</sup> Trade-offs among different values are inevitable, but there is good reason to draw some bottom lines. Child labor that is abusive to children—prostitution, bondage, slavery, and the employment of children as soldiers—threatens the core of their lives and should not be tolerated. There are other ways for children to provide income for their families that do not involve such extreme harm. But trade-offs between different values above this line need to be weighed in working to eliminate other forms of child labor that score especially high along one or more of the normative dimensions.

Although different people, organizations, families, and states will draw those trade-offs in different ways, it is important to keep the focus on what different policies do to individual children, not to aggregates. Limits should be placed on the costs that policies impose on children in the name of future familial or societal benefits. Children are not mere things, to be used and discarded. Contextualism must be guided and regulated by the universalist standards we are trying to realize.

In a sense the normative perspective proposed here is broadly humanitarian, giving priority to the securing of a decent minimum level of capacities and resources for all children. But the content of this humanitarianism is itself tied to a conception of equality: providing children with the resources they need to be independent adults. As Walzer described this conception of equality, “No more bowing and scraping, fawning and toadying; no more fearful trembling; no more high and mightiness; no more masters, no more slaves.”<sup>26</sup> Additionally insofar as liberal democratic institutions are instrumental to that humanitarian goal, promoting them must be part of overall strategies for addressing child labor. Indeed gradualist approaches to ending child labor are more likely to succeed in the context of accountable political entities. The poor are undoubtedly better off when governments do not devote themselves to theft or ethnically based spoils systems but to providing health clinics, primary schools, roads, and communications. Diminishing certain kinds of social inequality may also lead to better outcomes for the most vulnerable and least advantaged.

The state of the world may justify the use of some gradualist measures, but we need to be attentive to the trajectory of societies using child labor. It makes a great deal of difference whether child labor is a transitional strategy that can deliver future benefits to the child or a strategy of exploitation, propping up the profits of ruthless merchants, selfish parents, or corrupt governments or satisfying the whims of sadistic employers. It is thus crucial to establish benchmarks for progress in educating children. These benchmarks can foster accountability and allow tracking of what is actually happening over time to children's interests. If children's interests are to be realized, NGOs and lending institutions need to hold the parties they work with—parents, local villages, corporations, national governments—accountable for what happens to children.<sup>27</sup>

More data and empirical research are needed to identify which gradualist policies should be favored in which contexts. For example, although the claim is sometimes made that children benefit from child labor under some circumstances, insufficient attention has been paid in the empirical literature to the question of whether the child who is working is the *same* child who benefits.

Data are also needed (although difficult to come by) on intrahousehold trade-offs between children and between adults and children. It makes a great deal of difference whether all the children in a family work a little but all go to school or whether daughters are pulled completely out of school so that sons need not work. It is therefore important to continue to gather data on lower levels of analysis to assess the relevance of gender and other factors. Collecting these data could help policymakers formulate effective interventions. They could reveal, for example, that the focus should be on informing parents and teachers about the importance of educating girls or that, if this could be effective, lending agencies should make some of their loans conditional on achieving gender equity in education.

Too much of the data we currently have are underinclusive. In particular very few studies provide data on girls working at home who do not attend school. Indeed the ILO does not include such girls in its statistics on child labor. This limitation on who counts as a working child may be behind the category of nowhere children, children who are neither at work nor at school. Although it may be extremely difficult to obtain survey data on girls working at home, those data are critically

important for assessing the effectiveness and the normative adequacy of different policies.

Attention also needs to be paid to children who combine work and school. Subsidy programs may draw children into school without reducing the family's need for the child's labor. Kabeer has noted the implications of this "double burden" for children's achievements and well-being.<sup>28</sup> Studying this group of children is especially important insofar as gradualist strategies for combating child labor are adopted.

Good empirical projects are needed to investigate how and why some states and governments have made substantial progress in educating their children. Poor countries do differ in what they provide to their children. In India, for example, states with similar levels of poverty have dramatically different levels of educational performance. In Uttar Pradesh only 32 percent of rural twelve- to fourteen-year-old girls have ever attended school, about a third as many as in Kerala, where 98 percent of girls this age have attended school.<sup>29</sup> What factors explain this difference in outcomes?<sup>30</sup>

Child labor was once prevalent in what is now the industrial world. Eliminating it in poor societies may not be feasible on the basis of the resources and institutions of those societies. But a key difference between historical and contemporary cases of child labor is that today the industrial world exists. Increasing development aid, ending protectionist policies that close off markets to poor countries, encouraging multinationals to pay higher wages to adult workers, facilitating partnerships in the research and development of products needed by the poor (vaccines, drugs), empowering democratic institutions around the world, and transferring technology may all make a difference. The need for a well-funded global initiative on basic schooling, stressed by the United Nations, is also clear. Child labor may be understandable in parts of the world as a response to poverty. But different distributions of wealth and power would undercut the need for child labor. Much depends on whether these alternative distributions can be realized.<sup>31</sup>