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Errata: Particulars: Bare, Naked, and Nude

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from all the problematic consequences, is to give up the whole point of using "is true of," since this latter notion is introduced to avoid the futility of the extreme form of nominalism. Second, one could consider "W" as indicating a constituent of *a* and hold, in idealistic fashion, that such a constituent of a particular is a necessary constituent since no whole could be what it is without having just the parts it does have. This also gives up the gambit since "W" then *refers*, in the sense of  $R_1$ , to something while being *true of* the particular *a*. Moreover, what type of entity could "W" refer to but a property?

Aside from the ontological concern with universals there may be another motive behind the introduction of "is true of." We may consider that "refer" is more accurately taken to indicate a relation between signs, sign users and sign referents. As such it may be construed behavioristically. This is just to say that our using signs to refer to objects is a form of behavior. Asserting sentences is also behaving. But whether a sentence is true or false is not a matter of behavior. Yet the assimilation of "is true of" and "refer" might aid the further assimilation of both the asserting and the truth of sentences to the behavioristics of language usage. The "is true of" gambit may thus obscure the fact that truth is one thing and human behavior another. This perhaps indicates an affinity for the pragmatic-idealistic conception of truth. Thus there may be more behind or implicit in the gambit than the attempt to avoid a platonistic ontology. Be that as it may, we may conclude, first, that the use of "is true of" fails as a cogent nominalistic alternative and, second, that ontological commitments made through the use of a language are a matter not only of what entities one recognizes the language to be tied to but of what means one employs to tie the language to objects so that sentences may be "about" them and true.

## *Errata*

# NOÛS

## *Errata in Number 2*

p. 212 line 8 for  $(x)[(\exists\phi)(\phi x) \supset (\psi)(\phi \neq \psi)]$   
 read  $(x)(\exists\phi)[(\phi x) \supset (\psi)(\phi \neq \psi)]$