where the beast *now is*, then Mr. White can again accuse him of having failed to lead the target. But if Achilles moves as he is required to do in order for Zeno to have his Paradox at all, then he must move ωστ' αεί τι προέχειν αναγκαιον το βραδυτερον—"so that the slower must always be a bit ahead" (B26).

It isn't that the shade of Achilles was misled by the shade of Zeno into thinking that he had a problem where none really existed. Rather, by confusing the concepts of *intercepting* and *overtaking*, Mr. White has been misled into thinking that he had no problem where one may really exist. Whatever may be the ultimate analysis appropriate to Zeno's Paradox, it cannot be resolved by simply replacing it with some quite different, non-paradoxical substitute.

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NOTE

[1] "Achilles at the Shooting Gallery," *Mind*, 72:141 (January 1963).

# *Another Look at Bare Particulars*

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CHAPPELL's basic criticism of "Bare Particulars"[1] is that it engages a *spurious* problem; namely, to show that one is presented with bare particulars. The criticism rests on these claims: (I) The realistic analysis is itself a response to a spurious problem—the individuation problem, as I shall call it. (II) The "correct" solution to the "spurious" individuation problem does not require bare particulars.

I shall ignore (I). Chappell does not support it (perhaps because he believes that he can, if necessary, solve the individuation problem without bare particulars). He merely alludes to the current dogma that ontological problems arise from mistaken views about reference. I shall not ignore (II). Chappell does support it, but unsuccessfully, as I shall show. He argues that relations individuate.

I shall not ignore two other criticisms made by Chappell. (1) A proponent of the realistic analysis cannot exhibit the difference *in kind* between bare particulars and characters. (2) My defense of the realistic analysis

against the acquaintance objection is dialectical and not, as I allege, descriptive.

Assume that there are *two* things both of which have the *same* nonrelational characters. What accounts for their being (numerically) *different*? That is the problem of individuation. To grasp it as well as to solve it, one must attend to the uses of 'same' and 'different.' I begin with 'same' in 'same characters.'

For convenience, assume that our two things have but one nonrelational character, say, a color. Let 'R' be the name given to that color. In saying that the things have the *same* color I mean, first, that 'R' is (truly) applicable to each thing and, second, that the entity *in* the one thing that grounds or justifies the application of 'R' is *indistinguishable* from the entity *in* the other. R is an entity; in particular, a character. Moreover, in the case at hand, it is *in* both things—that is the implication of saying that the color of the one is indistinguishable from the color of the other.

At this point I must try to put down a nominalistic uprising. Many, though not apparently Chappell, would object to the claim that R is *in two* things; that is, that *one and the same* character is a constituent of both things.[2] The uprising has four main roots.

i. *Since 'R' applies to two things, its ground must be different.* This root grows out of confusing the character of a thing with the thing having it; or, analogously, out of confusing that which grounds the application of 'R' with what 'R' is applied to.[3] By speaking of 'R' both as the name of a color and as applying to (being a name of) a thing, we create the illusion that R *cannot* be a constituent of two things. The common-proper name terminology misleads us into believing that since 'R' applies to two things it must name two characters.

ii. *Since the things are in different places, R must also be in different places. That is absurd: a "thing" cannot be in two places at once.* This root also grows out of confusing a thing with its characters. Here, however, the confusion is spawned by the ambiguity of 'in.' Things, but not their characters, are in places, for things, but not their characters, exemplify spatial relations. By speaking of characters as *in* things we tempt oursèlves to think of characters as *parts* of things and thus as *spatial* parts of things. But characters are *in* things only in the sense that they are elements or constituents of the analysis of things. Of course, one might try—indeed some have tried—to deny that things have constituents. The denial is absurd. 'R' applies to a thing because the thing is R. Plainly, the thing is not R because 'R' applies to it.

iii. *One character cannot be a constituent of two things, for each thing has "a" character. There is "the color of the one" and "the color of the*

*other." Hence, even if two things have the same shade of color, each must have a (numerically) different character.* This root grows out of misunderstanding such phrases as 'the color of this' and 'the color of that.' Those phrases do not single out characters which are particular in the sense of being peculiar to the things having them. Rather, they single out characters which are particular in the sense of being distinguishable from other characters. 'The color of this,' 'the white in Socrates,' and so on are names of specific shades of colors. The names are specific because the things having the colors named are unique. Two things may nevertheless have the same specific shade of color.

iv. *To say that two things have the same color is merely to say that their "colors" are exactly similar.* 'Similar' and 'exactly similar' are forever ensnaring us. 'A is similar to B' and 'A is exactly similar to B,' where 'A' and 'B' refer to things, are analyzable into statements containing 'same'; e.g., 'A and B have the same color' and 'A and B have the same characters.' ('Same' may not mean "one and the same." Two things having different shades of red are sometimes said to have the same color: they are called by the same color word. 'Same' may mean "one and the same," though. Two things having the same shade of color are sometimes said to have the same color: the color of the one is indistinguishable from the color of the other.) Now two shades of red may also be said to be similar. (How this use of 'similar' is to be analyzed is a further issue.) It thus appears that we may also speak of two characters as exactly similar. That is, it appears that two characters may be merely numerically different. But we cannot give a sense to such difference without either putting characters in space or blurring the difference between characters and things. One could, of course, maintain that characters, like things, are complex. But that leads once more to the individuation problem, though now at the level of characters. 'A is exactly similar to B,' where 'A' and 'B' refer to characters, means, if anything, that 'A' and 'B' refer to one and the same character. Different words or phrases (e.g., 'the white in this paper' and 'the white in Socrates'), even though they have different "meanings," do not imply that the entities they name are different.

I turn again to our two things. They have the same nonrelational character. Each contains R. Faced with that fact, a proponent of the realistic analysis claims that each thing also contains a bare particular. The bare particulars, being different, account for the numerical difference of the things; account, in other words, for our referring to the things as "the one" and "the other." Bare particulars are, therefore, the entities *in* things accounting for the numerical difference *of* things.

Chappell, though apparently agreeing that two things may and sometimes

do have the same nonrelational characters, rejects the realistic analysis. He argues that the admitted relational difference of the two things accounts for their being numerically different. Chappell tries to solve the individuation problem by making relations *individuate*. (He uses, revealingly, 'differentiates.') This solution will not do, as Russell once demonstrated.[4] Relations—I'll stick with spatial ones—*presuppose* numerical difference; they do not account for it. The *thisness* and the *thatness* of things is presupposed in saying that *the one* is to the left of *the other*. Were it not, then in at least some cases we would be forced to say what we all know to be false; namely, that the same *thing* is to the left of itself.

That relations presuppose the numerical difference of the things exemplifying the relations may be brought out in the following way. Let us represent things by means of the nonrelational characters in them, and let 'A,' 'B,' 'C,' and so on stand for different sets of characters. (The difference is with respect to one or more characters.) Further, let 'L' stand for to-the-left-of; and 'L(—,. . .)' be the form for representing the fact that L is exemplified. Given that there are things which have the same nonrelational characters, we may encounter this representation 'L(A,A).' Thus we would have to say that the same thing is to the left of itself. But we do not wish to say that, for, as we know, there is one thing to the left of the other. Hence, in representing that things are spatially related, something more than merely characters and relations must be *represented*. The question is: Is that something more *presented*?

One may object at this point, maintaining that L *cannot* be exemplified by one thing. I agree. But we know that only because we know that things exemplifying L are at least numerically different. And our knowledge of that is primary. It does not depend on our knowing that the things stand in different relations. That L is asymmetrical is factual, not logical.

The mistaken belief that relations individuate derives from confusing numerical difference—call it simply difference—with qualitative (relational or nonrelational) difference—call it simply nonidentity. Difference is primary; nonidentity is not. That may be shown by considering a representation, an improved language as some say, built in accord with the rule that there is but one sign for one entity. In such a representation, the difference of two entities, say, *a* and *b*, shows itself in the difference of '*a*' and '*b*.' The nonidentity of *a* and *b* shows itself in the occurrence of at least two sentences, one true and the other false, which are the same except for the one containing '*a*,' the other '*b*.' One implication of distinguishing difference from nonidentity is that the former does not logically entail the latter. More pointedly, the Russell-Leibniz definition of '$\neq$' cannot be used to transcribe 'different,' only 'nonidentical.'[5]

The fundamental difference *in kind* between particulars and characters is that the former are bare, the latter are not. That is, particulars cannot be recognized ('re-recognized' would be better perhaps), characters can be. This is brought out by the fact that (at least some) characters are reidentifiable without criteria, things are not. There may, of course, be further differences between particulars and characters. Whether or not there are depends, first, on how particulars and characters are *tied* into things (that is, on what *tie* ties particulars and characters into things), and, second, on how spatial relations are tied to things (that is, on whether things or the particulars *in* them exemplify the spatial relations in which things are said to stand). But whether or not there are further categorial differences, there is at least this one: particulars are bare, characters are not.

I turn finally to Chappell's criticism that I defend dialectically against the acquaintance objection. The point of the criticism is that I claim, in effect, that one must be presented with particulars because the individuation problem cannot be solved without them. The key passage is this: ". . . the two collections of characters . . . are as presented numerically different. Clearly, therefore, something other than a character must be presented. That something is what the proponents of the realistic analysis call a bare particular."

At issue is the use of 'must.' Unlike Chappell, I do not think that its use is dialectical. Whatever force it has in the quoted passage is founded on the requirement of completely describing the things. If one is to give a complete description of what is presented when presented with two things having the same nonrelational characters, then one must include their numerical difference. Further, since the description is in terms of entities, one must include bare particulars, the entities which carry the numerical difference, the entities which ground the numerical difference of the things.

Particulars are controversial. Hence, no description of things yielding particulars will be dialectically untainted. Consequently, I conclude by outlining one root of the claim that they are not presented.

Assume that '*this*' refers to a thing; that a thing consists, *at the minimum*, of what we call its characters (properties); and that we can know, just by looking, all the characters of *this*. Suppose we are presented with *this*. What are we presented with? *This*. Of course. But we are also presented with the constituents of *this*, even though we may not immediately notice them. What are those constituents? To find out we must describe *this*. Suppose *this* is R, S, and C. The temptation is to claim that R, S, and C are the constituents of *this*. But here we have identified description with predication and so have excluded the possibility of including in our description that which accounts for the *thisness* of *this*. In describing a single thing, the

omission does not disturb. But in describing two things having the same characters, the omission does disturb. One thus says that things plainly contain bare particulars, which are, like characters, presented. However, a particular is different in kind from a character and is thus squeezed out of the description. One cannot predicate a particular of a thing. For, particulars, being bare, cannot be named as characters can be. Particulars are in that sense ineffable. Moreover, the only words we have for referring to them are 'this' and 'that,' and these are used to refer to things. Particulars are once more ineffable. They are not therefore unpresentable, though.

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NOTES

[1] *Philosophical Studies*, 14:1–8 (January–February 1963).

[2] Implicit in this objection is the nominalistic doctrine that characters are as unique as the things they characterize. For an explicit statement and defense of the doctrine see A. K. Stout, "The Nature of Universals and Propositions," *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. 10 (1921–23), pp. 157–72. For two excellent criticisms of the doctrine see G. E. Moore, "Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Universal or Particular?" *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Vol. III (1923), pp. 95–113, and Gustav Bergmann, "Synthetic *A Priori*," *Logic and Reality* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), pp. 272–301.

[3] The confusion (along with some others) is handsomely exemplified in the following remark by Austin (*Philosophical Papers* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 90n2): ". . . for a statement to be true one state of affairs must be *like* certain others, which is a natural relation, but also *sufficiently* like to merit the same 'description,' which is no longer a purely natural relation. . . . That things are *similar*, or even 'exactly' similar, I may literally see, but that they are the *same* I cannot literally see—in calling them the same colour a convention is involved additional to the conventional choice of the name to be given to the colour which they are said to be." The slide from things to their characters is patent. For an excellent criticism of the proper-common name doctrine see Reinhardt Grossmann, "Common Names," in Edwin B. Allaire *et al.*, *Essays in Ontology* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), pp. 64–75.

[4] Bertrand Russell, "On the Relations of Universals and Particulars," *Logic and Knowledge* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956), pp. 105–24.

[5] Cf. Gustav Bergmann, "Sameness, Meaning and Identity," *Meaning and Existence* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1960), pp. 132–38.

# *D-Words, A-Words, and G-Words*

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NOWELL-SMITH seems to argue that if we understand the functions of A- and G-words such as 'amusing' and 'worth-seeing,' we are well on the way