

## HAECCEITAS AND THE BARE PARTICULAR

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ACCORDING TO DUNS SCOTUS, what makes a material substance an individual is a positive entity which falls within the category of substance and contracts the specific nature to this or that.<sup>1</sup> That entity, called *haecceitas*, together with the formal distinction, constitutes the core of Scotus' theory of individuation.<sup>2</sup> But what is

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<sup>1</sup> John Duns Scotus, *Lectura in Librum Secundum Sententiarum*, dist. 3, q. 6, in *Opera Omnia*, ed. Balić (Rome: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1954–1982). For the translations given in this article I depend upon the following unpublished translation: John Duns Scotus, *Six Questions on Individuation from the Oxford Lectures*, Book II, Distinction 3, trans. Allan B. Wolter, from a transcription of *Duns Scoti Lectura II*, dist. 3, qq. 1–6, Vienna manuscript, cod. lat. 1449 (Nationalbibliothek), (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1981). According to Joseph Owens, Scotus treats extensively of “the nature taken just in itself” in the three parallel places where he is concerned with the problem of individuation. They are *Opus oxoniense*, II, dist. 3, qq. 1–6; *Reportata Parisiensia*, II, 12, 3–8, ed. Vivès, vol. 23, 20–41 [ed. Wadding, vol. 11.1, 323–3]; and *Quaestiones Subtillissimae in Metaphysicam Aristotelis*, ed. Vivès, vol. 7, 13, 402–26 [ed. Wadding, vol. 4, 697–710]. See J. Owens, “Common Nature: A Point of Comparison between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics,” in *Inquiries into Medieval Philosophy*, ed. J. F. Ross, (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Co., 1971), 185–209. *Lectura* is Scotus' original set of notes for his lectures as a bachelor at Oxford, while *Ordinatio* is his own revised version of these notes. *Ordinatio* has been generally considered to be authentic and is usually called “*Opus oxoniense*.” But recently A. Vos has cast doubt on the authenticity of *Ordinatio*. He claims that *Lectura* is the true *Opus oxoniense* because *Ordinatio* is neither a work of Scotus nor a book written in Oxford; see A. Vos, “On the Philosophy of the Young Duns Scotus: Some Semantical and Logical Aspects,” in *Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics*, ed. E. P. Bos (Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers, 1985), p. 198 and p. 217, n. 7. In his recent study of Scotus' theory of individuation, Wolter is heavily indebted to *Lectura*, even though he treats *Ordinatio* as authentic. I try to follow Wolter's example in this paper. See Wolter, “Scotus,” in *Individuation in Scholasticism: The Late Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation*, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia (München and Wien: Philosophia Verlag, forthcoming).

<sup>2</sup> In addition to Wolter's study, see T. Rudavsky's work on Scotus' theory of individuation as well as her “The Doctrine of Individuation in

*haecceitas*? *Haecceitas* is not definable. Nor can we be acquainted with it. Then how could we understand it? Both negatively and positively, Scotus himself tried to give an answer to this question. Before presenting his *haecceitas* theory, Scotus criticized six different types of rival theories available in his day: the position of the nominalists, the double negation theory, the theory of individuation by actual existence, the theory of individuation by quantity or other accidents, the theory of individuation by matter, and the theory attributed to Godfrey of Fontaines. In other words, he was explaining “what *haecceitas* is not” when he criticized these theories. More importantly, he tried to give us a positive characterization of *haecceitas*. Since he used “individual difference” as a synonym for “*haecceitas*,” he resorted to an analogy between the specific difference and the individual difference in order to explain the notion of *haecceitas*.<sup>3</sup> The problem is that twentieth-century ontologists may not be patient enough to study the triple analogy, which again presupposes Scotus’ doctrines of the formal distinction and the ultimate difference.<sup>4</sup> In order to draw their attention to Scotus’ theory of individuation, one would need to discuss the following questions: How can we translate the term “*haecceitas*” into modern terminology? Is there any counterpart of *haecceitas* in contemporary ontology? For what reasons should we reintroduce *haecceitas* into the current discussion of individuation, if it has a good counterpart? Is there still anything significant left to add to our understanding of *haecceitas*?

The aim of the present paper is to provide a partial answer to these questions and thereby to revive the interest in Scotus’ theory of individuation. If we are successful, ultimately we will be able to contribute to the larger project of bridging the gap between medieval

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Duns Scotus,” *Franziskanische Studien* 59 (1977): 320–77; (Fortsetzung), vol. 62 (1980): 62–83. For Scotus’ doctrine of the formal distinction, the following two studies should be consulted: M. J. Grajewski, *The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1944), and M. J. Jordan, “Duns Scotus on the Formal Distinction” (Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University, 1984). See also Woosuk Park, “Common Nature and *Haecceitas*,” *Franziskanische Studien* 71 (1989): 188–92.

<sup>3</sup> Dist. 3, q. 6, nn. 170–2.

<sup>4</sup> See Allan B. Wolter, *The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1946) for a succinct account of Scotus’ theory of ultimate differences.

and contemporary discussions of individuation.<sup>5</sup> We will begin by outlining the basic argument of this paper.

When one searches for a contemporary ontology which might help us understand Scotus' notion of *haecceitas*, Gustav Bergmann's bare particular theory of individuation immediately suggests itself because of the close similarity between the bare particular and *haecceitas*.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, some scholars have indicated that the bare particular and *haecceitas* are quite similar because (1) both have the sole function of individuation, (2) both are characterless, and (3) both are too ultimate and simple to be definable.<sup>7</sup> However, there is also a totally different interpretation of *haecceitas*, which interprets *haecceitas* as an individual essence or coordinate quality. This latter interpretation is found in contemporary analytic ontology as well as in the history of modern philosophy.<sup>8</sup> As will be shown,

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<sup>5</sup> Though it is well known that medieval scholastics were fascinated by the problem of individuation, discussions of individuation in contemporary philosophy rarely pay attention to the history of the problem. Jorge Gracia's works are a notable exception to the rule. See, for example, his *Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages*, 2nd ed. (München and Wien: Philosophia Verlag, 1988).

<sup>6</sup> For a quick survey of Bergmann's bare particular theory, one may refer to the paper "Synthetic *a priori*" in his *Logic and Reality* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964). Also useful are the papers collected in E. B. Allaire et al., eds., *Essays in Ontology* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1963).

<sup>7</sup> J. Gracia, *Suárez on Individuation* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1982), 221–2. Also, see L. Mackay, "Singular and Universal: A Franciscan Perspective," *Franciscan Studies* 39 (1979): 130–64; L. B. McCullough, "The Early Philosophy of Leibniz on Individuation: A Study of the 'Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui' of 1663" (Ph.D. diss., The University of Texas at Austin, 1975); T. P. McTighe, "Scotus, Plato and the Ontology of the Bare X," *The Monist* 49 (1965): 588–616.

<sup>8</sup> "Identity-with-Quine is an *individual essence* (individual concept, haecceity) of Quine. Let's say that a property *p* is *essential* to an object *x* iff it is not possible that *x* have its complement—equivalently, iff there is no possible world in which *x* exists but lacks *p*. Then, an essence of Quine is a property that he has essentially and is such that it is not possible that there be an object distinct from him that has it. In terms of possible worlds, an essence of Quine is a property he has in every world in which he exists, and one such that in no possible world is there an object distinct from him that has it. The view that proper names express individual essences has impressive historical credentials: it goes back to Scotus and, before him, to Boethius, . . ."; Alvin Plantinga, "The Boethian Compromise," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 15, no. 2 (April 1978): 132. "Historically, philosophers have used individual essences to individuate objects in space and time (for example Duns Scotus), and recently they have been

Bergmann also understands *haecceitas* as an individual essence, a coordinate quality, or both. I believe that such a misinterpretation of *haecceitas* is a stumbling block for any deeper comparative study of *haecceitas* ontology and the bare particular ontology. The major thesis of this paper, then, is that at least from Scotus' point of view, *haecceitas* cannot be understood as an individual essence or a coordinate quality.

Once the misinterpretation of *haecceitas* as an individual essence or a coordinate quality is corrected, the view which directs our attention to the similarities between *haecceitas* and the bare particular can be appreciated much better. Unfortunately, supporters of this view do not provide us with extensive comparisons of *haecceitas* and the bare particular, and we are left without precise knowledge as to the extent of the similarity between *haecceitas* and the bare particular. Indeed, it is not clear whether there is any significant difference between them. Apparently there are some differences that can be detected even in cursory investigation, and I shall point out some of them in the course of this paper. However, it is not my intention to give a complete comparison of *haecceitas* and the bare particular. I believe that the apparent differences between them are rooted in the structural differences between Scotus' and Bergmann's logic and metaphysics, the exposition of which is obviously beyond the scope of this paper. A secondary contribution of this paper will be the identification of some of the apparent differences between *haecceitas* and the bare particular.

My strategy is as follows. In section I, I shall report in what context and in what way Bergmann interprets *haecceitas* as an individual essence, a coordinate quality, or both. In section II, I shall show that, contrary to Bergmann's view, *haecceitas* cannot be an individual essence or coordinate quality or both. To carry out that task, I shall turn to Scotus' own writings on individuation. In section III, I shall point out some apparent differences between *haec-*

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used as principles of individuation for events"; Michael Losonsky, "Individual Essence," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (July 1987): 253. "The word 'haecceity' has traditionally been used to mean the same as 'individual essence' or 'essence of an individual thing'"; Roderick M. Chisholm, "Possibility without Haecceity," in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy XI: Studies in Essentialism*, ed. Peter A. French et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 160.

*ceitas* and the bare particular. Finally I shall also try to point out the direction where the explanation of those differences can be found.

I

In several places, Bergmann discusses Scotus' *haecceitas*. We may divide these discussions into two groups according to Bergmann's style or method of approach. In some places, where Bergmann deals with what he believes to be Scotus' theory of individuation as a rival to his bare particular theory, he feels compelled to give an interpretation of *haecceitas*.<sup>9</sup> We may say that in these cases Bergmann treats *haecceitas* for structural or systematic reasons. In other places, where he shows a quasi-historical interest in individuation, he also has to interpret *haecceitas* because Scotus' theory is one of the most influential theories of individuation in the history of philosophy.<sup>10</sup> We may say that in these cases Bergmann treats *haecceitas* for historical reasons.

Now we can observe an interesting fact. Bergmann interprets *haecceitas* as a coordinate quality when he treats it for structural or systematic reasons. On the other hand, he interprets *haecceitas* as an individual essence when he treats it for historical reasons. We shall examine both interpretations shortly.

Even more important than confirming that Bergmann in some places interprets *haecceitas* as an individual essence and in others as a coordinate quality is understanding how these two interpretations are related. Are they incompatible? Is there any inferential relation between them? Are they independent? With these questions in mind I shall proceed to examine each of the two interpretations.

(A) *Haecceitas as an Individual Essence*. Bergmann does not pretend to write a scholarly history, but he confesses that he would not know how to philosophize without the history that lives in him.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> For example, "Synthetic *a priori*," 287.

<sup>10</sup> For example, "Some Remarks on the Philosophy of Malebranche," in his *Meaning and Existence* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 191.

<sup>11</sup> Bergmann, "Intentionality," in *Meaning and Existence*, 3. Also, he thinks of his own style as analytic and quasi-historical; see "Russell's Examination of Leibniz Examined," in *Meaning and Existence*, 155.

So, while he never attempts to write a history of the problem of individuation, he gives some hints about how he appreciates the theories of individuation which have been influential in the history of philosophy.

In his critical remarks on Russell's interpretation of Leibniz, Bergmann gives us a one-paragraph survey of the previous theories of individuation. Since the purpose of the paragraph is merely to indicate various medieval aspects of Leibniz's view, we cannot complain that it is too short. Bergmann enumerates only four solutions for the problem of individuation. They are Aristotle's, Aquinas's, Scotus', and Leibniz's. Following the traditional interpretation, Bergmann understands that prime matter is the Aristotelian principle of individuation. He calls this solution the hylomorphic way. According to Bergmann, the second solution is the existential way of Aquinas. In this second way,

generic natures or essences, composed, except in the case of spirits, of both form and matter, are by divine acts endowed with "being."<sup>12</sup>

Though old, such an interpretation is by no means the standard interpretation of Aquinas. Traditionally, Aquinas has been thought to claim a theory of individuation by "designated matter."<sup>13</sup> But if Bergmann had understood designated matter as Aquinas's principle of individuation, he would have treated it as a variant of Aristotle's view or a type of spatio-temporal theory of individuation.

The third solution to the problem of individuation is a theory

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<sup>12</sup> Bergmann, "Russell's Examination of Leibniz Examined," 167.

<sup>13</sup> Since Aquinas explicitly defended in several places the view that designated matter is the principle of individuation, virtually everybody concedes that Aquinas had such a theory. What is troublesome is that it is not easy to understand what he meant by the term "designated matter." On account of the obscurity of this term there has been a continuing controversy concerning its interpretation. The first interpretation is that of orthodox Thomists. According to it, "designated matter" means "matter under determinate dimensions." This is generally conceded to be Aquinas's view in his later works. See Gracia, *Suárez on Individuation*, 17; *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 3, a. 3, *responsio*; *Summa Contra Gentiles* IV, 65. The second interpretation understands designated matter as "matter under indeterminate dimensions" and finds its textual support in some of Aquinas's early writings, such as *Commentary on Boethius' De trinitate*, q. 4, a. 2. Among the commentators of Aquinas who give a role to existence in individuation is Joseph Owens. See his "Thomas Aquinas on Individuation," in *Individuation in Scholasticism*.

Bergmann attributes to Scotus. Bergmann calls it “the essentialist way.” As Bergmann understands it, in the Scotist way

there are individual natures or *haecceitates*; I use, as Leibniz occasionally did, the term for the whole individual nature.<sup>14</sup>

Though short, this sentence is extremely clear about how Bergmann understands *haecceitas*: *haecceitas* consists of all the essential and accidental natures a singular thing has. Thus, the singular thing is identified with the set of all characteristics it has. In other words, the set of characteristics uniquely defines the singular thing. As Bergmann points out, such a set of characteristics has been thought to be the Leibnizian “individual essence.”

A similar attempt to enumerate the influential theories of individuation in the history of philosophy is found in Bergmann’s paper, “Some Remarks on the Philosophy of Malebranche.”<sup>15</sup> Here Bergmann is interested in the ontological grounds of the agreement and the difference between two cubes which are alike in all nonrelational respects.<sup>16</sup> Bergmann counts realism as one possible answer to the question of how the agreement and the difference are grounded. Since the problem of individuation plays a role in realist theories, Bergmann’s taxonomy of classical realism may also be viewed as a taxonomy of theories of individuation.<sup>17</sup>

Again, Bergmann enumerates four theories. Instead of giving an independent status to Leibniz’s theory, however, Bergmann introduces a new candidate, “roughly, moderate realism.” Also, Bergmann gives us further hints concerning how he views Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s solutions. But as far as Scotus’ theory is concerned we do not get any new information:

One variant assumes that no two situations agree in all universals. That makes it possible to solve the problem of individuation without recourse to particulars. This is what Scotus does.<sup>18</sup>

Though Bergmann does not explicitly use expressions such as “individual essence” or “individual nature,” this passage seems to

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<sup>14</sup> Bergmann, “Russell’s Examination of Leibniz Examined,” 167.

<sup>15</sup> In *Meaning and Existence*, 189–204.

<sup>16</sup> “Some Remarks on the Philosophy of Malebranche,” 190–1.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 191.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 191.

support the view that Bergmann sometimes interprets *haecceitas* as an individual essence. There are no two singular things which are alike in all natures because each of them has a unique set of characteristics, that is, *haecceitas*. There is no simple thing which is not a characteristic in such a *haecceitas*. Thus, there is no individual. This seems to be Bergmann's line of thought.

(B) *Haecceitas as a Coordinate Quality*. When Bergmann's interest is primarily structural, however, and he presents his own theory of individuation in terms of the bare particular, he usually contrasts it with the theory of individuation by a coordinate quality.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, Bergmann views the theory of individuation by a coordinate quality as the only possible way to handle the problem of individuation open to "Scotist ontologies."<sup>20</sup> Scotist ontologies in Bergmann's sense are ontologies in which all simple things are characters.<sup>21</sup> Those ontologies which in addition contain some individuals are called "nonscotist." In most nonscotist ontologies, individuals have natures. Bergmann's ontology is a unique kind of nonscotist ontology because his bare particular is an individual without a nature; it is "a mere individuator" and "cannot be recognized as such."<sup>22</sup> I shall refer to a few instances where Bergmann identifies the theory of individuation by a coordinate quality with the Scotistic solution.

Bergmann approaches the problem of individuation by raising the question of how to account for the difference of two situations that are alike in all nonrelational characteristics. For example, he writes:

Take now two green spots. There is identity as well as diversity to be accounted for. The two spots are identical in being both green. The universal accounts for the identity. They are different in being two, not one. The ontological assay must account for that difference. In traditional words, all philosophers embracing universals are faced with the problem of *individuation*.<sup>23</sup>

Bergmann hastens to add that "basically, there are two ways of solving [the problem]."<sup>24</sup> The first way is his own bare particular theory, while the second is coordinate qualities.

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<sup>19</sup> "Synthetic *a priori*," 287.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 277.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> "The Ontology of G. E. Moore," in *Logic and Reality*, 159–60.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.



How does Bergmann understand this latter way of solving the problem of individuation? In his paper “Synthetic *a priori*,” Bergmann writes:

Remember those peculiar spatial properties I called coordinate qualities, hereness, thereness, and so on. The Scotists need them to solve the problem of individuation. That is why I also called them *haecceitas*. If there are such properties then they are simple; or at least some of them are simple. Are there such properties? Depending on whether your answer is affirmative or negative you are an *absolutist* or a *relativist*.<sup>25</sup>

It is clear from this passage that Bergmann identifies Scotus’ *haecceitas* with a coordinate quality. *Haecceitas* is, so to speak, a spatial property, something like hereness or thereness.

Elsewhere Bergmann explains further how the coordinate quality works as an individuator:

All simples are universals. The basic tie is *inclusion*. A simple may be included in a complex. “Two” complexes are one if and only if they include the same simples. Individuation is achieved by a special class of nonrelational spatial and temporal universals. Call them here, there, now, then, and so on. One of the two spots, for instance, is a complex including green and there, the other, one including green and here. Space and time, one sees, are assayed as being in essence nonrelational. Simples and complexes are of the same type. More poignantly, there are no types. Accordingly, if  $\alpha$  includes  $\beta$  and  $\beta$  includes  $\gamma$  then  $\alpha$  includes  $\gamma$ . This gambit cannot but remind one of Scotus’, with the special class of space-time properties corresponding to his *haecceitates*.<sup>26</sup>

According to the explanation of the quoted passage, ordinary singular things are complexes. So, when two complexes share all simples, that is, universals, the only way to account for their being two and not one is to resort to spatio-temporal coordinates. And such a coordinate quality is nothing but Scotus’ *haecceitas*, according to Bergmann.

(C) *Individual Essence or Coordinate Quality?* I already pointed out that it would be important to understand the relationship between Bergmann’s interpretation of *haecceitas* as an individual essence and his interpretation of *haecceitas* as a coordinate quality. As we saw, sometimes Bergmann explicitly identifies *haecceitas* as a whole nature of a singular thing. On the other hand, at other

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<sup>25</sup> “Synthetic *a priori*,” 287.

<sup>26</sup> “The Ontology of G. E. Moore,” 160.

times he clearly views *haecceitas* as a spatio-temporal quality. Is there any conflict between these two interpretations? If not, is there any inferential relation between them?

It seems obvious that the answer must be sought in Bergmann's dichotomy of all ontologies: Scotist vs. nonscotist. As was discussed, by "Scotist ontologies" Bergmann means those in which all simple things are characters, while those ontologies that contain some individuals are nonscotist.<sup>27</sup> Here, any kind of individual is counted as individual. This means that not only the traditional material substance with a nature but also Bergmann's bare particular, devoid of a nature, are considered perfect examples of individual. Thus, according to Bergmann's classification of ontologies, (1) there is no material substance which is an individual in Scotist ontologies, and (2) *haecceitas* in Scotist ontologies cannot be an individual because Scotist ontologies have no individuals. But how could there be no individuals of any kind in a Scotist ontology? The answer to this question is not so difficult if one interprets *haecceitas* as an individual essence or a coordinate quality. If *haecceitas* is an individual essence, it is not simple but complex. But, according to Bergmann's usage of the term, "a thing is simple if and only if it has no constituent which is a thing,"<sup>28</sup> and "individuals are simple."<sup>29</sup> Since *haecceitas* understood as an individual essence is a complex, which has things as constituents, it cannot be an individual.<sup>30</sup> If *haecceitas* is a coordinate quality, it is a special universal. So, it is not an individual. Thus, whether *haecceitas* be an individual essence or a coordinate quality, there is no individual in Scotist ontologies.

If there is no individual in Scotist ontologies, one might think that Bergmann's dichotomy of ontologies is not helpful in determining the relationship between his two interpretations of *haecceitas*. But, according to the criterion for dividing ontologies into two groups—whether or not the ontology contains individuals—in any Scotist ontologies there should at least be individual essences

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<sup>27</sup> "Synthetic *a priori*," 277.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 289.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Martin Tweedale pointed out that two questions seem to be confused by Bergmann: (1) Does a given ontology admit of individuals?; (2) Does the ontology admit individuals as basic and reducible? I believe that Tweedale is right. But for my present purpose, I have to stick to Bergmann's own usage of terms.

even if *haecceitas* is not an individual essence but a coordinate quality. Perhaps it is a sound requirement that every ontology should be able to explain the ontological status of ordinary singular things. As traditional substance ontologies and Bergmann's bare particular theory provide their own explanation of the ontological ground of ordinary things, any Scotist ontology in Bergmann's sense should provide us with an explanation. This line of reasoning indicates that Bergmann distinguishes Scotist ontologies from traditional substance ontologies where the distinction between substantial and accidental characteristics is important. If there were such a distinction in Scotist ontologies, there would be no difference between Scotist ontologies and traditional substance ontologies because even Scotist ontologies would have individuals, that is, substances.

Further, an individual essence should contain spatio-temporal qualities because the individual essence is the whole nature a singular thing has. In other words, since there is no distinction between substantial and accidental characteristics in Scotist ontologies in Bergmann's sense, if an individual essence is a whole nature, that is, the entire set of all characteristics, of a singular thing, it must contain spatio-temporal qualities too. Now it should be clear that a Scotist ontology should have both an individual essence and a coordinate quality. The individual essence is a necessary condition for a Scotist ontology in Bergmann's sense. Coordinate qualities are also needed in any Scotist ontology because there is a need to solve the problem of individuation. Thus, there should not be any conflict between the fact that it also has individual essences and the fact that a Scotist ontology has coordinate qualities. What is problematic is which one should be called *haecceitas*. As long as an individual essence contains spatio-temporal qualities, it itself can be an individuator. Perhaps for this reason Bergmann sometimes interprets *haecceitas*, which is the principle of individuation for Scotus, as an individual essence. But if we concentrate on the function of individuation, and believe that a spatio-temporal quality does individuate, then it is tempting to interpret *haecceitas* as a coordinate quality. Perhaps that is the reason why Bergmann sometimes gives us such an interpretation. One may think that as long as any Scotist ontology contains both an individual essence and coordinate qualities, it does not really matter which one corresponds to Scotus' *haecceitas*. Only if we understand the situation this way is Bergmann's attitude toward the two interpretations justifiable. What is rather

interesting and important is to ask what role the individual essence and the coordinate quality would play in individuation in what Bergmann thought to be Scotus' ontology.

## II

In the last section, we saw that Bergmann interprets *haecceitas* as an individual essence or a coordinate quality. In order to show that his interpretation is wrong, then, it would be enough for us to establish that for Scotus *haecceitas* is neither an individual essence nor a coordinate quality. Of course, we saw that it is very important to understand the different roles assigned to the individual essence and the coordinate quality in Bergmann's interpretation of Scotus' theory of individuation. We shall come back to this point later. However, it should be obvious by now that no matter what roles are allocated to the individual essence and the coordinate quality, if *haecceitas* is neither one nor the other, then we have to say that Bergmann's interpretation of *haecceitas* is wrong.

It is not so difficult to see that *haecceitas* cannot be an individual essence. In his treatise on the problem of individuation, Scotus already rejected a nominalistic theory according to which a material substance is of its nature singular and individual.<sup>31</sup> If a theory of individuation by individual essences is such a theory, as I believe it to be, it would be absurd to interpret *haecceitas* as an individual essence.

Indeed, the nominalist theory of individuation was the first of the six theories identified and rejected by Scotus in his treatise on individuation. Scotus had good reason to criticize the nominalist theory before anything else, for if a material substance is of its very nature singular and individual, as nominalists believe, there would be no problem of individuation.<sup>32</sup> But Scotus shows that the problem of individuation is a genuine problem for which we should supply an answer, and that amounts to a rejection of the nominalist position. Though an interesting task, it is both unnecessary and impossible to discuss here how Scotus understands and reformulates

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<sup>31</sup> Dist. 3, q. 1.

<sup>32</sup> See Gracia, *Introduction to the Problem of Individuation*, 40–1.

the nominalist position and arguments in favor of it.<sup>33</sup> Nor is it necessary or possible to discuss Scotus' ingenious arguments against the nominalist theory.<sup>34</sup>

Further, Scotus' criticism of the nominalist view amounts to a major part of the first argument in his two arguments for postulating *haecceitas*.<sup>35</sup> In other words, if an individual essence were the principle of individuation, and as a consequence the material substance were of its nature this or that individual, then there would be no need to postulate *haecceitas*. Thus, *haecceitas* cannot be an individual essence for Scotus.

But, if Scotus' rejection of the nominalist theory does not entail that there are no individual essences in the modern sense, we need another reason that would show that *haecceitas* cannot be an individual essence. For this purpose, I would like to discuss briefly Scotus' triple analogy of an individual difference (that is, *haecceitas*) and a specific difference. In both *Lectura* and *Ordinatio*, Scotus compared an individual and a species in terms of their relationship to what is below each, to what is above each, and to what is on a par with each.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> It is not without value to ask who Scotus' target was in his criticism of the nominalist position, though the answer will be the result of guesswork. Wolter agrees with the editors of *Lectura* that "Scotus may have had in mind Roger Marston or Peter de Falco"; see Wolter, "Scotus." For the purposes of this paper, we might view Scotus' presentation of the nominalist position as a result of his own reconstruction, since what Scotus needed was a position that might be a stumbling block for the problem of individuation as a whole and not the ingenious arguments of an actual nominalist. See dist. 3, q. 1, n. 6 for Scotus' presentation of the nominalist position.

<sup>34</sup> Scotus had two arguments against the nominalist position. His first argument is in the form of a *reductio ad absurdum* whose single premise is that the object of the intellect is prior by nature to the act by which it is understood. The second argument is a syllogism which aims to show that there is a real unity other than numerical unity. Scotus needed to introduce sub-arguments to establish the premises. It is interesting to note that both of Scotus' arguments against the nominalist position ultimately are laying the ground for his theory of the common nature.

<sup>35</sup> Scotus proposed two arguments which jointly demonstrate that there must be something positive in the category of substance that individuates the specific nature. His first argument aims to show that something positive is necessary for the individuation of the specific nature, thereby rejecting the nominalist position; dist. 3, q. 6, n. 166.

<sup>36</sup> Dist. 3, q. 6, nn. 170-2.

First, Scotus tries to compare the individual difference and the specific difference in terms of what can fall under each of them.<sup>37</sup> He observes that the specific difference is the ultimate reason why the nature has its own unity and indivisibility. Unlike a genus, the species cannot be divided into several specific natures. Analogously, the individual difference is that by which an individual is not divisible into further individuals of the same sort. But there is a difference between the individual difference and the specific difference. While a specific difference excludes division of the species into parts of another nature, it does not exclude the possibility of division into those individuals of the same nature. On the other hand, the individual difference even excludes division into further individuals of the same sort. In the case of the individual, there is a certain entity “from which the notion of the individual difference is derived, something to which it is simply repugnant to be divided.”<sup>38</sup> This individual entity has a unity proper to itself, singularity. That unity is a maximal unity and it is greater than the generic or the specific unity.

Secondly, Scotus compared the specific difference and the individual difference in terms of what is above each.<sup>39</sup> The reality of the generic nature is determinable and able to be contracted through the reality of the specific difference. Likewise, the specific nature is determinable and able to be contracted through the reality from which the individual difference is derived. Here, Scotus is using the term “reality” as a synonym of “formality.” Realities or formalities are distinguished formally. In fact, Scotus is fully exploiting his notion of a formal distinction in order to explain his second analogy:

As there are diverse formal perfections or formal entities, then, in one and the same thing (such as whiteness) from which a generic intention can be derived (such as the intention of color), and another formal entity from which the intention of the difference (white) is derived—as we said in Bk. I [*Lectura*, d. 3, nn. 121–22; XVI, 270 ff.]—so too there is a formally distinct entity from which the ultimate

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<sup>37</sup> Dist. 3, q. 6, n. 170.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.: “a qua . . . accipitur ratio differentiae individualis, cui omnino repugnat dividi.”

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., n. 171.

individual difference is derived, one which is completely a “this,” to which any sort of division is abhorrent.<sup>40</sup>

What Scotus wants to say in this passage is clear enough. In a species, we can distinguish between the formality of its genus and the formality of its specific difference. Likewise, in one and the same individual, we can distinguish between the formality of the species to which the individual belongs and the formality of the individual difference.<sup>41</sup>

Finally, Scotus compared the specific difference with the individual difference in terms of what is on a par with each. Here Scotus wanted to know if there are any similarities and dissimilarities between the way in which a specific difference makes the species different from other species in the same genus and the way in which an individual difference individuates an individual differently from other individuals in the same species. This third analogy is extremely difficult to understand. For my present purpose it is not necessary to explain it fully, so I will just sketch what Scotus tries to achieve by it. Scotus’ point is that only a certain kind of specific difference is similar to individual differences. He distinguished between the specific differences which are not simply simple and the specific differences which are derived from ultimate simply simple differences. And, according to him, the specific differences of the first sort can have something in common predicated of them *in quid*, while the specific differences of the second sort cannot.<sup>42</sup>

The lesson from this brief report of Scotus’ triple analogy between the specific difference and the individual difference becomes clearer if we consider the possible consequences of substituting “individual essence” for “individual difference” in the analogy. In the

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<sup>40</sup> Dist. 3, q. 6, n. 171: “Unde sicut in eadem re sunt diversae perfectiones formales sive entitates formales (ut in albedine), a quarum una accipitur intentio generis (ut intentio coloris), et alia entitas formalis a qua accipitur intentio differentiae (albedinis), sicut dictum est in I,—sic est entitas positiva in eadem re a qua accipitur differentia ultima individualis, quae est omnino haec cui repugnat omnimoda divisio.”

<sup>41</sup> See my “Common Nature and *Haecceitas*.”

<sup>42</sup> Dist. 3, q. 6, n. 172; *Lectura*, I, dist. 3, pars. 1, q. 2, n. 122. See Wolter, *The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus*, pp. 79–98, for an excellent account of *in quid* and *in quale* predication.

first way, one would have to say that “the individual essence even excludes division into further individuals of the same sort.” This is indeed the absurdity to which any bundle theory of individuation leads, for there is in principle no reason to preclude the possibility of two instances of the same set of characteristics. In the second way, one would have to say that the specific nature is determinable and able to be contracted through the formality of the individual essence. But the individual essence must be a determinate rather than a determiner.<sup>43</sup> In the third way, we would have to say that any two individual essences are “primarily diverse differences.” As long as they share at least one characteristic, however, individual essences cannot be ultimately different. Thus, Scotus’ *haecceitas* (individual difference) cannot be an individual essence.

It is also not difficult to show that *haecceitas* cannot be a coordinate quality. A coordinate quality is an accidental feature of an individual for Scotus and for other scholastics in general.<sup>44</sup> But, in his treatise on individuation, Scotus explicitly rejected any kind of theory of individuation that resorted to accidents.<sup>45</sup> In the fourth question of his treatise on individuation, in which Scotus refutes the theory of individuation by quantity, he also refutes other accidental theories of individuation. Since quantity is merely an example of accidental characteristics, the criticisms of accidental theories of individuation can be applied to the theory of individuation by quantity. Indeed, among the four ways of refuting the theory of individuation by quantity, only one of them is especially devised for rejecting that theory. Although all four ways of rejecting accidental theories of individuation are interesting, it is neither necessary nor possible for me to discuss them here. What is important for my present purpose is to note that the coordinate quality brought up by Bergmann is nothing but an accidental characteristic. From this we can see that at least Scotus did not interpret *haecceitas* as an accident.

Further, Scotus’ criticism of the accidental theories of individuation amounts to a part of his second argument for postulating

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<sup>43</sup> Here I am indebted to Martin Tweedale.

<sup>44</sup> See Gracia, *Introduction to the Problem of Individuation*, 40–1.

<sup>45</sup> Dist. 3, q. 4, n. 95.



*haecceitas*.<sup>46</sup> If *haecceitas* were a coordinate quality, Scotus would be contradicting himself. Thus, *haecceitas* cannot be a coordinate quality for Scotus, as long as a coordinate quality is interpreted as an accidental characteristic of an individual.

So far, it has been demonstrated that for Scotus *haecceitas* cannot be either an individual essence or a coordinate quality. Bergmann's interpretation of *haecceitas* therefore turns out to be wrong. Interestingly, however, we can also show in a different way that Bergmann's interpretation of *haecceitas* as an individual essence and/or a coordinate quality is wrong.

Immediately before presenting his theory of *haecceitas*, Scotus criticized a theory created by a combination of a nominalist view and the accidental theory of individuation.<sup>47</sup> I believe that this theory attributed to Godfrey of Fontaines is quite similar to the theory of individuation by *haecceitas* as an individual essence and/or a coordinate quality in important respects. So, if it is the case that these theories are similar, Scotus seems to guard against the interpretation of *haecceitas* as an individual essence and/or a coordinate quality. Scotus' *haecceitas* theory of individuation cannot be the theory which exploits the combined force of an individual essence and a coordinate quality. Needless to say, *haecceitas* cannot be an individual essence and/or a coordinate quality.

At this point we might ask why Scotus deals with Godfrey's theory immediately before his own theory of individuation instead of criticizing it in a separate question. It is my conjecture that Scotus does so in order to guard against the possible misunderstanding which confuses his own theory with that of Godfrey. Why was such a need felt by Scotus?

The term "*haecceitas*" itself may be the source of the misunderstanding because it is ambiguous. By the "thisness" of the human individual Socrates, for example, some might understand the entire set of characteristics Socrates has, while others might understand a positive entity in the category of substance which

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<sup>46</sup> As mentioned in n. 35, Scotus had two arguments for postulating *haecceitas*. The aim of the second argument is to show that the something needed positively is neither existence nor accidents nor matter, and thus that it must belong to the category of substance; dist. 3, q. 4, n. 167.

<sup>47</sup> Dist. 3, q. 6, nn. 146–63.

contracts a common nature, like humanity, to this, like Socrates. Furthermore, even the coined term “Socrateity” or “Socratesness” has been used ambiguously.<sup>48</sup>

But that could not be the whole story. The ambiguity of the term “*haecceitas*” itself cannot explain the particular misunderstanding of Scotus’ theory as a combination of the nominalist view and an accidental theory of individuation in both the Middle Ages and the twentieth century. Fortunately, we can understand the structural reason for the origin of the misunderstanding as follows. Roughly speaking, the two components of both Godfrey’s theory and Bergmann’s theory correspond to two of the most salient problems of individuation: (1) the problem of the principle of indivisibility (or incommunicability) and (2) the problem of distinction (or numerical difference). The nominalist view component answers the problem of the principle of incommunicability. The other component, the accidental theory of individuation (the theory of individuation by quantity in Godfrey and the theory of individuation by a coordinate quality ascribed to Scotus by Bergmann), answers the problem of the principle of distinction or numerical difference.

The difference between Godfrey and Bergmann is this. Nobody outside the scholastic tradition in the twentieth century discusses the problem of individuation in terms of the common nature. Thus, it is not clear that Bergmann appreciates the problem of the principle of incommunicability as distinct from the problem of the numerical difference between individuals of the same kind. But we should note that, even though Bergmann usually formulates the problem of individuation as if it were primarily the problem of the principle of numerical difference, he is not satisfied by the sufficient condition of numerical difference. He probes for what is the ontological ground of numerical difference. Though Bergmann no longer formulates the problem of individuation in terms of the common nature,

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<sup>48</sup> For example, let us compare the following two different usages of “Socrateity”:

What he [Scotus] thought was that we can distinguish in Socrates his ‘Socratesness’ from his human nature. (Copleston, *Medieval Philosophy*, 109).

We have also learned that *id quos* are not individual except for those which represent the total property of an *id quod*, such as Platonity or Socrateity. (Gracia, *Introduction to the Problem of Individuation*, 159).

he seems to touch upon the problem of the principle of incommunicability. In other words, Bergmann seems to raise the question of what makes this individual this in addition to the problem of explaining the numerical difference between individuals of the same kind.

As was discussed elsewhere, Scotus treats the problem of the principle of incommunicability as basic and that of the principle of numerical difference as derivative.<sup>49</sup> So, he can answer the two problems by simply introducing *haecceitas*. It is not clear how Godfrey and Bergmann's Scotus understand the relationship between the two problems of individuation. Be that as it may, Godfrey and Bergmann's Scotus solve the problem of the principle of incommunicability by saying that a material substance is incommunicable of its nature or by its individual essence this. But that move leaves the problem of numerical difference unanswered. Suppose that there are two spots. Both are red and round, and they have no other characteristics. How could we explain the fact that there are two numerically different individuals? Godfrey and Bergmann's Scotus have to resort to some accidental characteristics to answer this question.

### III

Since it turns out that Bergmann's interpretation of *haecceitas* as an individual essence or a coordinate quality is wrong, we can return to the project of comparing *haecceitas* and the bare particular. Let me first go over their similarities again. As was reported, some scholars find similarities between them in the following respects:<sup>50</sup> First, they have no characteristics of themselves except for the function of individuating. Second, they are so ultimate and simple that we cannot define them or analyze them into further principles. Third, it seems likely that there is no other support for positing them besides purely dialectical arguments.

However, there are also apparent differences between *haecceitas*

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<sup>49</sup> See Woosuk Park, "The Problem of Individuation for Scotus: A Principle of Indivisibility or a Principle of Distinction?" *Franciscan Studies* 48, Annual XXVI (1988): 105-23.

<sup>50</sup> Gracia, *Suárez on Individuation*, 221-2.

and the bare particular. Let me first present these differences informally. Then I shall present them more rigorously using Bergmann's own terms.

The first difference is this. The bare particular seems to be momentary in the sense that it exists only in one instance of time.<sup>51</sup> On the other hand, a material substance individuated by *haecceitas* is a continuant. So, as long as *haecceitas* secures the identity of a substance through change, *haecceitas* seems to be a continuant as well.

The second difference is this. In Bergmann's ontology, the bare particular is an individual. Though the bare particular itself is not qualified, it is the possessor of characteristics. On the other hand, it is hard to call *haecceitas* an individual because it is not a substance but merely a principle of individuation of substance. In other words, it is not *haecceitas* but a substance that possesses characteristics.

In section 6, "Substance," of his book *Realism*, Bergmann gives us pertinent information to clarify these apparent differences. He distinguishes between several senses of the term "substance," from substance 1 through substance 5.<sup>52</sup> Substances 1 are individuator, according to Bergmann. When a substance 1 individuates an object, it is "in" the object.<sup>53</sup> If we expand such a use of "substance" a little bit, we can have substances 2, which are supporters of their qualities.<sup>54</sup> Bergmann calls substance 3 "the minimal object" and defines it as follows: "The substance 3 or the minimal object in an object is an object  $\alpha$  such that (1)  $\alpha$  is 'in'  $\beta$ , and (2) no entity 'in'  $\beta$ , except itself, is an object."<sup>55</sup> Bergmann calls entities which do the three functions thus far introduced "*momentary substances*."<sup>56</sup> And, he calls "things in time which are the same at two time points and throughout the interval between them" *continuants*.<sup>57</sup> Then, Bergmann introduces substance 4, which is a continuant "in" the object. Since it is a continuant, it establishes the object's identity through time.<sup>58</sup> Finally, there is substance 5. It is an *agent*, a

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<sup>51</sup> Bergmann, *Realism*, 120-1.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 117-24.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 117.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 118.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 114.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 113.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 121.

source of activity, in an object.<sup>59</sup> A discussion of substance 5 is not needed for my purpose here.

Now, we can inquire whether *haecceitas* and the bare particular may be called “substances” in each of these different senses. First of all, both *haecceitas* and the bare particular are claimed to be individuators. They are substances 1. Both *haecceitas* and the bare particular also seem to satisfy the condition for being substance 3: They are minimal objects. However, there is some doubt concerning the sense of “substance 2.” The bare particular is always presented as a supporter of its qualities. That is the reason why some people explain the notion of bare particular by using metaphors of a pincushion supporting pins or a peg by which clothes are hung together.<sup>60</sup> It is tempting to view *haecceitas* as a supporter of qualities that belong to an individual which it individuates. Without *haecceitas*, those qualities cannot hang together. The metaphor of peg or pincushion may be used for presenting the notion of *haecceitas* for that reason. But the problem is that something more seems to be implied by saying that the bare particular is a supporter of its qualities. As pointed out as the second intuitive difference between *haecceitas* and the bare particular, unlike *haecceitas*, bare particulars are claimed to *possess* those qualities. The difference between supporter and possessor may be made clearer if we consider the distinction between subject and predicate as a grammatical counterpart of the distinction between substance and attribute. Let us take a singular proposition, “Socrates is white.” Bergmann would say that a bare particular of “Socrates” at a specific point in time possesses a quality, “white.” But it would be odd if we said that the *haecceitas* of Socrates is white or that the *haecceitas* of Socrates possesses the quality “white.” It is not the *haecceitas* of Socrates but the qualified individual Socrates that is white or is a supporter and possessor of the quality “white,” at least from Scotus’ point of view. Unlike the bare particular, *haecceitas* cannot be a substance 2 unless the metaphor of supporter is more clearly elaborated.

Next, let us examine the first intuitive difference between *haecceitas* and the bare particular. Interestingly, as reported, Bergmann

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<sup>59</sup> *Realism*, 123.

<sup>60</sup> B. Aune, *Metaphysics: The Elements* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 46.

calls substance 1, substance 2, and substance 3 “*momentary substances*.”<sup>61</sup> Bare particulars are momentary substances because all and only those three limited jobs are assigned to them by Bergmann.<sup>62</sup> On the other hand, it is obvious that Bergmann would treat *haecceitas*—not in his own interpretation but in the interpretation which counts *haecceitas* as something positive in the category of substance and contracts the specific nature to this or that—as nonmomentary, for *haecceitas* satisfies the condition for being a substance 4. It is a continuant in the object. It provides us with a principle of identity between the same object at different points in time.

From Bergmann’s point of view, then, there are some obvious differences between *haecceitas* and the bare particular. Perhaps Bergmann would think that Scotus unnecessarily gives the double role, that is, the role of the principle of individuation and that of the principle of identity through change, to *haecceitas*. Also, Bergmann would say that Scotus could not set himself free from the spell of a substance ontology.

How about Scotus? What would he say about Bergmann’s bare particular? If we suppose that the bare particular is not only the principle of individuation but also the possessor of the qualities, as Bergmann claims, then there would be no separate role allotted to a substance. No doubt Scotus would complain that Bergmann unnecessarily gives the bare particular a double role, that is, the role of the principle of individuation and that of the possessor or the supporter of qualities.

Clearly, there are differences between *haecceitas* and the bare particular, whether one looks at *haecceitas* from Scotus’ point of view or from Bergmann’s. Naturally enough, our next project would have to be to weigh the relative strengths of the *haecceitas* theory and the bare particular theory. But such a task is beyond the scope of this investigation.

Let me finish, then, by pointing out some possible sources of the differences between Bergmann and Scotus. First, one might start the search for the ultimate difference between Scotus and Bergmann in the fact that they work with different logics and the-

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<sup>61</sup> *Realism*, 114.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 120.

ories of predication. I believe that such a project has some promise, although any suggestion in that direction is beyond the scope of this paper.<sup>63</sup> Second, as we discussed in the last section, Scotus and Bergmann seem to address different problems of individuation. We said that in Scotus the common nature plays an indispensable role in formulating the problem of individuation. On the other hand, as Bergmann's principle of exemplification makes clear, there is no place for a common nature in Bergmann's ontology. Though Bergmann does not just want to solve the problem of the principle of numerical difference between individuals of the same kind, and does seek the ontological ground of numerical difference, his problem cannot be the problem of the principle of incommunicability whose formulation presupposes the common nature. Perhaps *haecceitas* without the common nature is inconceivable. But this difference should not be interpreted as a demonstration of the incomparability of *haecceitas* and the bare particular. Rather, it reminds us of the gap between medieval and contemporary treatments of the problem of individuation. The only hope of bridging this gap rests on further comparative studies.

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<sup>63</sup> See my "Scotus, Frege, and Bergmann," *The Modern Schoolman* 67 (May 1990): 259–73.