game is played and another to ask whether we *ought* to play it, the latter raising a question as to its Value.

It may be suggestive to try to think of a kind of "language" to which Ryle's word-tool analogy, as he uses it, is peculiarly appropriate. We have seen that Ryle's misreading of its strength and weakness confuses the exposition he would give of the use of "use" in the analysis of ordinary language. On the other hand, his analogy, as he uses it, is appropriate to the distinctions one can make in explaining a logical calculus. So long as questions of extrasystematic interpretation, of Value, are excluded, analysis of a formal system can remain purely syntactic: this usual and useful exclusion makes it superfluous to distinguish Value from Function. Questions of Function, if they could as such be asked, could only be answered and be fully answered in terms of intra-systematic convenience. Questions of usage would be irrelevant. Ryle's suggestion that analysis confine itself to what can be learned from consideration of informal syntactic rules—and insistence on the sentence-frame technique amounts to this—leads us to suspect that the model of language with which he here unconsciously operates is that of a formal system, a calculus.[6] There is a ghost in Ryle's concept of ordinary language, which has yet to be exorcised.

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NOTES

[1] Ryle, "Ordinary Language," *Philosophical Review*, 62:167–86 (1953).

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 174–75.

[3] Cf. Ryle's "Categories," reprinted in *Logic and Language*, second series, edited by A. Flew (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), pp. 65–81, especially 76ff.

[4] S. Toulmin, "Concept-Formation in Philosophy and Psychology," in *Dimensions of Mind*, edited by S. Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1960), pp. 212–13.

[5] Ryle, "Ordinary Language," p. 174.

[6] For a more complete discussion of this see Frank A. Tillman, "Truth and Meaning: Two Concepts at Issue in Contemporary Anglo-American Philosophy" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1958).

Particulars Re-Clothed

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IN HIS paper "Bare Particulars" Allaire seeks to reconcile what he calls the "individual-character analysis," or later the "realistic analysis," of things like

colored discs with the Russellian "principle of acquaintance."[1] He wants to show that these are not incompatible, presumably, because he thinks that both are correct or true and ought to be accepted by philosophers. It seems to me, however, that both the individual-character analysis and the principle of acquaintance are mistaken at best. If so, the task of reconciling them is no real problem for philosophers, however interesting it might be as an academic exercise.

The individual-character analysis is evidently founded on certain views about reference, or rather about what Allaire calls reference, which is to say, broadly, about how linguistic expressions apply or are applied to things. True sentences refer (or are used to refer) to facts, demonstratives refer to characterless ("bare") particulars, adjectives in the predicate position refer to universals. Allaire does not defend these views in his paper, so I do not know just how to take them. Taken literally, however, they seem to me to be wrong, wrong about reference and wrong in what they imply about facts, particulars, and universals. Taken in some other way, they may be true but true by definition, and not only can I see no reason for accepting the consequent definitions, I think there is good reason not to accept them, namely that they produce or invite confusion. An instance of such confusion shows, I think, in the considerations concerning sameness and difference which Allaire cites to support the individual-character analysis. It is a strength of this analysis, he claims, that it can "account" for the sameness and difference of things. In fact it is no strength but a foregone conclusion, for Allaire's conception of what is required to account for the sameness and difference of things is surely determined by this analysis, or by the views about "reference" which determine it. In any case, Allaire's conception of sameness and difference is very curious, to say the least. Among the views he seems to hold are that two things cannot be similar unless they have some numerically identical element in common, and that two things cannot be numerically different unless each has some unique element which it does not share with the other, both of which seem to me to be false. Allaire also holds that sameness, by which I think he here means similarity, must be "grounded in entities," i.e., cannot just be a matter of linguistic convention, except that it is just or mainly that in some cases. This is muddled if not plainly wrong: numerical sameness is always and qualitative sameness or similarity is sometimes a matter of linguistic convention, but neither is ever *just* that, but is also in part a matter of "entities" or of facts. In any case, Allaire's allusions to sameness and difference confound the individual-character analysis; they certainly do not support it. Nor can I think of any sound argument which would support it, or which would justify the "bare particulars" which it requires.

As for the principle of acquaintance, Allaire says one thing that I think is plainly false, namely that there is a sense of "know" in which "to know" means "to be acquainted with." Of course I may know Jones by being acquainted with him, but this is not the sense of "acquainted with" that Allaire has in mind, or anyhow that Russell had in mind; for in that sense I cannot be acquainted with Jones or with anybody or anything other than my own sense data. Secondly, Allaire implies that when one has experience or is experiencing something one is acquainted with something (in the requisite sense), and this too I think is false, unless again made a matter of definition. Thirdly, I think it is doubtful that anyone is ever acquainted with anything in the Allairian, Russellian sense. Finally, the principle of acquaintance is certainly not, as Allaire says, "a basic tenet of empiricism," if by that he means either that all empiricists do or that any empiricist must hold it to be true.

In sum, I think there are serious and indeed vitiating difficulties in the views and assumptions from which Allaire's problem, or supposed problem, arises. I do not see that his problem is a genuine one at all—though of course there are great and important problems about the topics with which these views and assumptions are concerned.

But this is not all. It also seems to me that Allaire's proposed solution to his problem is defective, quite apart from the fact that the problem is, from the outset, spurious. I shall mention three ways in which it is defective.

1. Allaire's solution fails to meet his own condition for such a solution, that it be a result of "phenomenological description" and not a mere response to "dialectical needs." I think it is doubtful that there is any such thing as phenomenological description in the sense Allaire intends, or that if there is it has any place in philosophy. But that aside, I think it is clear that Allaire's solution is not the report of a discovery, and not a description of something found at all. His very language gives him away. He says we are acquainted with bare particulars upon occasion (hence the principle of acquaintance is not violated), namely when we are presented with two things that are exactly similar in all non-relational respects, i.e., that differ *solo numero*, at one and the same time. But we are acquainted with them because we *must* be, Allaire says; "something other than a character must also be presented" (p. 7). We are presented with two things as two things, which by hypothesis differ only numerically; hence we must be presented with their difference also, or rather with "what accounts for it," namely the two "numerically different individuals" (bare particulars). The two individuals are not presented; they must be acknowledged to account for what is presented: two different but exactly similar things. This certainly sounds like argument and not discovery, like "dialectics" and not "phenomenology."

2. The conclusion which constitutes Allaire's solution to his problem is a *non sequitur*. I have suggested that this solution does spring from an argument; the argument is that since when we are presented with two things differing *solo numero* we are presented with two things, we must be presented with their difference, or that which accounts for their difference; and this can only be the different bare particulars which the two respectively embody, since by hypothesis they do not differ in respect of any character or property. But the hypothesis is that they do not differ in respect of any *non-relational* property. Not only may they differ in respect of relational properties, but if the two are presented to a perceiver they *must* differ in respect of some such properties at least—one must appear at some distance and in some direction from the other, for example, and though the other appears at the same distance from it, it does not appear in the same direction from it. That A is north of B is then sufficient to differentiate the two, since B cannot be north of A; the differentiation is established by this difference in the relational properties of A and B, and since this difference is sufficient to differentiate them, i.e., to enable a perceiver to perceive them as two, there is no need to call in the supposed bare particulars which each embodies or contains. It is just the absence of this difference in relational properties (at least in those properties resulting from their relation to one another) that makes the two things indistinguishable when they are not "presented together." Hence Allaire's conclusion, that the two things owe their appearance as two, when they are presented together, to their perceiver's capacity to discern or "be acquainted with" their respective bare particulars, does not follow.

3. Allaire's solution seems to me to be inconsistent with the doctrines that form the dialectical conditions from which the solution emerges. Allaire concludes that the numerical difference, or the ground of the numerical difference, of two exactly similar things, which is to say the bare particulars which they respectively embody, is presented when they are presented together. But if so, how can it be maintained that this numerical difference is not itself a character, albeit not a non-relational character? Or better, how can it be maintained that the bare particularity of a thing is not a character, one which makes its appearance only when the thing is presented to a perceiver with another, contrasting thing? The ground of the distinction between characters and individuals or bare particulars would seem to disappear (if it ever did exist) if the bare particularity of a thing be allowed to appear in perception, even under special conditions. Or to put it the other way around, if a difference between two things can appear in perception, as Allaire alleges the numerical difference of two exactly similar things can do, how can it be maintained that the difference is one of number solely? If

the difference were solely one of number it ought to be incapable of appearing or being presented in perception; two things differing *solo numero* must be absolutely indiscernible, not merely indistinguishable under some conditions.

I suspect that what is at the bottom of a good deal of what I take to be defective in Allaire's position is a confusion over the relation between numerical and qualitative difference—and, correspondingly, over the relation between numerical and qualitative sameness or similarity—a confusion which has given rise, *inter alia*, to the doctrine of the identity of indiscernibles. In this Allaire appears to follow Leibniz, and Leibniz, I think, was wrong.

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NOTE

[1] *Philosophical Studies*, 14:1–8 (1963).

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