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Center Director
Editor

Raquel E. Quiñones
Managing Editor

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, Peter van Inwagen and Kenneth P. Winkler
led by
of New York College at Brockport.

2003-2004

Philosophic Exchange

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**The Annual Proceedings
Of the
Center for Philosophic Exchange**

Number 34: 2003-2004

Georges Dicker
Center Director
Editor

Raquel E. Quiñones
Managing Editor

State University Chancellor Samuel B. Gould established the Center for Philosophic Exchange at the College of Arts and Science at Brockport, New York on April 11, 1969 "to conduct a continuing program of philosophical inquiry relating to both academic and public issues."

The Center conducts conferences and seminars on a variety of philosophic topics, publishing its results through the printing of these Annual Proceedings. The Center continues the program of the International Philosophy Year 1967-68, which produced fourteen international conferences at the Brockport campus, on a variety of philosophic topics. The major papers produced by that program have been published by State University of New York Press as a four-volume anthology titled *Contemporary Philosophic Thought: Volume I, Language, Belief and Metaphysics; Volume II, Mind, Science and History; Volume III, Perspectives in Education, Religion, and the Arts; Volume IV, Ethics and Social Justice* (Eds. H. Kiefer and M. Munitz, Albany, 1970).

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
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Peter van Inwagen

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Can Science Disprove the Existence of God?

Peter van Inwagen

In one of his essays, Sartre mentions a French Marxist writer who describes atheism as a "scientific" position. Sartre comments on this description as follows: "I recognize that in denying the existence of God, I am no less a metaphysician than is the believer who affirms the existence of God." This seems to me to be one of the few things Sartre has said that is indisputably correct. Atheism is, and must be, a metaphysical, or, at any rate, a philosophical position. And any argument for atheism will be, and must be, a philosophical and not a scientific argument. A philosophical argument can, of course, have among its premises various facts that have been established by scientific investigation. The great biologist Richard Dawkins, for example, is an indefatigable champion of atheism, and most of his arguments for atheism are based on what he knows best, the discoveries of evolutionary biology. They are, nevertheless, philosophical arguments—as much so as Thomas Aquinas's argument for a First Mover or Descartes's argument for the immateriality of the soul; as much so as the arguments of those scientists of the present day who see the hand of God in the values of the parameters that occur in the laws of physics.

Now why do I say that any argument for the non-existence of God must be a philosophical and not a scientific argument? Science has many times shown that various things that people had believed in did not exist: the spontaneous generation of life, the rotating crystalline spheres in which the planets were supposedly embedded, the canals of Mars, the influence of the positions of the stars at the moment of one's birth on the course of one's life If science was able to show that the crystalline spheres in which the planets were supposedly embedded did not exist, why should science be unable to show that God does not exist?

Let us look at the case of the crystalline spheres. How did science show that they did not exist? The answer is simple: when the orbits of certain comets were first accurately described, it was seen that these comets passed *through* the crystalline spheres—or rather through the space these spheres would have occupied if they had existed. So everyone immediately concluded that the celestial spheres did not exist—even though all astronomers from the ancient Greeks to Copernicus had assumed that they did. So: scientists made certain observations; these established the orbits of certain comets and the fact that these orbits passed through the space supposedly occupied by the celestial spheres. Of course, it doesn't *logically* follow from this fact that the spheres don't exist. Logic, blind as justice, demands another premise: that comets can't pass through crystalline spheres (spheres strong enough to bear the weight of the planets embedded in them). But this premise is pretty obvious and no one seriously thought of doubting it; as far as I know, no one bothered to state it explicitly. Observations, from the austere point of view of pure logic, can never establish that something does not exist. Before she will authorize you to

conclude that something-or-other does not exist, logic will demand more than a premise about how things look; she will demand a premise of the following form: if that "something-or-other" *did* exist, things wouldn't look the way they do. Scientific observation is a refined way of finding out how things look; scientific observations can establish that something does not exist only when they are conjoined with a premise to the effect that if that thing existed, things would not look the way science says they look. There would seem, therefore to be only two cases in which science, science *alone*, can prove that X does not exist: when the 'if things look such-and-such a way, then X does not exist' statement that is conjoined with the observations of scientists is itself a statement that can be established by science, or when it is so obvious that it needs no support.

Science, therefore, can establish that God does not exist only if there is some scientific observation—or scientifically established fact or experimental result—such that we can look at it and say with confidence, That's not how things would be if there were a God. And this 'if' statement must either itself be scientifically established or so obvious that it doesn't need to be "established." But all this is rather abstract. Let's look at a possible example. I have heard some people argue as follows. "There are major design deficiencies in the human eye and the human knee. If God existed, and were even a moderately good engineer, these design deficiencies wouldn't exist. But, of course, if God existed, he'd be a rather better than moderately good engineer. So God doesn't exist." Let's suppose for the sake of argument that the design of the human eye and knee could be improved on. This is not the only premise of the argument. There is another premise, an 'if' statement. Something like this:

If there were a God, human beings would exhibit optimal biological design.

What sort of statement is this? Is it a scientific statement? If it is, what science does it belong to? Theobiology? I think it should be evident that this is not a statement that has been established by any of the sciences. If the argument we are examining is to constitute a scientific disproof of the existence of God, therefore, this statement must be so obvious that everyone should just accept it—accept it without argument. Is this statement that obvious? It certainly doesn't seem so to me. I can see myself believing this statement on the basis of some argument, but it doesn't seem to me the sort of thing one could believe unless someone were aware of some consideration that could be adduced in its favor.

The statement 'If there were a God, human beings would exhibit optimal biological design', therefore, should not be accepted in the absence of any argument. Or, if that's too strong a statement, at least this much is true: no one *has* to accept this statement in the absence of any argument for it. No one has the right to expect that of anyone. And this isn't true of all statements. There are plenty of statements that I have the right to expect anyone to believe. If I

am trying to convince you that God was committed, and my opponent can travel from Chicago to expect you to accept that at that point, you would have asserted the thesis, 'If there is biological design', and wasting his time and yours it would be perfectly legitimate.

Now if someone did say that human beings would exhibit optimal biological design if there were a God, would it be? Well, it would be a reasonable premise for an argument, and if any argument, then the argument is the argument.

Human beings exhibit optimal biological design.

If there were a God, human beings would exhibit optimal biological design.

Hence,

There is no God.

is a philosophical argument. The first premise (we have to come to classifying it as a single "philosophical defense"), it is a philosophical argument only if *all* the premises are established by science or philosophy.

I make bold to say that the philosophical argument for the existence of God must be a philosophical argument. An impossible attempt to show that there is or conceptually impossible impossibility may be that the impossibility of them has (in my view) been rather technical—not professional philosophy.

exist, logic will demand more than a premise of the following things wouldn't look the way they of finding out how things look; nothing does not exist only when t that if that thing existed, things c. There would seem, therefore to *alone*, can prove that X does not h a way, then X does not exist' rations of scientists is itself a e, or when it is so obvious that it

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am trying to convince you that Alice wasn't in Memphis at the time the crime was committed, and my argument has the (probably unspoken) premise that no one can travel from Oxford to Memphis in ten minutes, I have the right to expect you to accept that premise without argument. If you challenged me on that point, you would simply be wasting your time and mine. But if someone asserted the thesis, 'If there were a God, human beings would exhibit optimal biological design', and if you challenged him on that point, you would not be wasting his time and yours. He might have a good answer to your challenge, but it would be perfectly legitimate to ask to hear what this good answer was.

Now if someone did offer an argument for the truth of 'If there were a God, human beings would exhibit optimal biological design', what sort of argument would it be? Well, it would be a philosophical argument. What else could it be? Here is a reasonable principle: if some premise of an argument itself requires an argument, and if any argument for that premise would have to be a philosophical argument, then the larger argument is a philosophical argument. Therefore, the argument

Human beings exhibit less than optimal biological design

If there were a God, human beings would exhibit optimal biological design

Hence,

There is no God

is a philosophical argument, not a scientific argument, despite the fact that its first premise (we have granted this) has been established by science. When it comes to classifying arguments, philosophy trumps science: if an argument has a single "philosophical" premise (a single premise that requires a philosophical defense), it is a philosophical argument. But an argument is a scientific argument only if *all* its premises are either propositions that have been established by science or else propositions so trivial that they require no defense.

I make bold to say: all arguments for the non-existence of God must be philosophical arguments. So far as I can see, any argument for the non-existence of God must be of one of two types. First, it may be an *impossibility* argument. An impossibility argument for the non-existence of a thing is an attempt to show that the concept of that thing is internally self-contradictory or conceptually impossible—as impossible as a round square, although the impossibility may be harder to see (which is why an argument is needed to show that the impossibility exists). I shall not discuss impossibility arguments; none of them has (in my view) any merit whatever, and discussions of them tend to be rather technical—that is to say, extremely yawn-inducing in people who are not professional philosophers. I note only that it is pretty obvious that any

impossibility argument would be a philosophical argument.

The second sort of argument is an argument that is based on some observed fact (or facts). We have already looked at an argument of this type—the “optimal design” argument. The argument begins by stating the observed fact; it goes on to contend that this fact would not be a fact if there were a God, and concludes that there is no God. My thesis is that the second premise of any such argument, the if-then premise, will never be so evident as to require no argument and that any argument for it will have to be a philosophical argument. But why must this be? As we have seen, there are plenty of arguments for the non-existence of things that are based on observation and in which the second premise—the if-then premise—is sufficiently evident that it requires no defense. How can we be sure *a priori* that the case of God is different? If we can prove that the celestial spheres or astrological influences or spontaneously generated life do not exist without recourse to philosophy, how can we be confident that the non-existence of God cannot be proved without recourse to philosophy?

The answer is that there is a vast difference between God and any object or kind of thing that science has proved does not exist. Take the crystalline celestial spheres. These are really very much like the objects that we see and touch every day—it’s just that, if they existed, they’d be vastly larger than the objects that we see and touch every day. But God is not like that. The *idea* of God is not the *idea* of a being that is like that. I once saw a cartoon in which a fundamentalist preacher is informing his flock from the pulpit that God’s socks are as big as New Jersey and his tee-shirts are the size of Texas. That preacher had the wrong idea. If he had the right idea, it would certainly be possible to prove scientifically that there was no God. If there were such a being (at least if he were anywhere around here) we’d see him and we could measure his gravitational influence on, say, the orbits of satellites. And, anyway, there couldn’t be a solid, living man-shaped being of that size; not only would there be no possible source of energy for it, but the laws of physics simply wouldn’t permit it to live or even to maintain its structural integrity.

If God isn’t like that, what is God like? Or, for those who don’t believe in God, what is God *supposed* to be like? Well, to begin with, God is, or is supposed to be, omnipresent. As you might guess, this word means present everywhere. But this definition is ambiguous. Consider the luminiferous aether, that all-pervasive perfectly elastic subtle stuff that, according to nineteenth-century physics, stood to light as air stands to sound. According to the nineteenth-century theory of light, the luminiferous aether was everywhere—in a laboratory vacuum flask, inside the earth, at the center of every star—and it was therefore in the most literal sense of the word omnipresent. It was present everywhere because every region of space was filled with a *part* of it: one part of it was conterminous with the Mississippi River, another (a large ball-shaped part) occupied the same region of space as the star Arcturus, and so on. But God has no parts. The first of the Anglican Articles of Religion begins, “There is but one living and true God, . . ., without body [or] parts. . . .” So God can’t be

omnipresent in the sense in which the aether is present in another place and omnipresent? This question is like asking whether a painting—say Rembrandt’s *The Night Watch*—is present everywhere in that room. Obviously not by having a part in every section. Rembrandt, of course, is present everywhere in the sense that he is the author of the painting. Rather, he managed to make it so that every part of the painting; every part of it was Rembrandt’s work. It was his work of black here, this bit of white there, are the colors and shapes. God is present everywhere in the sense that he is the creative power. This power is present everywhere, yonder, all exist and they should. Each exists in the way that it is only because of that way, and if God did not continue to exist, it would be as if the created objects that depend on the will of God for their physical universe would cease to exist. That is what God will do.

Perhaps I should say that God is not ontological or factual but rather what conceives a being would have to be. The physical universe of thought and power would be God’s work. God is wise and ancient being and has physical properties. The atheists are right: the ancient being who made the world is not or confused. An implication is admitted to being a part of God.

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omnipresent in the sense that one part of him is in one place and another part
 in another place and some part in every place. In what sense, then, is God
 omnipresent? This question is best answered by means of an analogy. Consider
 a painting—say Rembrandt's *The Night Watch*. There is, surely, a very good
 sense (even if it is not the most literal sense) in which Rembrandt is present
 everywhere in that rather sizable painting. How does Rembrandt manage that?
 Obviously not by having one of his parts in one section of the painting and
 another of his parts in another section and at least one of his parts in every
 section. Rembrandt, unlike God, did have parts, but he didn't manage to be
 present everywhere in *The Night Watch* by distributing them across the canvas.
 Rather, he managed it in this wise: his creative activity is present everywhere
 in the painting; everything, at every point in the painting is the way it is because
 it was Rembrandt's will that it should be that way; he *made* it that way. This bit
 of black here, this bit of gold there . . . they're all the way they are because those
 are the colors and shapes that Rembrandt's will decreed for that spot. Similarly,
 God is present everywhere in the physical universe not because he is a space-
 occupying being who happens to be big enough to occupy all space (like the
 aether) but rather because every space-occupying being is a product of his
 creative power. This rock here, that elephant there, that neutron star over
 yonder, all exist and have the properties they do because it is God's will that
 they should. Each exists from moment to moment and continues to be the kind
 of thing it is only because it is God's will that it should continue to exist and be
 that way, and if God were to stop willing that, say, the neutron star, should
 continue to exist, it would vanish, all in an instant. And it is not only individual
 created objects that have this feature, this continuous moment-to-moment
 dependency on the will of God; the laws of physics, the basic rules by which the
 physical universe works, stay the same from moment to moment only because
 that is what God wills.

Perhaps I should remind you that I am not making any existential or
 ontological or factual claim when I say this. I am telling you not how things are
 but rather what concept the concept of God is. I am telling you what features
 a being would have to have to count as God. No being who is present in the
 physical universe otherwise than by the continuous exercise of its creative
 power would be God. If it should turn out that some immensely powerful and
 wise and ancient being made us, and if this being has a size and occupies space
 and has physical properties, and if there is no greater being than this, then the
 atheists are right: there is no God. If the immensely powerful and wise and
 ancient being who made us claimed to be God, it would be either an impostor
 or confused. An impostor if it claimed to be omnipresent, and confused if it
 admitted to being a physical thing that occupied space and still claimed to be
 God.

Omnipresence, omnipresence in the special sense I have been laying out, is,
 therefore, an essential part of the idea of God. And this implies that God can
 be connected with our observations of the physical world in only the most
 indirect and subtle of ways. The medieval philosophers said that a thing that

was present in a region of space by literally occupying that region, by filling it up, was "locally present" in that region. They would have summed up what I have been telling you in these words: God is locally present nowhere and totally present everywhere. (He is totally present everywhere in that the totality of his being is reflected in the sustaining power that keeps every spatial thing everywhere in the physical universe in existence from moment to moment.) But consider. Only a locally present being can reflect light, and thus only a locally present being can be visible. Only a locally present being can exclude other beings from the space it occupies, and thus only a locally present being can be tangible. Thus, none of our sense-organs or instruments can possibly detect God, for they can detect only locally present things. Unbelievers sometimes challenge God to come out of hiding—they refer to him as "the hidden God." But there is nothing God can do to come out of hiding, for he isn't hidden. He isn't the sort of being who could be either hidden or on display.

And this is why his non-existence can't be proved by science alone. Science can prove the non-existence only of things that exhibit some sort of local presence, like the celestial spheres or the luminiferous aether. If a medieval student had asked his astronomy teachers why we couldn't see the celestial spheres, he would have been told that they were invisible because they were perfectly transparent. But, of course, you can prove the non-existence of a locally present but invisible thing, whether it's Wells's invisible man or the celestial spheres. It will have to manifest its local presence in some way, and everyone agreed that the celestial spheres manifested themselves in certain regions of space by being a real solid, presence there—one that would stop a comet dead in its tracks. God isn't like that: he's not invisible by being locally present but perfectly transparent; he's invisible by not being locally present at all. The luminiferous aether is locally present everywhere, perfectly transparent (by definition), and intangible—at least in the sense that we can detect no resistance when we move a physical object through it. Nevertheless, the fact that it is locally present (even if uniformly so everywhere) has observational consequences. The earth moves around the sun in pretty nearly a circle, and the constant change of direction of the earth's motion through the motionless aether that this implies would have certain consequences for the way light behaves; when we look for these consequences, we don't find them, and they are of such a magnitude that, even a century ago, finding them was well within the competency of experimental physics. So, because of its local presence, the aether can have its existence disproved by science. God, however, being without local presence, is not in the business of having his existence disproved by science.

If what I have said is right, it does not mean that the existence of God can't be disproved. What it means is that the proof will have to be something other than a scientific disproof (though it may indeed include premises that have been established by scientific investigation). It will have to be a philosophical disproof: God's not being a locally present being means that the question of the relation between any observation and any statement about God will have to be

a philosophical question.

We observe so-and-so

If there were a God, so

hence,

There is no God

that person has to be a premise, the premise that will never be so self-evident because a being who is not our mental reflexes are a philosophical one (in defense, deals only with philosophy is above science, grants philosophy is the final things that we don't know Science cannot, therefore the question that is my the implications of inaction).

If science cannot disprove the existence of God must be an argument. This is what I am concerned to show. Why am I concerned to show the non-existence of God? The question by means of which the conclusion is a *compelling* conclusion is a carefully considered the reasoning by which the conclusion is not accept the conclusion so stringent as to be a conclusion. Mathematics: Euclid's proof that there is no greatest prime number (for example. The great crackpottery) sets out the question which the earth has changed human history. (His proof that it was an event in elementary knowledge leave physics aside. If so is that, at the moment

a philosophical question. If anyone ever presents any argument of the form

We observe so-and-so, and not such-and-such

If there were a God, we should observe such-and-such, not so-and-so

hence,

There is no God

that person has to be offering a philosophical argument because the second premise, the premise that tells us what we should observe if there were a God, will never be so self-evidently true that it doesn't need any defense (this is because a being who is not locally present is so different from the kinds of beings our mental reflexes are used to dealing with), and the defense will have to be a philosophical one (because science, the only other possible source of a defense, deals only with locally present beings). I say this not because philosophy is above science, grander, made of finer intellectual clay, but simply because philosophy is the final home of all those questions about the general nature of things that we don't know how to deal with in any decisive or compelling way. Science cannot, therefore, disprove the existence of God. I have now answered the question that is my title. But I have more to say. I want to go on to discuss the implications of inability of science to disprove the existence of God.

If science cannot disprove the existence of God, then any disproof of the existence of God must be philosophical—must take the form of a philosophical argument. This is what I have been trying to convince you of. But to what end? Why am I concerned to try to convince you that any successful argument for the non-existence of God must be a philosophical argument? Let me approach this question by means of a definition. Let us say that an argument for some conclusion is a *compelling* argument for that conclusion if any human being who carefully considered the argument, and who understood its premises and the reasoning by which the conclusion was derived from the premises, and who did not accept the conclusion would be positively *irrational*. This definition is not so stringent as to be useless. There are compelling arguments for certain conclusions. Mathematics is full of them; one famous example would be Euclid's proof that there is no greatest prime. Here is a non-mathematical example. The great crackpot Emmanuel Velikovsky (there can be greatness in crackpottery) sets out in his book *Worlds in Collision* a theory according to which the earth has changed its direction of spin during the span of recorded human history. (His position is not that this reversal was a miracle; he contends that it was an event in the natural order.) Now anyone who has even the most elementary knowledge of physics will know that this is impossible. But let us leave physics aside. If such an event were to occur, the very least we could expect is that, at the moment of the reversal of the direction of the earth's rotation,

there would be violent earthquakes on every point on the surface of the earth. (Those who are not willing to leave physics aside will realize that this statement is comparable to the statement that if a hydrogen bomb were to go off in your bedroom, the very least you could expect is that the bedroom windows would be blown out.) So, if Velikovsky is right, there was some moment in, say, the last ten thousand years at which there were violent earthquakes all over the surface of the earth. But there is a compelling argument for the conclusion that this thesis is false. (The argument is due to Isaac Asimov.) At many places in the world there are limestone caverns decorated by nature with those remarkable structures called stalactites and stalagmites—and these structures are as delicate as they are remarkable. A violent earthquake would cause them all to come crashing down. And they take hundreds of thousands of years to form. It follows that, at least at those places at which there are stalactites and stalagmites, there has been no earthquake during the last ten thousand years. And so Velikovsky is refuted. And this argument is in my sense compelling. Anyone who understands it and does not reject at least Velikovsky's thesis that the earth changed its direction of spin in the last ten thousand years is simply being irrational. (Strictly speaking, I suppose, the scientific reasons for thinking that stalactites and stalagmites take hundreds of thousands of years to form would have to be included in the reasoning for it to be truly compelling. But I think it would be irrational to reject expert testimony on this matter, and that is what geologists tell us.)

There are, therefore, compelling arguments—against there having been ubiquitous earthquakes in the last ten thousand years, against the existence of the celestial spheres, against the existence of astrological influences. All these examples are arguments for the non-existence of various things. I have chosen them as examples because it is non-existence arguments that are our primary interest here. But, of course, I don't mean to imply by my choice of examples that there aren't also compelling arguments for the *existence* of various things. There is, for example, a compelling argument for the existence of a causal link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer.

But are there any compelling *philosophical* arguments? If so, what would they be? Let us look at a philosophical argument that I will use as an example simply because I think it's a pretty good argument. First, a bit of stage-setting. Let's say that one has *free will* if, when one is faced with a decision between two or more alternatives, one is at least sometimes able to choose either of them: each of them is *open* to one. Suppose, for example, that I'm trying to decide whether to admit to the offence the police have charged me with (and of which I'm indeed guilty) or to try to brazen it out. If I'm both able to confess and able to try to brazen it out, if both alternatives are open to me, then I have free will—at least on this particular occasion. And let's say that *determinism* is the thesis that the past determines a unique future, that given the past and given the laws of nature, there's only one way for things to go on. It seems pretty obvious to most people that determinism implies that no one has free will. It comes as a surprise to most undergraduate students of philosophy that many great philosophers have

denied this—that many free will even if the past Hume, and John Stuart Mill affirmed this.) But here good, for the conclusion of this thesis is, as another great philosopher has said, "a subterfuge." Consider then, or to try to brazen it out, trying to decide between by what has already happened, confession, that the past then, although I'm in fact try to brazen it out. The police must in some sense occur only if there is a violation of the law, which a violation of the law to do something such that it occur? It just seems evident, born that when a certain it isn't open to me to do it just seems evident, that

Well, there's a philosophical good argument. But is it it and continues to believe determinism rules, must anyone one thinks this philosophers reject this compelling because, if professional career defeated if I am tempted to believe contemporary, the late aware of this argument. Lewis understood the argument to say this, he was smart to boot. I have simply explained to you the depth of this one of Lewis's lectures, that Lewis was irrational, the argument I've laid out that trying to believe that pigs can fly. I can only defend my professional life defending I must add, Lewis is irrational argument; there have been

Our subject is argument

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denied this—that many great philosophers have affirmed that one can have free will even if the past determines a unique future. (Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, and John Stuart Mill are examples of great philosophers who have affirmed this.) But here's a philosophical argument, which I think is pretty good, for the conclusion that these great philosophers were wrong—that their thesis is, as another great philosopher, Immanuel Kant, put it, “a wretched subterfuge.” Consider the case in which I'm trying to decide whether to confess or to try to brazen it out. If determinism is true, one of the two alternatives I'm trying to decide between belongs to that one future that is determined to occur by what has already happened. Let's suppose that the determined alternative is confession, that the past determines that I'm going to confess. If I have free will, then, although I'm in fact going to confess, it must be the case that I'm *able* to try to brazen it out. That is to say, a future in which I attempt to deceive the police must in some sense be *open* to me. But, given the past, such a future can occur only if there is a violation of the laws of nature. And how can a future in which a violation of the laws of nature occurs be *open* to me? How can I be *able* to do something such that, before I do it, a violation of the laws of nature must occur? It just seems evident that, if it was determined a million years before I was born that when a certain moment rolls round I'll confess my crime to the police, it isn't open to me to do anything else—I'm not *able* to do anything else. And it just seems evident, therefore, that Hobbes and Hume and Mill were wrong.

Well, there's a philosophical argument. As I say, to me it seems to be a pretty good argument. But is it a *compelling* argument? That is, if someone understands it and continues to believe that one can have free will even in a world in which determinism rules, must we conclude that that person is simply *irrational*? If anyone one thinks this, he has to deal with an awkward fact: many very able philosophers reject this argument. I'd like to believe that the argument is compelling because, if for no other reason, I've spent a large part of my professional career defending various rather more technical versions of it. But if I am tempted to believe this, I have to consider an awkward fact: my great contemporary, the late Professor David Lewis of Princeton University, was aware of this argument and rejected its conclusion. And I am convinced that Lewis understood the argument perfectly. And, although he once asked me not to say this, he was smarter than I am, and a technically more able philosopher to boot. I have simply *enormous* respect for Lewis; I cannot adequately convey to you the depth of this respect. I once heard a philosopher say, after hearing one of Lewis's lectures, “Lewis is so smart it's scary.” And I agree. Am I to believe that Lewis was irrational—for that's what I must believe if I'm to believe that the argument I've laid out is compelling? I find I can't believe that. In fact, I find that trying to believe that is like trying to believe that the sun is green or that pigs can fly. I can only conclude that the argument I've spent a large part of my professional life defending, whatever its merits may be, is not compelling. And, I must add, Lewis is not the only philosopher I respect who rejects this argument; there have been, and are, lots of others.

Our subject is arguments for the nonexistence of God—which, as I've tried

to show, must be philosophical arguments. Let me lay *those* arguments aside for the moment. I'll make a generalization: with the possible exception of some arguments for the nonexistence of God, there are *no* compelling arguments for any substantive conclusion in philosophy. I offer the following argument for this generalization (and if you're waiting to catch me out in a contradiction on this point, I'll tell you right now that I don't regard this argument as compelling; I just think it's a pretty cogent argument): on both sides in *every* important philosophical dispute there are extremely able philosophers. Are there objectively true moral principles, or is morality an entirely subjective matter? Can a purely physical thing be conscious? Do we really know anything, or is knowledge an illusion? Has the state the right to compel us to do things that benefit others but not ourselves? Is it in principle possible for science to explain why there is anything at all? For each of these questions, you can find able philosophers who will answer it Yes, others who will answer it No, and some who will say Maybe.

I think we must admit, therefore, that a pretty strong—but not, of course, compelling—case can be made for the conclusion that there are no compelling arguments in philosophy (with the possible exception of arguments for the nonexistence of God)—no *proofs*. Now someone may point out that *proof* is a very strong word, and that in the practical business of life (and in science as well) we are often satisfied with something a good deal weaker than proof. If I am apprehended walking out of a jeweler's shop with thousands of dollars' worth of the shop's diamonds in a concealed pocket in my overcoat, that doesn't *prove* I'm a jewel thief. Maybe the concealed pocket is there for some innocent reason, and perhaps someone slipped the diamonds into the pocket to frame me. It happens all the time in the movies. Still, as Thoreau said, "Some circumstantial evidence is very strong, as when you find a trout in the milk"—meaning that that's very good evidence that the dairy is watering the milk. The evidence I have imagined may not constitute a *proof* that I am a thief, but it would probably be enough to get me convicted of theft in a court of law, and it would provide anyone who knew about it with a very good reason for thinking that I was a thief.

Has philosophy produced any good reasons for thinking that anything of philosophical interest is so? In one sense, at least, the answer to this question must be Yes. But let us be careful about what we mean. Suppose that Fred's Aunt Alice has been found strangled, and that it's well known that Fred hated her; that (despite his feelings towards her) she had named him as the sole heir to her entire, very large, fortune; that Fred is deeply in debt, and that he is a large, powerful man, twice convicted of assault with intent to do bodily harm, while Aunt Alice was a feeble old woman; and, finally, that Fred is unable to account for his whereabouts at the time the murder was committed. Do these facts together constitute a good reason for thinking that he murdered her? Well, they certainly constitute some sort of reason. If the police detective in charge of the investigation, in full possession of all these facts, said, "There's no reason whatever to believe that it was Fred who strangled Alice," this would probably cause his colleagues to wonder whether he might be losing his professional grip.

On the other hand, the murderer is perfect that he isn't. Suppose, of an unknown person in which Alice was in fingerprints that match footprints under one of that were made by shoes all the relevant facts, it are reasons that support reasons that count against is self-evidently strong to say this, but, human One can imagine a doing anything we can take think Fred did it. He caught and discarded it after splitting open a small pair on his feet. Just the obvious suspect might fingerprints—well, I've unaccounted-for fingerprints it on him sooner or later evidence *pro et contra*. One can imagine into these different ways of would be imagining a philosophers are disputing the will or the relation

Sadly, there is no one defines a professor as certainly applies to pre history—the academic fits philosophy better Clemenceau that the Great War was the fact didn't know what they know what they would Germany. The lesson is a great deal that is beyond that is beyond dispute there is very little the advance good reasons which one can do this advance good reasons

Let me lay *those* arguments aside for with the possible exception of some there are no compelling arguments for it. I offer the following argument for to catch me out in a contradiction on regard this argument as compelling;): on both sides in every important able philosophers. Are there objection entirely subjective matter? Can we really know anything, or is knowledge compel us to do things that benefit possible for science to explain why these questions, you can find able ers who will answer it No, and some

a pretty strong—but not, of course, conclusion that there are no compelling exception of arguments for the non-one may point out that *proof* is a very mess of life (and in science as well) we od deal weaker than proof. If I am op with thousands of dollars' worth et in my overcoat, that doesn't *prove* ket is there for some innocent reason, nds into the pocket to frame me. It Thoreau said, "Some circumstantial a trout in the milk"—meaning that s watering the milk. The evidence I hat I am a thief, but it would probably a court of law, and it would provide reason for thinking that I was a thief. asons for thinking that anything of at least, the answer to this question it we mean. Suppose that Fred's Aunt it's well known that Fred hated her; ad named him as the sole heir to her eply in debt, and that he is a large, with intent to do bodily harm, while inally, that Fred is unable to account der was committed. Do these facts ing that he murdered her? Well, they the police detective in charge of the ese facts, said, "There's no reason trangled Alice," this would probably might be losing his professional grip.

On the other hand, the existence of all these reasons for believing that Fred is the murderer is perfectly consistent with the existence of reasons for believing that he isn't. Suppose, for example, that the police have found the fingerprints of an unknown person—definitely not Fred's—on several articles in the room in which Alice was murdered, that there are shreds of cloth under Alice's fingernails that match none of Fred's garments, and that there are fresh footprints under one of the windows of the room in which Alice was murdered that were made by shoes too small for Fred to squeeze his feet into. If these were all the relevant facts, it would seem to be reasonable to say that, although there are reasons that support the hypothesis that Fred is the murderer, there are reasons that count against this hypothesis, too, and that neither set of reasons is self-evidently strong enough to outweigh the other. It would seem reasonable to say this, but, human nature being what it is, people may still have opinions. One can imagine a detective saying, "Well, of course we haven't yet got anything we can take to court, but I always bet on motive and opportunity. I think Fred did it. He could have bought a jacket at some second-hand clothiers and discarded it afterwards. Maybe the footprints are a trick—he could have split open a small pair of shoes and then taped the split shoes so that they'd stay on his feet. Just the kind of trick someone who knew he would be the one obvious suspect might use to try to throw us off the track. And as for the fingerprints—well, I've seen enough cases to know that there are often unaccounted-for fingerprints at the scene of a crime. Mark my words, we'll pin it on him sooner or later." And one can imagine another detective weighing the evidence *pro et contra* differently and coming to just the opposite conclusion. One can imagine interminable arguments between the two detectives about these different ways of weighing the opposing bodies of evidence. If one did, one would be imagining a conversation a lot like a conversation in which two philosophers are disputing about the objectivity of morality or the freedom of the will or the relation of consciousness to the physical events in the brain.

Sadly, there is no uniformity of opinion in philosophy. A German aphorism defines a professor as someone who thinks otherwise, and this aphorism certainly applies to professors of philosophy. The historian Peter Geyl said that history—the academic field—was "argument without end." This description fits philosophy better than it fits history. The German general Ludendorff told Clemenceau that the historians of the twenty-first century would say that the Great War was the fault of Britain and France. Clemenceau replied that he didn't know what the historians of the twenty-first century *would* say, but he did know what they *wouldn't* say: they wouldn't say that Belgium had invaded Germany. The lesson of this well-known anecdote is that even in history there is a great deal that is beyond dispute. But in philosophy, there is really very little that is beyond dispute. If you want an argument for that thesis, I offer this one: there is very little that isn't disputed. It is indeed possible in philosophy to advance good reasons for one's views; unfortunately, in every case I know of in which one can do this, it is equally possible for the opponents of one's views to advance good reasons for *their* views—and it never seems to be the case that the

good reasons that can be advanced in support of a view decisively outweigh the good reasons that can be advanced in support of the opposing view. Of course, philosophers commonly think that their *own* views *do* have this feature: a philosopher who, for example, thinks that there is an objective morality will probably think that the reasons he or she has for thinking that there is an objective morality decisively outweigh the reasons that other philosophers have for thinking that there is no objective morality. But this philosopher will find it *easy* to believe this only if he ignores a very important question, to wit, If there are these good reasons for believing that there is an objective morality, and if they decisively outweigh the reasons that other philosophers have for thinking that there is no objective morality, and if they are the very reasons that you are in possession of and which convince you that there is an objective morality—why don't they convince *everyone*, or *every-one* that can understand these reasons, or failing this, *almost* everyone? Shouldn't reasons for believing something that decisively outweigh the reasons that support the opposing position have that power? We can confront our philosopher with this challenge: Why don't all, or almost all, philosophers agree with you? What is it with these philosophers who take other positions than yours? Are they just stupid? Is it that they don't understand the reasons you say decisively support the position you take? Are they intellectually dishonest? Are they psychologically weak—do they get some sort of psychological thrill or comfort from believing that there is no objective morality, and therefore hold on to this position even though it isn't rationally defensible? Are they perhaps simply wicked? If you think any of these things—well, isn't that convenient for you. If you're right, then you're smarter or nicer or more rational than a lot of other people in the same profession as yourself. Aren't you lucky that it was *you* who turned out to be the smart or nice or rational one? And, of course, that there is an objective morality isn't the only philosophical position you hold. You probably hold dozens of philosophical positions, all of which, you think, are decisively supported by the reasons you advance in support of them. And in each of these dozens of cases, there are other philosophers who hold positions inconsistent with yours. What an amazing coincidence: there is *one* person who holds the *right* position on *dozens* of questions, probably the *only* person who holds that particular combination of positions, and it just happens to be *you*.

If any philosopher is willing to answer all these questions by saying, "Yes—it certainly is amazing. I'm the only one who is right on these dozens of philosophical issues, and it's because I'm either smarter or more rational or nicer or more intellectually courageous than the philosophers who disagree with me," then what can we say to that philosopher? I know what I would say. I would tell that philosopher that he or she was a comic figure. Of course, few philosophers would make the little speech I've imagined. Of all the philosophers I've forced to confront the fact of pervasive philosophical disagreement—and there have been quite a few—only one has said anything like it. And yet philosophers do continue to hold and defend philosophical positions,

and they regard the advantages of having decisive advantages over opposing positions. (I take position on any philosophical charge. I take position on reasons for holding the position. Philosophers who disagree with me cannot say what justifies my position. If I can justify it, I will say so. I will say, for example, the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism (the position I hold) cannot be refuted. If they were, and if they had the arguments for the contrary, they would be able to convert at least some of them with my arguments. He published some articles in the community of physicists who are thinking that free will is incompatible with determinism and hence incommensurable with the laws of physics. A pretty feeble argument. It's just that I can't hold a philosophical position unless I perfectly understand it. I have no consolations. The first fellow I mentioned who was in the same boat. The second fellow I mentioned was a philosopher—quite a few philosophers—quite a few philosophers who hold positions inconsistent with mine.

Suppose, just to simplify, that we call them Left and Right. Let us say that the Left party is in power. The Right party, although in reality reflect the members of the political party and more compassionate. Punishment is an ineffable. It is not a human being. It is and under strict control of theses of which the

port of a view decisively outweigh support of the opposing view. Of at their own views do have this thinks that there is an objective ns he or she has for thinking that outweigh the reasons that other is no objective morality. But this only if he ignores a very important sons for believing that there is an outweigh the reasons that other no objective morality, and if they n of and which convince you that they convince *everyone*, or every- or failing this, *almost everyone*? ng that decisively outweigh the ave that power? We can confront on't all, or almost all, philosophers sopers who take other positions hey don't understand the reasons ou take? Are they intellectually —do they get some sort of psycho- there is no objective morality, and ough it isn't rationally defensible? ik any of these things—well, isn't n you're smarter or nicer or more ime profession as yourself. Aren't e the smart or nice or rational one? orality isn't the only philosophical s of philosophical positions, all of d by the reasons you advance in dozens of cases, there are other ent with yours. What an amazing ls the *right* position on *dozens* of ds that particular combination of

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and they regard the arguments they present in support of these positions as having decisive advantages over the arguments of those philosophers who hold opposing positions. (I have met only one philosopher who claimed to take no position on any philosophical question.) And I cannot except myself from this charge. I take positions on many philosophical questions, and I think that my reasons for holding them decisively outweigh the reasons that those philosophers who disagree with me have for holding the positions they do. I really cannot say what justifies me in taking this position. If you force me to try to justify it, I will say something like this: The arguments I can give in support of, say, the thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism (a philosophical position I hold) cannot be the totality of my reasons for accepting this thesis. If they were, and if they really outweighed, outweighed decisively, all the arguments for the compatibility of free will and determinism, then I ought to be able to convert at least a goodly number of those philosophers who think that free will is compatible with determinism to my own view simply by presenting them with my arguments. After all, that's what Einstein was able to do with respect to his revolutionary views on motion, light, mass, inertia, and gravity. He published some arguments, and after a few years of thinking it over, the community of physicists saw things his way. I think that some of my reasons for thinking that free will is incompatible with determinism must be inarticulable and hence incommunicable—unlike Einstein's reasons for the theses that are associated with his name—which could be written down and passed on to others. A pretty feeble response, you may say, and I'll have to admit that you're right. It's just that I can't think of anything non-feeble to say in defense of holding a philosophical position on which so many able philosophers who perfectly understand my published arguments disagree with me. I have only two consolations. The first is that all other philosophers—with the exception of the fellow I mentioned who, or so he says, accepts no philosophical theses—are in the same boat. The second is that there are other passengers in this boat than philosophers—quite a lot of them, in fact. For example, the name of almost everyone who holds political views of any sort is to be found on her passenger list.

Suppose, just to simplify matters, that there are only two political positions: call them Left and Right. Suppose you are an adherent of one of these positions—let us say the Left. Your position, that of the Left, will be a amalgam of various theses. For example: That people are, in general, better off when the Left party is in power than when the Right party is in power. That the policies of the Right party, although publicly defended by appeal to abstract principles, in reality reflect the interests of large multi-national corporations. That members of the political Left are, in general, more intelligent, better educated, and more compassionate than members of the political Right. That capital punishment is an ineffective deterrent to murder. That a three-month old fetus is not a human being. That there would be less use of hard drugs if they were legal and under strict control. And so on and so on. (In giving these examples of theses of which the political position of the Left is an amalgam, I have

deliberately not used moral terms like 'should' or 'unfair', despite the fact that most people will immediately begin to talk in moral terms if you ask them to describe their politics. I have avoided these terms because I wanted to present what are uncontroversially a set of *theses*, and many philosophers believe that statements couched in moral terms, statements like 'The state should, before all other things, ensure the fair distribution of goods and services', are not properly speaking *theses*, but rather the expressions of attitudes.) Now do you think, as a member of the Left, that there are reasons that support these theses to which you subscribe, reasons that decisively outweigh the reasons the members of the Right could adduce in support of their own—of course contrary—theses? If you really are an adherent of the Left, it is very probable that you do. But if you spend any time arguing with someone of your own level of intelligence and education on the Right, you will find that the exchange of arguments bears a disquieting resemblance to the arguments of the philosophers about free will or materialism or the objectivity of morality. That is, neither of you will convince the other: the reasons that seem to you to be decisive arguments in favor of your position will seem to the other to be answerable and he or she will be happy to give you the answers. Of course, you won't think that these answers are effective answers to your arguments, but it will be quite plain that your opponent will think they are. In fact, if both of you have any capacity for abstract thought, you will see that what you are arguing about is just exactly philosophy—political philosophy. And if you have any capacity for self-doubt—a very big *if* indeed—you will begin to wonder whether the arguments you can advance in favor of the theses you hold really do decisively outweigh the arguments that your colleague on the Right has advanced for the contrary positions. But all this about politics is an aside—an attempt to convince you that it isn't only in philosophy that people believe things without having compelling arguments for them. My point is that—with the possible exception of arguments for the non-existence of God—all philosophical arguments for any position are less than compelling.

Now, what about this possible exception? Is it indeed plausible to hold that philosophy is capable of providing a compelling argument for exactly one substantive thesis? Is it plausible to hold that philosophy can provide a compelling argument for the non-existence of God, even though she is unable to provide a compelling argument for any other substantive thesis? I have to say that this seems implausible to me. It seems antecedently highly improbable that philosophy, in whose house there have been debated scores (at least) of important questions, should be able to provide a decisive answer to *exactly one* of them. It is implausible to suppose that philosophy should be able to answer the question 'Do we have free will?'—but no other substantive philosophical question. It is implausible to suppose that philosophy should be able to answer the question 'Are thoughts events in the brain?'—but no other substantive philosophical question. It is implausible to suppose that philosophy should be able to answer the question 'Does mathematics treat of an objective reality that exists independently of the physical world?'—but no other substantive philosophical question. One would expect that either philosophy would be able to

answer lots of the questions, or to answer none of them, or to answer about uniqueness. It is not plausible to answer the question about uniqueness. Still, history of thought seemed implausible a beneath our feet was investigation of this available arguments for example. But such further My hope is that reflection on the non-existence of God has so far failed to establish substantial doubts about God. Perhaps some of the reasoning I have presented would establish the point, I concede. I believe in there is or could be at such an argument in the existence I can't prove person—believes this to affirm any substantial to mention one impossible to prove—and I don't see with believing this asymmetry between them. If I may judge from the correspondence and the rate, a great many of the argument that prove theists who believe in scientific or philosophy. It seems to me, then, the epistemic status of theism and atheism.

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answer lots of the questions that philosophy has posed or else would be able to
 answer none of them. There is something suspicious about the number one,
 about uniqueness. It is implausible to suppose that philosophy should be able
 to answer the question 'Does God exist?'—but no other substantive philosophi-
 cal question. Still, highly implausible things, or things that at one point in the
 history of thought *seemed* highly implausible, have turned out to be true. It
 seemed implausible at one point in history to suppose that the solid earth
 beneath our feet was in rapid motion, but it turned out to be true. Further
 investigation of this question would require a detailed examination of the
 available arguments for the non-existence of God—the argument from evil, for
 example. But such further investigation would be beyond the scope of this essay.
 My hope is that reflection on my two conclusions—that any argument for the
 non-existence of God must be a philosophical argument, and that philosophy
 has so far failed to establish any *other* substantive conclusion—will at least raise
 substantial doubts about whether it is possible to prove the non-existence of
 God. Perhaps someone will be eager to point out to me that if the line of
 reasoning I have presented is cogent, a parallel line of reasoning, equally cogent,
 would establish the impossibility of proving the *existence* of God. But this I
 concede. I believe in God, but I think it entirely implausible to suppose that
 there is or could be an argument that *proves* his existence. The impossibility of
 such an argument in no way troubles me, since I believe in lots of things whose
 existence I can't prove. I think, in fact, that everyone—or at least every normal
 person—believes things he or she is unable to prove. Everyone who is willing
 to affirm any substantive philosophical or political thesis, for example. I think,
 to mention one important case, that all atheists believe things they are unable
 to prove—and I don't criticize them on this ground, for I see nothing wrong *per*
se with believing things one is unable to prove. But I do think that there is an
 asymmetry between theism and atheism in the matter of opinions about proof.
 If I may judge from reading the controversial writings of atheists, and by my
 correspondence and conversation with atheists, most of atheists think—at any
 rate, a great many of them think—that there is some scientific or philosophical
 argument that proves that God does not exist. The proportion of present-day
 theists who believe that the existence of God can be proved by some sort of
 scientific or philosophical argument, however, seems to me to be much smaller.
 It seems to me, therefore, that theists are generally more realistic about the
 epistemic status of theism than atheists are as regards the epistemic status of
 atheism.

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