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In a footnote in *Science, Perception and Reality* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 282 Sellars offers the following as the "neatest way in which to expose the absurdity of the notion of bare particulars": The statement "Universals are exemplified by bare particulars" is self-contradictory as is evident if it is translated into logical notation, viz. $(x)[(\exists\phi)(\phi x) \supset \sim(\exists\phi)(\phi x)]$. This translation of the statement "Universals are exemplified by bare particulars" certainly *does* reduce it to an absurdity—although the statement cited by Sellars is *not* a contradiction. For Sellars' translation entails '$(x) \sim (\exists\phi)(\phi x)$' and certainly anyone who holds that 'universals are exemplified by bare particulars' countenances the existence of some properties and thus would undoubtedly claim that '$(\exists x)(\exists\phi)(\phi x)$' is true—hence, if Sellars' translation of the claim 'universals are exemplified by bare particulars' is correct, he has exposed the absurdity of bare particulars.

A puckish defender of bare particulars is well advised to follow the lead of Sir Kenneth Clark and distinguish between the naked and the nude. Particulars are *nude* in that they have no natures, that is, they are *not necessarily connected* to any specific property or set of properties. A **nude** particular has no **nature,** and is to be distinguished from the **naked** particular which has no **properties.** Those who claim that there are bare particulars, Russell, Bergmann, Allaire, *et al.,* claim that they are nude of *natures, not* that they are naked of *properties.* What Sellars has shown, albeit in a Pickwickian manner, is that the jade who prefers his particulars *naked* must descend to nominalism (the view that there are no properties—i.e., $(x) \sim (\exists\phi)(\phi x)$). But this reduction to nominalism is simply inapplicable to those who prefer their particulars nude. And this becomes evident if we translate the claim "universals are exemplified by bare particulars" into logical notation reading 'bare' *unequivocally* as denuded of a nature—but *not* shorn of properties. Let 'ψ' be a predicate variable ranging over all and only those properties which are necessarily connected to certain particulars; either of the following constitutes a correct translation of 'universals are exemplified by bare particulars':

$$(x)[(\exists\phi)(\phi x) \cdot \sim (\exists\psi)(\psi x)]$$

$$(x)[(\exists\phi)(\phi x) \supset (\psi)(\phi \neq \psi)]$$

Neither of these entail the absurd nominalist claim that

$$(x) \sim (\exists\phi)(\phi x)$$