

Common Projects and Moral Virtue

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I

We speak of someone being a "good colleague" in a philosophy department, in a sense that has little to do with philosophical, pedagogical, or administrative talent, and much to do with motives and traits of character. A good colleague in this sense is considerate of students and co-workers, sensitive to *their needs and concerns*, conscientious in carrying out responsibilities to them, and cares about them as individuals. These qualities are forms of benevolence and conscientiousness, and it is obvious that they are morally virtuous. There are other qualities of a good colleague, however, which do not seem to be forms of benevolence and conscientiousness. A good philosophical colleague cares about philosophy for its own sake. She wants to do it well herself, and she wants other people, specifically including her students and colleagues, to do it well. She wants them to do it well, not only for their sake, but also for philosophy's sake. And she cares about her department for its own sake, in a way that is not simply reducible to caring about the welfare of the individuals involved in it. She wants it to be the best philosophy department it can be. If she has been devoted to this goal for many years, has labored effectively to build and improve the department and strengthen its position in the university and in the discipline, and has shown a consistent loyalty to this project, and a willingness to make personal sacrifices for it, her colleagues owe her a great debt of gratitude. Members of other (to some extent competing) departments do not owe her the same debt of gratitude, but they ought certainly to admire her for being such a good colleague. I think this is *moral* admiration, not only insofar as it is admiration for her benevolence and conscientiousness, but also insofar as it is admiration for her devotion to the project of making a certain philosophy department the best it can be.

Similar judgments can be made on the side of deficiency. Suppose that after fifteen years as a member of the UCLA philosophy department, having been generally well-treated by my colleagues and the university, I were conscientious and benevolent toward my students and colleagues as individuals, but cared not at all about the de-

partment's collective aspiration to be an exceptionally good philosophy department. This lack would appropriately elicit some anger from my colleagues, and disapproval from others. And I think the disapproval would have a strongly moral flavor.

Being a good or bad philosophical colleague is not an isolated case. Someone who plays on a serious athletic team without caring about winning, or in an orchestra without caring about the musical quality of the performance, is apt to be perceived as "letting the side down." This is a morally tinged criticism, and it applies even if the offender is attentive to the interests of her associates as individuals. (What would be more likely to blunt the criticism would be the discovery that she was distracted with some personal grief or worry.) Conversely, one who "puts her heart into" the game or the music is perceived as exhibiting a moral or quasi-moral virtue. Similar considerations apply to most situations in which one cooperates with other people to make a product or perform a service. One is expected to care about the product or the service in a way that is not easily or obviously reducible to caring about the welfare of the individuals affected.

At work and at play we are involved in a great variety of common projects, projects that we share with other people. They make up an enormous part of the fabric of our lives. And in most cases the project will go better if participants care about it for its own sake. A capacity for investing emotionally in common projects is a quality much to be desired in an associate in almost any area of life. I think it is largely because they are believed to contribute to the development of that capacity that team sports are widely regarded as useful for moral education.

It may be suggested that the sort of devotion or caring or commitment of which I am speaking enters the purview of morality as a kind of *loyalty*. I have no objection to the use of that term; but if what I am speaking of is a loyalty, it is a loyalty to a project as such, rather than to a group of people as such. If I join a choir, I ought to care about the quality of its singing; but there is no reason why I should be committed to the group in such a way as to want it to continue to exist as a group, and want to belong to it myself, if it ceased to be a choir. Perhaps it will be said that the loyalty one ought to have as a choir member is to the choir as an institution, though not to a group of individuals as such. Again I need not disagree; for I count institutions, or their development, maintenance, and flourishing, as common projects. I am thus focusing on the common projects of groups of people that are associated for a specific purpose, or for a limited range of purposes. Such associations play a dominant role in our pluralistic, technological society. Their projects are a good starting point for our reflections, though the discussion will be extended, before the end of this paper, to projects characteristic of associations, such as family and friendship, that are not for special purposes but for a more comprehensive sharing of life.

I am arguing that caring about a common project for its own sake is morally virtuous, at least in some cases. Of course devotion to a common project is not always virtuous. Devotion to an evil project is not virtuous, and the most horrendously evil projects are usually common projects of groups. And even devotion to a good project can be a morally ugly thing if it is too ruthless, or is not seasoned with a lively concern for the rights and welfare of other people.

The theme of this paper, then, is that caring, in an appropriate way (not too ruthlessly, for instance), about good common projects for their own sake is morally

virtuous. I will develop one possible rationale for this view in sections II and III, and will then suggest in section IV that these considerations may help to explain how caring for their own sake about personal relationships and about one's good could be morally virtuous.

II

For present purposes we can grant that moral virtue has to do in some way with human good, and perhaps even specifically with the good of other people. The first step toward understanding how caring about common projects for their own sake can be morally virtuous is to see the relation of common projects to human good. In much of ethical theory there is an emphasis on aspects of human good that can be thought of in terms of *commodities*, an emphasis that is rooted in what we may call "the economic model" of beneficence. Being good to people is widely understood in terms of conferring benefits on them, and that in turn is conceived on the model of giving them money. This is obviously true of utilitarian theory, in which the concept of utility is supposed to structure the measurement and distribution of benefits in general as money structures more narrowly economic transactions; but I think the influence of the economic model extends far beyond utilitarianism. It captures what is most important in some contexts. Commodities provide an indispensable physical basis for human good, and economic issues are among the most important topics of public morality.

In other contexts, however, the economic model of beneficence is very misleading. Human good is not itself a commodity. A person's life does not consist in abundance of possessions.¹ And in order to be humanly good to one's associates it is often not enough to be a benefactor on the economic model.

A famous argument of Butler's is relevant here. "Happiness," he says, "consists in the gratification of particular passions, which supposes the having of them."² By 'particular passions' he means, roughly, first-order desires or interests, in which one cares about something besides the satisfaction of other desires or interests of one's own. Butler argues that one must have such desires or interests in order to be happy, because happiness consists in having them satisfied, and having them satisfied presupposes that one has them.

Aristotle thought that human good or happiness consists, not in the satisfaction of desire, but in activity of a certain sort.³ This activity must fulfill an interest that one has, however, if it is to make its contribution to one's good. One must value the activity for its own sake, or else see it as a way of achieving something else that one desires. Since there is a vicious regress in the idea that one might have interests but be interested in nothing besides the satisfaction of other interests that one has, Aristotle could agree with Butler that one must have first-order desires or interests in order to be happy.

Without committing ourselves here to any theory of what happiness or human good *consists in*, we can agree with Aristotle that it is found largely in good activity, and with Butler that it requires first-order desires or interests. In the terminology of the present paper, the happy person, the person whose good is realized to any very satisfactory extent, must have projects, must engage in activities that derive their point

or meaning from first-order desires or interests. For this reason, and because it is clear that an excessive preoccupation with our own good as such is apt to prevent us from developing the more "particular" interests that would be most likely to engage us in fulfilling activity, we can also agree with Butler that "that character we call selfish is not the most promising for happiness."⁴

I have no *a priori* argument to show that a happy person must care about some activities for their own sake. One can imagine people who engaged in no activities except in order to satisfy their physical needs, and who found their activities meaningful and satisfying only because of their orientation toward their physical needs. But such a life would barely be recognizable as human. We surely would not desire it. Even in a subsistence economy, people typically develop activities of play, conversation, ritual, and art that are carried on largely, if not solely, for their own sake. And even in economically necessary activities, such as farming and cooking, people learn to find satisfaction in the activity itself, and the way in which it is done becomes something they care about for its own sake. It is clear, at a minimum, that such interest in activities for their own sake is in fact a major contributor to human good or happiness, and the disappearance of such interest would be a loss for which there could be no adequate compensation in any human life that is likely to exist in this world.

This much about the importance of projects and the interest we have in them for their own sake would be accepted by most moralists, I think. Many writers in ethics have made use of it, John Rawls being an obvious example. What is less often emphasized in moral philosophy is the extent to which these projects are common projects.

Conversations essentially require the participation of more than one person. So do concerts and dances and most games and rituals. Political activity is by its very nature situated in the context of some common project of social organization; the only possible exceptions would be acts of rebellion so isolated and so alienated as to be at most marginally political. Science and philosophy could to some extent be carried on in isolation, but we would not get very far with them as purely private projects. Some forms of work could in principle be solitary, others could not, but almost all work is in fact done in the context of some common project.

Except for the most rudimentary activities of satisfying physical needs, moreover, all our activities depend on abilities and interests that are acquired only through participation in shared projects. Education is an induction into common projects. Educationally the most fundamental of common projects is conversation. Almost all distinctively human activities depend in one way or another on language, and language is acquired by children in conversation with their elders—mainly, I suspect, in conversations that are ends in themselves for both the child and the elders. As we acquire language, so also we acquire a culture, anthropologically speaking. We are inducted into a culture as we grow up. And a culture depends for its existence on common projects which very largely determine what activities will make sense to people who participate in the culture.

Thus human good is found very largely in activities whose point and value depend on the participation of other people in a common project. The value of the ac-

tivities depends also on other people's caring about common projects. Common projects are not mindless biological processes like digestion and metabolism. They exist only because people care about them. And if too many of the participants do not care enough about them, the activities connected with them are apt to lose value for all the participants.

This helps to explain why one must be more than an economic benefactor if one is to be humanly good to one's associates. The benefits conferred in the economic model are commodities, or at any rate benefits to which the motives of the benefactor are external. Even if they are in fact conferred out of benevolence, they would be the same benefits if the benefactor's motive were more mercenary. Benefits of this sort are vitally important, but a very full realization of human good also requires benefits of another kind. In particular, as I have been arguing, it requires the opportunity to participate actively in common projects that engage the interest, in some cases even the enthusiasm or devotion, of other people. That opportunity is a great benefit that other people give us by their interested participation in the common project. It is a benefit to which their motivation, their interest in the project, is essential and not external. And as that interest in the project is distinct from a benevolent interest in the good of the recipient, this benefit is one that cannot be given solely out of such benevolence.

A lively interest in common projects for their own sakes is therefore a normal part of being humanly good to one's associates. It is a normal part of being a good colleague, a good teammate, a good citizen, a good mentor, a good friend, a good spouse, a good parent, child, or sibling. And being a good exemplar of these relational kinds is a moral achievement. It is morally virtuous. Being a colleague, friend, or parent, but not a good one, on the other hand, is a moral shortcoming, or in extreme cases a moral failure. Not caring appropriately about common projects can constitute such a shortcoming or failure.

Being good to one's associates in these ways is far from the whole of moral virtue. A general benevolent interest in the welfare of other people, including people with whom one has little or no association, and a conscientious regard for their rights, are even more important morally. But an exclusively benevolent or conscientious motivation that was totally focused on human welfare and rights as such might keep one from being as good a friend or colleague, and in general as good an associate, as one should be, if it kept one from caring about common projects for their own sakes when the projects are not explicitly aimed at welfare or justice as such. Butler's claim that "that character we call selfish is not the most promising for happiness" is closely preceded by the statement that "over-fondness for a child is not generally thought to be for its advantage."⁵ If these words contain a suggestion that "too much love" might be bad for a child, I would not wish to endorse it. But if the suggestion is that an exclusively benevolent (or even an exclusively benevolent and conscientious) motivation is not the most promising for being good to a child in the way that a parent should be, I would agree. A parent who shares with a child an activity that he himself enjoys gives the child more than if he engaged in the activity only for the child's good. Similarly a teacher who cares about both her subject and her students, for their own sakes,

gives the students more than a teacher who cares about only one or the other.

III

The claims I have made thus far about moral virtue have been plausible (I hope), but also rather dogmatic. I have no intention of developing here a full-fledged theory of the nature of virtue, and I doubt that I will be able entirely to dispel the air of dogmatism. But certain things at least should be said about reasons for which, and the extent to which, caring appropriately about good common projects may be said to be morally virtuous and being willing and able to invest emotionally and motivationally such projects may be regarded as a moral virtue.

Few would disagree with Philippa Foot's statement that "virtues are in general beneficial characteristics, and indeed ones that a human being needs to have, for his own sake and that of his fellows."⁶ In the previous section I argued, in effect, that a willingness and ability to invest one's concern in good common projects satisfies this condition. But it is clearly only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for being a moral virtue, as Foot points out.

A similar necessary condition is suggested by James Wallace, who classifies virtues as human excellences and says that "human excellences will be tendencies and capacities for living well the sort of life that is characteristic of human beings."⁷ The sort of life that is characteristic of human beings, Wallace emphasizes, is a social life. The aspect of social life that he singles out for special mention is that it is "informed by convention." Conventions (most pervasively and crucially, linguistic conventions) are indeed characteristic of human life, and Wallace is right to insist on the moral importance of this fact. But common projects are no less characteristic of human life, and a willingness to invest in good ones is no less important for social life. This disposition therefore satisfies Wallace's initial necessary condition for being a virtue.

Both Foot and Wallace are concerned to distinguish virtues from other human excellences, such as strength and skill. Foot suggests that this may be accomplished by saying that "virtues belong to the will," though " 'will' must here be understood in its widest sense, to cover what is wished for as well as what is sought," and 'belong' must also be construed fairly broadly, as she makes clear.⁸ This presents us with another plausible necessary condition for being a virtue, and another condition that is plainly satisfied by the disposition that interests us, for caring about a common project certainly belongs to the will, in the indicated broad sense.

Another point on which Foot and Wallace agree is that virtues must be useful and important for the living well of human life *in general*. One reason why the love of philosophy, for example, is not a virtue is that many (perhaps most) human beings can live well enough without it, though it is important equipment for a philosopher. A willingness and ability to invest one's concern in good common projects qualifies as a virtue on this count too, because one needs it to do well in almost any human relationship.

The points I have mentioned thus far, however, do not suffice to distinguish moral virtues from all other human excellences. I take it that curiosity and a taste for physical exercise are not moral virtues; but why not? Both belong to the will, in the

broad sense. They are interests in certain goods (knowledge, and activity suited to one's physical capacities). And both are useful in almost any sort of human life. Perhaps it is relevant here that while curiosity is important for a great variety of human concerns, and not just for a particular specialized pursuit like philosophy, it may not be important for *everybody* to be curious, so long as enough people are. But a moderate taste for exercise would enhance almost anyone's prospects for health, and it would probably be advantageous to almost any human community if all its members had such a taste—and still it is not a moral virtue.

Need I concern myself with this, since I am not proposing a comprehensive theory of the nature of virtue? We may reasonably believe that honesty is a moral virtue and a taste for exercise is not, even if we cannot explain why. It is incumbent on me, however, to be concerned about the possibility of explanations that would suggest or imply that devotion to good common projects for their own sake is not a moral virtue. One such explanation would focus on the fact that a regard for the rights and interests of other people is not involved in a taste for exercise as it is in honesty. The only concerns or interests or desires that are morally virtuous, it might be suggested, are those that are conscientious or benevolent, having the rights or welfare of others as their object—to which caring appropriately about one's own moral virtue might perhaps be added as a second order moral virtue. This suggestion is in tune with some ethical theories, and is not incompatible with regarding courage and self-control as moral virtues, since what is virtuous in them is not a particular sort of interest or desire, but a capacity for dealing with one's actual and potential fears and desires in such a way as not to be hindered from virtuous disposition and action.⁹ Nonetheless I think it expresses too narrow a conception of moral virtue. It is inconsistent with the main thesis of this paper, since caring about a common project for its own sake is different, in most cases, from caring about the rights or welfare of affected persons. In order to defend my thesis against this suggestion, it would be advantageous to be able to indicate a difference between devotion to good common projects and a taste for exercise which might be a reason why the former is a moral virtue and the latter is not.

This can be done, and it can be done in a way that accommodates the widely held view that morality has to do with how one relates to other persons.¹⁰ For though an interest in a good common project is not an interest in the good of other persons as such, it is an interest in something of a sort in which much of their good is found—and found not by accident, but by virtue of deeply rooted characteristics of human life. As I argued in section II, the capacity for caring about good common projects is therefore essential equipment for being a good colleague, a good friend, a good family member, and in general for being humanly good to other people in most sorts of human relationships. None of this is true of curiosity or a taste for exercise. Caring about projects in which much of the good of other people is to be found, and caring about such projects in a way that is necessary if one is to be a good person to be associated with, is plausibly regarded as morally virtuous even if it is not the good of other people as such that one cares about.

This would not be plausible, I think, without the proviso that the projects one cares about are good. That is not to say that a common project must be noble or exalted if moral virtue is to be manifest in devotion to it. Putting one's heart into a pick-

up basketball game, and caring with some enthusiasm about the success of the team one happens to be on, can be an expression of the virtue I am talking about.¹¹ But, other things being equal, devotion to a nobler project is more meritorious.

Indeed consuming devotion to a relatively trivial project is not virtuous at all. And one's interest even in a project greatly good can be excessive to the point of vice. This is an important point, for it is a dangerous truth that I am defending here. Precisely because of the moral aspect of devotion to common projects, some of the most appallingly seductive temptations to idolatry are found in them—not least in those projects that go under the name of patriotism.

There is doubtless much more to be said about the conditions under which, and the extent to which, devotion to a common project is morally virtuous, and the absence of such devotion a moral shortcoming. I make no claim to be saying here all there is to be said about this subject, but I will mention one further point, by way of example. There seems to be less reason to regard not caring about a project as a moral fault if one has not been treated well by the people with whom one shares the project. The reason for this, I suspect, is that what is virtuous here is not just caring about certain kinds of projects, but developing a concern for them as a part of one's forming a social union with other people; and it is less of a fault (if a fault at all) to fail to form social bonds with people by whom one has been ill-treated.

IV

It is my hope that the line of thought developed here may help us to recognize more adequately in our ethical theories the moral value of some important types of motivation. Two types in particular will be discussed to conclude this essay. In both cases I will be arguing for the moral worth of motives that are not forms of conscientiousness or benevolence.

(A) *Friendship*. Moral virtue is shown in being a good friend, as well as in less intimate relationships. This can be understood partly on the basis of the fact that a good friend is conscientious, committed to do his duty to his friend, and benevolent, wanting his friend to flourish. The importance of conscientiousness and benevolence in ethical theory (and in popular moral thinking) may tempt us to think they are all that is morally virtuous in the good friend. Even such an eloquent apostle of the moral value of friendship as Lawrence Blum appeals only to the benevolent aspect of friendship in arguing for its moral worth.¹²

But conscientiousness and benevolence are not all that is involved in being a good friend, as Blum would surely agree.¹³ Another characteristic of a good friend is that she values the friendship for its own sake; she is glad to be this particular person's friend, and she wants very much to continue and enhance the relationship. Why shouldn't this aspect of being a good friend also be regarded as virtuous in its own right? I think in fact it is. My reasoning about common projects supports this view.

A friendship is, in a broad sense, a project shared by the friends; and as such it is a particularly important type of common project. Few of us would want to be without friendships, and having good friends is generally acknowledged to be important to human happiness. The value of a friendship, moreover, depends very much on both

parties caring about the common project (their relationship) for its own sake. An ostensible friend who does not value the relationship in this way is apt to be perceived as spoiling the common project—"letting the side down," so to speak. It may even be doubted whether a friendship really exists unless both parties care about the relationship for its own sake, no matter how great their benevolence and conscientiousness toward each other. What is usually understood (and desired) as "the gift of friendship" is therefore one of those goods that no one can give you solely out of a desire to benefit you.

For reasons such as these, the disposition to prize a friendship for its own sake is not only an instance of the (virtuous) general disposition to invest oneself in a common project. It is itself a trait that is important for living well the kind of life that is characteristic of human beings, and a quality that is important for being humanly good to another person in a type of relationship that virtually everyone has reason to want. These considerations support the view that it is a virtue.

(B) *Caring about one's own good.*¹⁴ It may seem strange to speak of concern for one's own good as a moral virtue. One reason for this is that persons are rarely thought to be remarkable for this quality unless it is carried to that excess which is known as selfishness, which is obviously a vice rather than a virtue. To care about one's own good to (at least) an appropriate degree seems so normal and natural that no one gets much credit for it. Certainly it is possible, however, to care too little, or have too little respect, for one's own good. I believe that it is (or can be) a moral shortcoming, and that an appropriate regard for one's own good is at least a part of moral virtue, even if it rarely deserves to be singled out for special praise. Perhaps we can think of it, on the Aristotelian pattern, as a mean between the opposing vices of selfishness (excess) and self-neglect (deficiency), though I suspect that these traits are in fact distinguished by something more subtle than quantitative differences in intensity of self-interestedness.

More than one rationale can be given for regarding an appropriate form and degree of this concern as virtuous. One might think it morally virtuous simply because a human individual can hardly flourish without it. On the other hand, that might seem an inadequate reason to those who believe that morality is a matter of how one relates to other persons. I will not try to adjudicate that dispute here. I will only point out that there is an alternative rationale according to which the moral value of an appropriate concern for one's own good has roots in one's relations with other people—namely, insofar as one's own good is a common project that one shares with others.

This may at first seem a far-fetched idea, but I believe discussion of objections to it will reveal its merits. The most obvious objection is that it is unrealistic to think of caring about one's own good as caring about a common project—that one's own good is one's own project, and caring about it is an instinctive, individual phenomenon, rather than a social one. This objection is mistaken, however. No doubt human beings are instinctively or innately self-centered in various ways. But we are not innately concerned for our own good. For concern for one's own good presupposes a concept of one's own good; and that is not innate. Virtually all of us acquired it from people who not only had the concept of our good before we did, but also cared about our good before we could even conceive of it. It is a basic feature of human life that

children have to be *taught* to take care of themselves; that is and has to be a very large part of all early childhood education. In learning to take care of himself the child begins to conceive of and care about his own good. This process can be thought of as an initiation into a project that the child shares with his parents and teachers, or with whoever is nurturing and teaching him—a project of caring for his good.

“This is very well for children,” the objector may reply, “but it is part of maturity that a person’s good ceases to be a common project and becomes his own individual affair.” Not so, I think. In any normal or desirable human situation adults too pursue their good in the context of relationships in which the good of each person is an object of common concern and cooperative effort. This is a feature of family life and friendship. At a less intimate level it is also a feature of educational and medical institutions in which adults are involved, and of whole communities insofar as they take some responsibility for the welfare of their members. Most people find an important part of their own good in caring for the good of others; and it is therefore an important way of being humanly good to other people to share with them the project of promoting one’s own good.

The project of promoting my good, however, is one for which my interested participation is crucial. There are many ways in which my good will not be effectively promoted or even protected unless I care about it and pursue it. To be sure, it is also a familiar and important truth that there are ways in which my good will not be advanced by my being too concerned about it; caring more about other things than about oneself is good for one. But if I do not care for my health, avoid bad habits, and take an interest in my education, there is not a lot that my friends can do to rectify these deficiencies. This is a frequent source of anxiety and frustration to people who care about other people. Such facts help to make it intelligible that people who neglect their education or their health, harming (directly) no one but themselves, are sometimes spoken of as “irresponsible.” Since people do find much of their good in participating in advancing the good of others, caring appropriately about one’s own good is apt to be important to the good of others as well as to one’s own.¹⁵ That is a reason for thinking such a concern virtuous.

The idea of an individual’s good being a common project may raise in some minds the specter of an objectionable paternalism. There are errors to be avoided on both sides here. On the one hand, it would not be a morally good thing to say (in any desirable human situation) that whether I am happy or miserable is nobody’s business but my own. That would be an affront to any relationship or community of mutual love or benevolence. On the other hand, it would be a dangerous mistake not to see that even if my flourishing is a common project, it is one that is related to my will and commitments in a way in which it cannot and should not be related to anyone else’s. For the goal of the project is that I should live a good life; and on any attractive conception of a good life, that presupposes that I live my life, making choices, developing interests and tastes and convictions of my own. The concrete form that the project of my flourishing is to take must therefore be determined very largely by my will.

The advancement of *my good* is a different project from my being or becoming a good philosopher, or financially secure, or an accomplished pianist. The latter are

projects that people who care about me could share with me, and their sharing them would be fine if my adoption of them is not the result of manipulation or pressure. But not embracing such projects need not be a moral shortcoming in me, even if they are espoused by well-meaning friends. That I should care in an appropriate and general way about my own good as such (and thus value my own life as a project) is important for my fruitful participation in any decently benevolent human community. That I should agree with my friends about which of the careers that are open to me would be best for me is not similarly important for my participation in any but an oppressive society. To be seriously mistaken about what would be good for oneself may in some cases be a moral fault; but if so, the fact is not explained by anything that has been said in this essay.

Notes

1. Luke 12:15.
2. Joseph Butler, *Butler's Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel and A Dissertation of the Nature of Virtue*, edited by T. A. Roberts (London, 1970), 102.
3. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1.7. 1097a22–1098b20.
4. Butler, *Fifteen Sermons*, 102.
5. Ibid.
6. Philippa Foot, *Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy* (Berkeley, 1978), 3.
7. James D. Wallace, *Virtues and Vices* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1978), 37.
8. Foot, *Virtues and Vices*, 4–7.
9. See Wallace, *Virtues and Vices*, 160f. Wallace's statements are compatible with the suggestion I am mentioning here, though I don't think they commit him to it.
10. I do not mean to commit myself to this exclusively social view of morality—only to show that the view I am defending is not inconsistent with it.
11. Games illustrate another point that deserves to be noted here. The goal of a good project need not be intrinsically valuable. Games are often good projects even though the goal of the project (winning) is highly artificial and has neither value nor sense apart from people's commitment to the project.
12. Lawrence Blum, *Friendship, Altruism and Morality* (London, 1980), chap. 4. See, e.g., 67f: "[O]ther things being equal, acts of friendship are morally good insofar as they involve acting from regard for another person for his own sake. . . . [T]he deeper and stronger the concern for the friend . . . the greater the degree of moral worth (again, other things being equal)."
13. Cf. Blum, *Friendship*, 82, where he expresses a desire to avoid "an overmoralized view of friendship" that "sees the concern for the friend's good as the central element in friendship, downplaying or neglecting the liking of the friend, the desire to be with him, the enjoyment of shared activities, etc."
14. In what I have to say about this subject I am much indebted to discussions with Lisa Halko.
15. Even someone who did not value her own good could try to be considerate of other people's interest in her good. But I think this is not likely to be a very satisfactory substitute.