

LEIBNIZ'S *EXAMINATION OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION*

Robert Merrihew Adams

Leibniz, though a lifelong member of the Lutheran church, left us a complete, Roman Catholic systematic theology. The present paper explores the questions this raises for our understanding of his life and religious thought, placing him in the context of the Calixtine Lutheran theology dominant in Lower Saxony in his time. The work is shown to be neither a platform for church reunion nor Leibniz's personal confession of faith, but it does reflect his own views regarding a theology of love and the practical nature of theology.

It is not widely known that Leibniz wrote a complete treatise of systematic theology. A hundred short pages of Latin text, in the edition I shall cite,¹ it has been generally known by the title *Theological System* [*Systema theologicum*]; but the back of the last page bears the inscription *Examination of the Christian Religion*, arguably in Leibniz's own hand (B 4),² and I shall use that title. Numerous affinities with other writings indicate that it was probably composed in the mid-1680's, and thus belongs to the period in which Leibniz's thought assumed its mature form. The paper on which it is written has the same watermark as paper that Leibniz is known to have used during the first four months of 1686, when the *Discourse on Metaphysics* was written (VE 2411).

The nineteenth century saw the first publication of the *Examination*, and several subsequent Latin editions, as well as translations into French, German, and English.³ The twentieth century has paid little attention to it, no doubt in part because many of our century's Leibniz scholars have not been much interested in questions of Christian theology, but also because it is genuinely hard to know what to make of the book.⁴ Though written by one who remained a member of the Lutheran church throughout his life, it is unmistakably a work of Roman Catholic rather than Protestant theology. It thus confronts us with the difficult issue of Leibniz's personal religious stance.

It is well known that he was a pioneer in what is now known as ecumenism, and engaged for many years in theological discussions aimed at the reunion of the churches. He was interested in all the theological tendencies of Western Europe in his time, and well informed about them. In many of his



writings in ecumenical theology his voice is that of an impartial arbiter, clarifying the positions and censuring the arguments on each side, and trying to find points of contact between them.⁵ This is not Leibniz's only theological voice, however. Sometimes his voice is that of a loyal Protestant (e.g., A VI,i,516), and occasionally that voice speaks of Catholic positions with a certain asperity (Gr 206f. from 1697) or even sarcasm (VE 266-72/L 213-16). Another voice, with greater pathos than the others, is heard from the late 1660's through the mid-1680's, the voice of one who would like personally to join the Roman Catholic Church but feels unable in conscience to do so. There is also the voice of a Catholic, a voice heard as early as in the "Catholic Demonstrations" of the late 1660's (e.g., A VI,i,508-13/L 115-19). This is the voice that is heard in the *Examination*.

Which of these voices is Leibniz's own? All of them are, at least in the sense that distinctively Leibnizian things are said in all of them. This adds to the difficulty of knowing how much Leibniz believed of what he said in the different voices, particularly the Catholic voice. Closely related is the difficulty of understanding his motives in speaking thus. I cannot claim to be able to resolve these difficulties entirely, even with regard to the *Examination*, let alone the whole array of Leibniz's theological writings. But I think I discern in his work a coherent theological stance that makes sense of most of the phenomena and motivates most of the writings.

Leibniz's religious thought certainly changed with the years, especially in its flavor and emphasis. After some point in the later 1680's it is obviously less favorable to Roman Catholicism, and seems to me also to manifest less religious fervor; those who will may speculate about connections between those changes. One may also speculate on the extent to which Leibniz, political on principle in these matters (as we shall see), was motivated in his changing attitudes by changes in his political context. The attention of the Hannoverian court, still focused in the early 1690's on the Electoral rank it was obtaining, and hence on the Catholic court in Vienna, had turned by 1700 toward its hopes for succession to the British throne, and hence toward the Protestant politics of London. And in a more general way, Protestantism probably appeared more firmly established in northern Europe in Leibniz's last years than it did in his youth. Nonetheless I believe the theological position that underlies the *Theodicy* of 1710 is still basically the same as that which motivated the *Examination* a quarter century earlier.

1. The Hannover Strategy for Church Reunion

In a letter of 14/24 March 1683 to his most intimate Catholic correspondent of that period, Count Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels, Leibniz wrote that

I believe one could compose an Exposition of all the controversial articles that . . . ought to satisfy even the most precise people; the more so, the more

they are fit to examine the matters in depth, provided these same people are well intentioned. If such an exposition were as well done as I conceive is feasible, good God, what fruit wouldn't it bear in the Church? I even believe, if it were done by a man who dissembled his name and his party, that it could get separately the approval or avowal of tolerability of the ablest and best intentioned Theologians of each party independently, without either group knowing anything about the others. (A I,iii,279f.)

The idea of obtaining approval for an anonymous or pseudonymous work on points of controversy recurs a year later, in a letter of March 1684 to Count Ernst, with Leibniz's explicit desire to write it himself, and with a more Catholic audience apparently in mind, for Leibniz states that "it must not be known in any way that the author is not in the Roman Communion. That prejudice alone renders the best things suspect" (A I,iv,325; cf. A I,iv,329). The *Examination* has been regarded as fulfilling or growing out of this desire; and as the letter of 1683 clearly envisages an exposition that would serve as a theological platform for reunion of the churches, the *Examination* too has been viewed as intended for that role.⁶

This can hardly have been Leibniz's intention, however; for he must have recognized that the book is much too one-sidedly Catholic to be suited for that role. In fact it can be shown that there is no direct role for the *Examination* in the strategy for reunion of the churches that Leibniz regarded as most promising in the mid-1680's and pursued in his correspondence with Bossuet in the 1690's. Even as Leibniz wrote to Count Ernst in March of 1683, the main lines of this strategy were being laid down in secret negotiations in Hannover about which Leibniz was not then free to say much to the Count (A I,iii,280,288). Later, in November 1687, Leibniz felt able to write a memorandum for the Count in which it is fully described and presented with enthusiasm as "of all the methods that have been proposed to remove this great Schism of the West, . . . the most reasonable" (A I,v,10). We can hardly discern the motives of the *Examination* without understanding this strategy and the very specific political, ecclesiastical, and theological context in which Leibniz's ecumenical efforts took place.

The strategy had initially a German focus (A I,v,15), and received its first impetus from the Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I (a Catholic), who sent the Catholic bishop Cristobal de Rojas y Spinola⁷ to negotiate with the Protestant princes of Germany regarding reunion of the churches. Rojas claimed to have obtained declarations of approval from a number of Catholic theologians for a package of conciliatory proposals in which he sought to interest the Protestants. His main proposal, as Leibniz saw it, was that Protestants could be allowed to join the Roman Catholic Church, and their clergy could be ordained as priests and bishops in it, without first settling all the disputed issues. This proposal could be approved on the basis of "the Great Principle of the Catholics, which is that a Christian is in the internal communion of the

Church, and is neither heretic nor schismatic, when he is in the Spirit of submission, ready to receive and desirous of learning what God reveals," not only in the Scriptures but also through the tradition of the Church and particularly a legitimate Ecumenical Council of the Church. Mere doctrinal error, without rebelliousness, does not make one a heretic. Moreover, this line of thought continues, those who, by an error of fact, doubt the legitimacy of a particular Ecumenical Council, "and believe themselves grounded in good reasons, and are so persuaded of it that their error is morally invincible in the present state of things, are not heretics, provided that they recognize [in principle] sincerely and in good faith the power of the Councils of the Catholic Church." Since Protestants could be judged by Catholics to be in this condition with regard to the Council of Trent (and since, as Leibniz notes, there were precedents of such doubts regarding Trent among Catholics), acceptance of the Council of Trent need not be demanded of Protestants as a condition of acceptance into the Roman Catholic communion (A I,v,12f.; cf. LA 130).

How then would disagreements be resolved between those who accepted and those who rejected the Council of Trent? At this point Leibniz credited Rojas with an insight into the Protestant position. The most widely accepted of the Protestant creeds, according to Leibniz, was the Augsburg Confession of 1530. It was also the most conciliatory toward Catholics, though Leibniz does not compare it with other Protestant confessions on that point. And in the Augsburg Confession the German Protestant princes declared themselves willing "in full obedience, even beyond what is required, to participate in" a legitimate general council of the Church, which they petitioned the Emperor and the Pope to convene.⁸ Rojas proposed to the Protestants that, in keeping with this undertaking of their ancestors, they enter into a preliminary but binding reunion with the Roman Church, in which they would not be held to the decisions of the Council of Trent, but outstanding disagreements would be resolved by a future council that they would regard as legitimate. These two ideas, that of a preliminary reunion, and that of a future ecumenical council to settle the most important issues left open in the preliminary agreements, constitute the heart of the reunion strategy from its beginnings with Rojas to its end in the failure of Leibniz's correspondence with Bossuet.

Rojas visited the courts of several German Protestant princes, inquiring whether these proposals might be acceptable to them, and what would constitute a council that they would regard as legitimate (A I,v,13f.). In several courts he was received with great suspicion and was unable to engage the Protestant theologians in fruitful discussion (A I,v,18). In Hannover, however, he received a warm reception, which must be understood in relation to the political situation in Hannover and the theological situation in Lower Saxony as a whole. The Duke in Hannover, when Rojas visited first, in 1676

and 1679, was Johann Friedrich, a convert to Catholicism who practiced his religion privately but did not disturb the official Lutheranism of his duchy.⁹ He had obvious reasons for his deep interest in church reunion. By 1683 he had been succeeded by his brother Ernst August, who was Lutheran, but less devout and more political in his interest in these matters. His hope (eventually fulfilled) of gaining Electoral status for himself and his heirs disposed him to be rather forthcoming toward the Emperor's emissary, Rojas. He "ordered his Theologians, of the court as well as of the university, to enter into negotiation with the Bishop of Tübingen" (A I,v,18).

These theologians, on their own account, might have been expected to be more favorably disposed than most Lutherans toward Rojas's project; and at least one of them was. There was a university at Helmstedt, which Hannover shared with the other two principalities into which the Guelph family had divided the original territory of Lower Saxony (nominally of Brunswick). Its theological faculty was Lutheran and dominated, in the last three quarters of the seventeenth century, by the theology of Georg Calixt (1586-1656), which also served, through the second half of the century, as the more or less official theology of the Guelph courts. In his time Calixt was German Lutheranism's most important representative of the humanistic tendency in Melancthon's thought. He accorded a major role to philosophy in his theology, and was known for his irenic or ecumenical stance toward the Catholic and Reformed communions. His irenicism was the object of a furious attack by more conservative Lutheran theologians, principally from Upper Saxony and East Prussia. What became known as the "Syncretism Controversy" began with an argument at a conference in 1645, at which Calixt's affirmation that Calvinists should be regarded as "true Christians" enraged Abraham Calov, who became his chief opponent;¹⁰ and Calixt was even more fiercely attacked for friendliness toward Catholicism.

Calixt's influence in Lower Saxony represented a respectfulness and openness to dialogue across religious lines that was uncommon in seventeenth century Europe—a point that was very important to Leibniz. Its importance should not be underestimated in trying to understand the persistence of his allegiance to Lutheranism and to Hannover. Leibniz was certainly an admirer of Calixt, claiming to have been so from earliest youth;¹¹ and the two most important Lutheran theologians in the Hannover negotiations of 1683 stood even closer to Calixt. One was his son, Friedrich Ulrich Calixt, professor of theology at Helmstedt and his father's principal defender. The other was Gerhard Wolter Molanus (1633-1722), the Director of the Lutheran state church of the duchy of Hannover, who had studied under Georg Calixt at Helmstedt.¹² Molanus was an extremely high-church Lutheran who, as Abbott of the Lutheran monastery of Loccum, reintroduced a version of the Rule of St. Benedict, including regular hours of conventual prayer and a rule (though

not a perpetual vow) of celibacy for the abbot and monks.¹³ He became Rojas's principal Lutheran discussion partner, and later Leibniz's principal collaborator in a series of efforts for the reunion of the churches.

The main lines of the reunion project had been laid down by Rojas and Molanus before Leibniz was significantly involved in the negotiations. Though Molanus saw himself as continuing the Calixtine tradition, his strategy for reunion differed consciously from that of the elder Calixt. The latter had hoped to reconcile the churches on the basis that only the creeds of the first five Christian centuries, which they held in common, were fundamental, and that other, later developments of doctrine were not important enough to divide them. Molanus, in contrast,¹⁴ proposed to give full weight to characteristically Catholic and characteristically Protestant doctrines, and try to find a way to reconcile them. This is the meaning of the formula he adopted from his earliest discussions with Rojas, that reunion should take place *salvis principiis utriusque partis* [preserving the principles of both parties].¹⁵

Rojas met with a much less favorable reception from F. U. Calixt than from Molanus. The younger Calixt suspected that no real concession was being offered from the Catholic side—partly because it was unclear what ecclesiastical authorization Rojas had for his proposals, and partly because what was proposed involved the Protestants submitting to the authority of the Roman Catholic hierarchy *before* the future council would make clear the ultimate disposition of disputed issues. It seems that most Lutherans who heard of the negotiations shared these fears.¹⁶

Molanus can hardly have been unconcerned about these points, and attempted to deal with them in a document entitled *Method of Restoring Ecclesiastical Union between Romans and Protestants*. The *Method* embraced the fundamental ideas of the preliminary union and the future ecumenical council. Molanus was even prepared (like Leibniz) to grant the infallibility of such a council,¹⁷ but insisted that its legitimacy depended on the Superintendants of the Protestant churches having seats and votes in it (A I,iv,505; cf. v,19f.). The other, even more important safeguard proposed by Molanus for the Protestants is found in his division of controversial issues into four classes. The first class was the crucial one; it consisted of points on which the Protestants refused to compromise or allow any uncertainty for the decision of a future council, demanding guarantees from the Pope in advance. The second class of issues were those to be treated as merely verbal, including "the question of the number of the sacraments, and whether in the sacrament of the altar there is a sacrifice properly speaking." A third group of issues were those regarded as disputed *within* one or both of the churches, such as the merit of good works and the immaculate conception of Mary; these should be more easily settled. The fourth and final class were the fairly important issues that need not be an obstacle to the initial union but should be decided by a future council (A I,v,19; cf. iv,504f.).

The *Method* constituted, in the view of Molanus and Leibniz, the substance of the Lutheran response that was presented by Duke Ernst August to Rojas with the signatures of four Lutheran theologians, two from Hannover including Molanus, and two from Helmstedt including F. U. Calixt. Even under pressure from the Duke, however, F. U. Calixt was apparently unwilling to sign the *Method* as a free-standing document; so what the four theologians signed was a more complex, and more ambiguous, dossier of documents from their conference.¹⁸ Rojas did not sign any of these documents, and it is important to recognize that the *Method* did not represent an agreement between him and the Lutherans of Hannover. It was a Protestant document, and represented a Protestant move in the negotiations (A I,iii,576f.; cf. 297,316f.). That it was never met with an official countermove from Rome was ascribed by Molanus to the politically motivated opposition of the French cardinals.¹⁹ The Protestant proposal presented by Leibniz and Molanus to Bossuet in 1691, in hopes of winning a more favorable French response to their project, was still essentially that of the *Method* (OCB IV,470-82).

The question our present investigation prompts us to ask about the *Method* is how it is related to Leibniz's *Examination of the Christian Religion*. One of the great Leibniz scholars of our century described the *Examination* as marked by "agreement with the signed declarations of Molanus,"²⁰ but I am more struck by the disagreement between them. What is most striking is that the nonnegotiable points claimed as most important for Protestants in Molanus's *Method* are not in general assured to them in the *Examination*. They are: "[1] communion under both species, [2] the rejection of private masses,²¹ [3] the justification of the sinner, [4] the marriage of Ecclesiastics, [5] the validity of the ordinations that are performed among them,²² . . . and . . . [6] the Episcopal rights of the protestant princes" (A I,v,19).²³

The most theological of these points, and the most central for Lutherans, is "the justification of the sinner." Its role in the *Method*, in the *Examination*, and in the projects of Molanus and Leibniz is complex, and will be taken up in the next section of this paper. The other five demands, pertaining to ecclesiastical practice, are clearly not honored in the *Examination*. (1) The *Examination* hints that it would be advisable to permit the historically Protestant peoples to have communion under both species, but more firmly advises Protestants to submit to whatever the Pope may decide in this matter (*Exam* 145). (2) The Protestant rejection of private masses is condemned (*Exam* 157f.). (4) It is hinted that it would be good to permit marriage of priests, but the one firm conclusion is that the Protestants should endure the requirement of clerical celibacy as long as it seems right to "the Rulers of the Church" (*Exam* 187f.). And (5) while the validity of Protestant ordinations is not discussed, the discussion most relevant to it concludes with the rather Catholic admonition that it is safest not to attempt a "private" answer

to such questions nor to depart from the historic, Apostolic succession of ordinations (VE 2489 = *Exam* 179). (6) "The Episcopal rights of the protestant princes" are not discussed in the *Examination*; Leibniz seems to have regarded the issue as merely political (A I,iv,509).

Of course, the *Examination* presents itself as a Catholic document, whereas the nonnegotiable demands were a Protestant position to which Rojas never committed himself, though Leibniz seems to have believed in 1687 that he was prepared to grant the substance of most of them (A I,v,17). It is therefore noteworthy that the *Examination* does not even incorporate the most fundamental features of the strategy on which Rojas and Molanus were *agreed*, though it does envisage a return of Protestants to the Roman Church. The *Examination* makes no mention of a preliminary reunion, or of reserving disputed points to a future ecumenical council. It appeals to the authority of the Council of Trent (e.g., *Exam* 183). Among the issues that Molanus's *Method* (as Leibniz understood it) would reserve to a future council are those of "purgatory, the limits of the Pope's authority, . . . the manner of the real presence, . . . the cult of the saints, relics and images, oricular confession" (A I,v,19). Where the *Examination* discusses these issues, it generally decides them in a recognizably Catholic framework, with some provisions that could be regarded as concessions to Protestants—for instance, that they need not adopt the use of religious images (*Exam* 89f.), and that the Pope is to be obeyed "in everything that we judge, examining ourselves, can be done without sin and in conscience, even to the point that in doubt, other things equal, obedience should be judged safer"—which seems to leave a wide territory for conscientious dissent (VE 2487 = *Exam* 173). (See *Exam* 199f. on purgatory, 125-39 on the real presence, 91-113 on the cult of the saints, 113 on relics, 69-91 on images, and 159-67 on sacramental confession.) Even if these judgments represent the way in which Leibniz thought a future council would or should decide the questions, it remains the case that presenting a resolution of these issues in advance is no part of the reunion strategy that Leibniz said he found uniquely promising. The point is important in the historical context; in 1694 Leibniz communicated to Rojas that Molanus could not support a certain document because it "defines very freely almost all controversies, which the [Hannover] Conference judged cannot yet be done" (A I,x,154).

The *Examination* cannot have been conceived as a document to which Protestants and Catholics would agree, for Leibniz must have known that there was not the slightest hope of obtaining Protestant assent to it. Molanus was probably the most ecumenically conciliatory Lutheran ecclesiastic known to Leibniz, and he seems never to have been prepared to concede much more to the Catholics than was conceded in his *Method*. Leibniz was well aware that even those concessions exposed Molanus to Lutheran suspicions

of having sold out to Catholicism, as news of the negotiations in Hannover leaked out in 1683 and 1684.²⁴

To be sure, Leibniz never expected immediate success for the strategy of Rojas and Molanus (A I,v,11), having been initially rather pessimistic about it (A I,iii,288). Like Molanus, Rojas was suspected by his coreligionists of having conceded too much to the other side (see, e.g., A I,iii,297). In these matters, Leibniz thought, "one must proceed by steps" (A I,x,151). The Protestant proposals of Molanus's *Method* could expect, at best, to meet with a Catholic counter-proposal that would offer the Protestants less than the *Method* demanded. Could the *Examination* have been conceived as that Catholic counter-proposal? Not plausibly, I think. It is too stingy toward the Protestants to play that part, as it does not even incorporate the most basic proposals with which Rojas had approached the Protestants.

We are not left to mere speculation regarding the shape of the counter-offer that Leibniz hoped to see from the Catholic side. A decade having passed with no such response, Leibniz wrote in October 1694 to prod Rojas gently to be as forthcoming as the Hannover Lutherans had been (A I,x,154). As a next "step," he suggested, Rojas should compose and send to him and Molanus "something accommodated to the principles of the Hannover conference, as if originating from Hungarian or other Protestants" (A I,x,155). It would be important for such a document not to transgress the "limits" or "lines" laid down in that meeting, presumably in the *Method* (A I,x,151,154). Leibniz and Molanus would revise the text and arrange for its publication, in due time, with the sort of official permission commonly granted to theological books by the dean of a Lutheran theological faculty. They in turn would compose a similarly pseudonymous statement from a Catholic point of view and send it to Rojas for revision and publication with the normal Catholic ecclesiastical approval (A I,x,155). Whatever else Leibniz may have hoped to achieve in this way, it provided him with a tactful occasion to send Rojas his own draft of the next step he thought should be taken from the Catholic side, which he did in a document, approved by Molanus, entitled *Judgment of a Catholic Doctor about the Discussion of Reunion recently held with certain Protestant Theologians* (A I,x,155,156-69).

The *Judgment* does not grant the Protestants everything on which Molanus insisted in the *Method*. It expresses vehement opposition to the suggestion that "the Protestants with whom [Rojas] dealt want certain controversies to be excluded even from the authority of a future Council, and not to be submitted to the judgment of the Church, but to remain forever in suspension," but relies on the hope that the Protestant proposals need not be interpreted in such a sense (A I,x,165f.). It seems to me disingenuous of Leibniz to suggest such a hope to the Catholics, but it is clear, in any event, that he did not expect the Catholics, at the next step, to grant the Protestants guar-

antees, up front, on nonnegotiable issues. On the substance of those issues, however, the *Judgment*, unlike the *Examination*, denies the Protestants little. The questions of "conceding communion under both species and marriage of the Clergy" to the Protestants are mentioned in a conciliatory tone, and it is suggested that the negotiations to date show Protestants and Catholics differing only verbally about justification (A I,x,157f.); the other nonnegotiable items of the *Method* are not mentioned at all.

The *Judgment* insists on "the authority of the Catholic Church," and especially of its ecumenical councils, but in terms that Molanus and Leibniz were prepared to accept (A I,x,158-62). Most important, it argues vigorously for the two basic features of the Rojas-Molanus strategy. (1) It argues that a future ecumenical council should be allowed to decide outstanding controversies, including issues thought by Catholics to have been decided at Trent, commenting that "we Catholics ought not to fear that the Holy Spirit will change its mind or pronounce otherwise in a new Council than as it defined in an old one" (A I,x,162-65). (2) It also argues that the Pope is able, in principle, to let Protestants enter the Roman communion on an "interim" basis, "keeping their opinions, which would be referred to the ultimate decision of the Council." In this matter, says the fictitious author, "I would favor the power of the Pontiff rather . . . than confine it without compelling reason" (A I,x,166-68). The text of the *Judgment* joins the correspondence with Bossuet as evidence that Leibniz thought the next step in the reunion process should be to persuade Catholics of the appropriateness of these two policies. By comparison with the *Judgment*, the *Examination* seems simply irrelevant to the reunion process that Leibniz envisaged.²⁵

There remains, perhaps, a possibility that the *Examination* was meant to contribute to church reunion more indirectly, by planting conciliatory thoughts in the minds of Catholic readers. It does tend to minimize Protestant-Catholic disagreements, emphasizes the importance of avoiding abuses in such practices as veneration of the saints and the use of religious images, and suggests that concessions could well be made to Protestants (though it does not promise them) in such matters as communion under both species and marriage of the clergy. This cannot be absolutely excluded as a motive for the work; but if propaganda for such ideas were a major motive, we might have expected a more vigorous persuasive effort on their behalf, which Leibniz certainly had the skill to present, even in a context of pseudonymous deference to Roman authority, as the *Judgment* shows.

2. The Love of God Above All Things

If the *Examination* had little or nothing to contribute to Leibniz's large ecclesiastical schemes, perhaps it should be viewed as a more personal document. There are several indications in Leibniz's letters to Count Ernst that

one of his main concerns in the famous correspondence with Arnauld that passed through the Count's hands was to ascertain whether Arnauld believed that one who professed the philosophical opinions that Leibniz presented to Arnauld could or "could not be tolerated in the Catholic Church" (LA 131; cf. LA 15f., 21, 103 and A I, v, 149). He had earlier indicated to Ernst that he was deterred from joining the Roman communion because he feared that certain "philosophical opinions, of which [he believed he had] a demonstration" would not be tolerated in that church (A I, iv, 320f.).²⁶ It is presumably these "philosophical opinions," or closely related ones, that Leibniz wrote down for Arnauld to read in the *Discourse on Metaphysics*. We may be tempted by the hypothesis that the *Examination* presents Leibniz's own opinions and was written, like the *Discourse*, to be read by a Catholic theologian who could tell Leibniz whether his views would be tolerated in the Roman Church. Perhaps Arnauld would have seen the *Examination* if his response to Leibniz's opinions on the presumably less risky topics of the *Discourse* had been more favorable (though the *Examination* would presumably have been written in French if it had been intended primarily for Arnauld). On this hypothesis the *Examination* is a personal profession of faith, composed for the purpose of testing the possibility of Leibniz's individual conversion to Roman Catholicism.

In support of this reading it can be noted that distinctively Leibnizian views are expressed in the *Examination*. Issues of theodicy are treated in terms of God's choice among possible substances and their complete individual concepts, in a way that is strikingly reminiscent of the *Discourse* (*Exam* 7, 27f.). The immortality of the human soul is defended on the basis of a recognizably Leibnizian doctrine of simple substance (*Exam* 191f.). And direct causal interaction between mind and body and, more broadly, among created substances is denied in very Leibnizian terms (*Exam* 93f.).

In addition to these metaphysical features, the *Examination* has Leibnizian traits in its view of religion. One of the most important of these, and one of the riskiest from the point of view of both Catholic and Protestant orthodoxy, is the development of a theology of love.²⁷ Leibniz identified "the love of God above all things" as "the principle of true religion" (Gr 161). This means loving God

not only for the sake of the goods that he distributes to us, but for his own sake and as an ultimate end. For this is the nature of true love in general, which is called friendship's [love], that we locate our own happiness and perfection in the happiness and perfection of the object loved, partly, that is, if the object is of finite perfection . . . , but entirely, if it is of the highest excellence and goodness (VE 2428 = *Exam* 39).²⁸

The happier and more perfect the object, the more happiness can be found in loving it. Love for God, Leibniz inferred, is the most reliable source of

happiness or joy. “*Divine love*, moreover, surpasses other loves because God can be loved with the greatest success, since nothing is happier than God, and at the same time nothing more beautiful or worthier of happiness can be understood” (G III,387/L 422; cf. G VI,27/T 51).

Also since God is the most perfect and the happiest, and consequently the most lovable, of substances, and since *true, pure Love* consists in the state that makes one taste pleasure in the perfections and in the happiness of that which one loves, this Love must give us the greatest pleasure of which one can be capable when God is its object (PNG 16).

Leibniz’s conception of love for God has a pronounced rationalistic and indeed Stoic aspect. Those who love God above all things

never murmur against the divine will, knowing that everything must issue in good for those who love God,²⁹ and just as they are content with past things, they try likewise regarding future things to do whatever they judge to agree with the presumed will of God (VE 2412 = *Exam* 5).

The best foundation for the love of God above all things is rational demonstration of the divine perfection (Gr 8f.; Cf. G VI,27-29/T 51-53). Some of Leibniz’s papers evince an evangelistic zeal for propagation of the love of God through philosophical instruction (Gr 7-17, VE 1786-1823, both from the period 1677-82); and his *Theodicy* is plainly animated by a concern to establish views that will sustain love for God (G VI,29/T 53; cf. DM 2-5).

Leibniz understood his relation to Luther in terms of his own persistent emphasis on the love of God above all things.

And if, in accordance with that voice of Staupitz that Luther said excited him, one locates the whole force of true penitence, conversion, justification, renewal, and finally of good works, in true charity or divine love, to what else does one refer but that living faith that Protestants locate not so much in the intellect as in the will—that is, filial trust that is conceived from the immense goodness of God and the benefits conferred through [God’s] son, and is efficacious through an ardor for obedience? (A I,vii,274)

A similar interpretation of Luther is implied in the *Examination* where Leibniz says that the view of those “who place the whole force of justification in Faith alone” can be accepted if it is understood that they

have another notion of faith than that which was formerly received in [scholastic thought]; for they place faith not only in the intellect, but also in the will; indeed they extend the nature of faith so far as to include filial trust toward God, in which charity or love [*dilectio*] of God seems to me to be involved (*Exam* 33f.).

I think Leibniz was aware that this interpretation of justifying faith was novel and controversial in relation to Lutheran theology. The addition of “to me” as a conscious afterthought (VE 2426) in the last clause of the passage

just quoted pinpoints the place at which Leibniz steps over a line that even the Calixts had been careful not to cross. That justifying faith is a matter of trust [*fiducia*], and hence a function of the will, was a commonplace of Lutheran thought.³⁰ But it is no part of Lutheran theology that faith, as an act of will, includes charity. According to the Calixtine theology faith, justification, and charity occur at the same time in the person that is being justified, but whereas faith is an instrumental cause of justification, charity is an effect of it. Thus they are distinct, though inseparable in God's plan of salvation.³¹

This point was very important to Friedrich Ulrich Calixt in defending his father against the charge of having betrayed the Lutheran doctrine of justification by *faith alone* [*sola fide*]. Calov accused the elder Calixt of abandoning the thesis that "faith does not justify because it is formed or efficacious through charity." The younger Calixt replied that his father had stated that "by the the gratuitous gift and kindness of of God we attain eternal life by the intervention of faith, indeed, but not of faith under that concept [*ratio*] by which it is a more or less perfect virtue, but rather under that by which we apprehend the Divine promises and rest on the merit of Christ."³²

As I noted in the previous section, Molanus listed the Lutheran doctrine of "the justification of the sinner" among the nonnegotiable points that Protestants must be assured they would not have to give up. In the structure of his *Method* these essential points are contrasted with the second class of issues, which are merely verbal. In fact, however, the place of justification in the church reunion strategy, for Molanus as well as for Leibniz, was more complex than their summaries of the *Method* would suggest. In the full statement of the *Private Thoughts* that he prepared for Bossuet in 1691, Molanus still insists that the Pope must "leave intact and unimpaired" to the Protestant churches "the doctrine of the justification of the sinful human being before God," but nevertheless argues that there is no reason for the Pope to refuse this concession because it can be seen now that the whole disagreement is "not about the thing, but about the diverse understanding of terms" (OCB IV,472).

This thought, that the dispute about justification can be resolved as merely verbal, was by the 1690's, if not earlier, part of Leibniz's and Molanus's strategy for the reunion of the churches (A I,x,158). It is found also in the *Examination*; and the explanation that Leibniz gives there is essentially the same that Molanus would offer Bossuet. If by the question, how a sinner is justified, we mean how one is freed from guilt, both sides will agree with the Protestants that we are justified by "the satisfaction of Christ imputed to us." But if by justification we mean being made just in one's actual moral disposition, both sides will agree with the Catholics that "that trait [*habitus*] of justice is infused in us by God in regeneration" (*Exam* 31f.; cf. OCB IV,472).

In his *Private Thoughts* for Bossuet, Molanus goes on to treat the issue

whether “faith alone justifies” as merely verbal. “Faith alone” can be accepted as long as it does not mean faith that is “destitute of good works, or at least of good intent.” Justifying faith is faith that “works through charity.” This has a certain similarity to the treatment of the “faith alone” doctrine in Leibniz’s *Examination*, but Molanus does not imply, as Leibniz does, that the charity “through” which the faith works is part of the faith rather than an effect of it. Molanus does not explicitly address that issue, but seems to imply that the faith and the charity are distinct, inasmuch as he holds that faith plays a causal role that charity does not play in justification (OCB IV,476).

The view of justification advocated in the *Examination* was pretty clearly Leibniz’s own (cf. A I,iv420; vii,497). His attempt to integrate the doctrine of justification by faith into an essentially love-based soteriology led him, on this crucial point, outside the Lutheran tradition, even in its conciliatory Calixtine form, and arguably beyond any doctrinal basis that his associate Molanus was prepared to embrace for church reunion. There is no doubt that Leibniz’s piety breathes a very different spirit from Luther’s. He had far less sympathy for Luther’s concerns about justification, and a much less profound understanding of them, than Kant had, for example, though he was superficially more respectful toward Lutheran orthodoxy than Kant was. Like Luther, Leibniz was concerned to establish faith in God’s love toward creatures. But whereas for Luther this meant, famously, a desire to find a *gracious* God, the form of God’s love that most concerned Leibniz was not grace but *justice*—justice, according to Leibniz’s standard definition, being “the charity of the wise,” and thus a form of love (G I,73).

Much in Luther’s theology responds to his keen sense of being concretely, persistently, and as a Christian still a sinner (*simul justus et peccator*). In relation to this consciousness of sin, Luther’s felt need was for grace, not justice. Luther’s sense of sin is not prominently present in the *Examination*, or more generally in Leibniz’s writings. Leibniz does accept a doctrine of original sin and a need for divine redemption (*Exam* 7-11); but the *Examination*’s view of original sin is much closer to the Council of Trent than to Luther and Melancthon, inasmuch as it denies that original sin remains in the regenerate (*Exam* 41f.)—something that Georg Calixt did not deny even though he adopted much of the Scholastic framework that inspired Trent’s decisions about the subject.³³

Leibniz’s view of ordinary human capacities is much more optimistic than Luther’s. He takes a dim view of the actual religious performance of most people, but insists on the capacity of reason to lead us to the love of God above all things, provided that God gives us the gift of “serious attention” (Gr 7-10). Likewise he seems less concerned about our need for grace than about the danger of compromising the divine justice and loveliness by

ascribing to God any merely arbitrary treatment of people (A I,vi,120). This concern about justice makes it credible that the *Examination's* rather Catholic endorsement of the merit of good works represents Leibniz's own view. Retributive justice would not strictly require so great a reward as eternal happiness for those who love God, but such a reward "is congruent with God's justice." And "it belongs to distributive justice that not only some . . . but all of those who love God should be admitted to eternal bliss" (VE 2434 = *Exam* 53). Leibniz had indeed stated to Count Ernst that in regard to justification "the sentiments of some Catholics seem to me more reasonable than those of some protestants. For charity rather than faith puts a man in a state of grace," though as we have seen, Leibniz thinks that charity can be incorporated in faith (A I,iii,261; cf. Gr 27).

At one point, however, Leibniz's emphasis on God's justice and its relation to human love for God led him in a direction that would stretch the boundaries of Catholic as well as Protestant orthodoxy. Both his conception of divine justice and the intrinsic connection he saw between happiness and the love of God above all things gave him reason to regard such love for God as both necessary and sufficient for salvation. Its sufficiency claims special attention here. Leibniz evidently approved the doctrine that he ascribed to "several very authoritative Theologians in the Roman Church itself," that "a sincere Act of love of God above all things suffices for salvation, when it is aroused by the grace of Jesus Christ" (G VI,156/T 176; cf. Gr 167). This idea grounded Leibniz's persistent opposition to the idea that there is no salvation outside the Roman Catholic Church. "So men of good will are saved. Whence it follows that either there is no man of good will outside the Roman Church, or else a good will suffices for salvation even outside it" (Gr 158; cf. Gr 206f.,216).

Leibniz was prepared to carry the argument further, however. About 1678 or 1679 he wrote a little dialogue whose characters are Poliandre, a Catholic missionary proselytizing among the Protestants, and Theophile, "a very honorable man of the Augsburg Confession" (VE 266/L 213); the Lutheran character is painted much more sympathetically than the Catholic. Theophile suggests it should be beyond controversy that loving God above all things suffices for salvation. He infers that the issues disputed between Catholics and Protestants are less than crucial. Poliandre initially objects, on the ground that

A pagan Philosopher can love God above all things, since reason can teach him that God is a being infinitely perfect and supremely lovable. But he will not be a Christian for all that, for perhaps he will not have heard of Jesus Christ, without whom there is no salvation. Therefore love of God does not suffice. (VE 267/L 213f.)

In many contexts of Protestant/Catholic controversy this would have been an effective objection, for Protestants have been no less insistent than Catholics

on relationship to Jesus Christ as necessary for salvation. The objection depends, of course, on the premise that "a pagan Philosopher can love God above all things." Leibniz (in the person of Theophile) shows no interest in attacking that premise, however. It is, after all, a thesis that might be inferred from his own belief in philosophy as a means of fostering love for God. In fact he clearly believed it (Gr 161). Rather he questions the assumption that the pagan philosopher will not be related to Christ in the necessary way.

This question of the salvation of the pagans is too much for me. However I like very much the thought of certain learned and pious Theologians, who believe that God will enlighten all who sincerely seek him, at least at the point of death, by revealing to them, even internally, what they must know about Jesus Christ—according to this incontestable rule: that God does not refuse his grace to those who do what depends on them. (VE 267/L 214)

At this point Poliandre abandons his objection. Not wishing "to combat sentiments that seem to [him] well suited to reconcile piety with reason," he is "quite willing to grant you that the love of God above all things suffices when it is taken from that angle" (VE 267/L 214). For the rest of the dialogue Poliandre labors to establish that one who really does love God, and knows about the Roman Catholic Church, will want to become part of that church. This is a line of argument with which Leibniz has more sympathy although (in the person of Theophile, at any rate) he is not convinced by it.

Leibniz clearly liked these ideas about the salvation of enlightened and virtuous pagans. Similar treatments of the topic recur often in his writings throughout his career (e.g., VE 2553f.; Gr 235,346,456; A I,vii,434f.; cf. NE 510).³⁴ Well known in his own time was the memorandum with which Leibniz initiated his correspondence with the Catholic convert Paul Pelisson-Fontanier, a document published by Pelisson in 1691 with Leibniz's blessing. There Leibniz discusses, noncommittally but with evident sympathy, a view that he ascribes to "several great men of the Roman Church."³⁵ On this view, "*one can be saved in all the Religions, provided that one truly loves God above all things* with a friendship-love based on his infinite perfections." This thesis is applied even to people who have sinned, on the ground that "contrition, that is to say, the penitence that comes from that sincere love, effaces sins without any intervention of the keys of the Church or the Sacrament." There is no mention here of the hypothesis that pagans so graced will be enlightened about Christ at the moment of death; but it is part of the view that they are illumined by the light that is Christ, and are "tightly united with the eternal Word, and with the divine wisdom that is in Jesus Christ, even if they would not know him according to the flesh, and even if they would never have heard of that assemblage of letters that form his name" (A I,vi,78f.).

Leibniz evinces great caution in this discussion. He emphasizes that the view is one "that the Protestant Theologians do not approve," and he presents

it only as worthy of discussion as one of two possible solutions to a problem. In a marginal note commenting on the printed version he complains of Pelisson's ignoring the other alternative and focusing on this view, "which I employed . . . only *ad hominem*, because it is admissible according to the principles of the Jesuits" (A I,vi,78). Both the length and the tone of Leibniz's discussion, however, gave Pelisson plenty of reason to assume that Leibniz was more interested in the view offering salvation in all religions, than in the alternative.

The next month Leibniz wrote bluntly to Count Ernst that belief in the damnation of all pagans "yields thoughts that are not very compatible with the goodness and justice of God." An earlier, even more assertive draft of this letter declares, "I could not believe that all those who have not known Jesus Christ according to the Gospel preached in the world will be lost without resource no matter how they have lived," and comments, "I don't know why we take so much pleasure in believing people damned. Isn't there here a little vanity and a bit of the corruption of the human heart, which finds a secret joy in the ills of others, in lifting itself above so many people that one believes wretched?" (A I,vi,107f.; cf. Gr 501)

In his *Theodicy* of 1710 Leibniz returns to the idea of a private revelation of Christ, granted at the moment of death. Confronting the objection that "there has been, and still is, an infinity of human beings among the civilized peoples and among the barbarians who have never had that knowledge of God and of Jesus Christ that one needs in order to be saved by the ordinary ways," he responds that "the fact can be doubted, for how do we know whether they do not receive ordinary or extraordinary assistance that is unknown to us?" (G VI,155/T 175f.) It is safest, he grants, to teach that "today a knowledge of Jesus Christ according to the flesh is absolutely necessary for salvation," but since "we cannot know what passes in souls at the point of death," why should we deny that the necessary knowledge of Christ is given at that point in appropriate cases? "So there are an infinity of paths open to God that give him means of satisfying both his justice and his goodness" (G VI,157/T 177). In the *Theodicy* Leibniz endorses this solution in his own voice. "Thus," he declares, "one grants neither the damnation of infants who die without baptism or outside the Church, nor the damnation of adults who have acted according to the lights that God has given them." And if such an adult had lacked any necessary light "during his life, he would receive it at least at the point of death" (G VI,384/T 385).

Leibniz suggests that this view may be more acceptable to Catholic than to Protestant orthodoxy, the former being less insistent than the latter on explicit faith in Christ (G VI,156/T 176; cf. A I,vi,119; Gr 202); but he surely knew that the position would seem daring in either communion. The non-committal caution with which he laid it before Pelisson suggests that he can

hardly have been surprised at the vehemence with which Pelisson rejected it (A I,vi,91-101,124-26), though Leibniz claimed that it was more widely supported in the Roman Church (especially by the Jesuits) than Pelisson would admit (A I,vi,119-21,126n). Nonetheless, this relatively daring view is plainly asserted in the *Examination*, which in general exalts "the love of God above all things" as the highest of religious virtues (*Exam* 5,39).³⁶

Moreover God gives *sufficient grace* to all human beings so that, given only their own serious volition, nothing further is wanted for their salvation that is not in [their] power. And therefore many pious men have been persuaded that every human being coming into this world is so enlightened by that light of minds, the eternal Son of God, and by his Holy Spirit, that at least before death, whether by external preaching or by internal illumination of the mind, he arrives at as much knowledge as was sufficient and necessary so that he could obtain salvation if only he himself willed [it]; with the end, of course, that if he obstinately resists God's call, he is at least rendered without excuse; for divine justice definitely demands this. By what scheme God assures this, however, even in those whom no suggestion of the Gospel of Christ reaches by any preaching of the external word, is not to be rashly defined by us, but left to his wisdom and mercy. (*Exam* 27; cf. VE 2422f.)

Likewise the condemnation of unbaptized infants to Hell is firmly rejected in the *Examination* (p. 9), as elsewhere in Leibniz's writings. He does not go so far here as to claim salvation for such infants; the doctrine of limbo, involving a loss of bliss but no infliction of suffering, is seen as consistent with divine justice (*Exam* 195), presumably because these infants have not attained to actual love for God. This agrees also with Leibniz's statements in the *Theodicy* (G VI,153/T 173).

This development of his doctrine of love for God "above all things," with its implications for the eternal destiny of persons not known to us as Christians, constitutes the boldest self-assertion vis-à-vis Catholic orthodoxy that Leibniz ventures in the *Examination*. I think it likely that of all the controversial issues in Christian theology, this was the one about which he cared most deeply. If there is any point on which the *Examination* is plausibly read as a trial balloon intended to test the acceptability of Leibniz's views in the Church of Rome, this is it.

Even in this system of ideas, however, it may be doubted whether the *Examination* is completely faithful to Leibniz's beliefs. The doubt arises with respect to the question whether love for God above all things is not only sufficient but *necessary* for salvation, and particularly with regard to a question about penitence. In the *Examination* (pp. 117,163f.) as elsewhere, Leibniz insists (with Catholic precedent) that an act of perfect contrition, which involves love for God above all things, suffices for reconciliation with God, even without sacramental confession (provided, here, that the sacrament is not despised). "The weighty question remains," whether such perfect con-

trition is *required*, “or whether attrition suffices”—attrition being “an imperfect penitence, which is born, not of pure love for God, but of fear of punishment or hope of eternal life, and other similar causes.” Attrition is admittedly unable of itself to lead to justification. But it is argued that the sacrament of confession and absolution ought to confer some benefit on the faithful over and above what they could obtain without it by an act of perfect *contrition*, and that this benefit is that they can receive forgiveness with a less perfect act of *attrition*, which would be quite insufficient without the sacrament. In the *Examination* (p. 163f.) Leibniz accepts this argument and admits the sufficiency of attrition in the context of sacramental confession, “most rightly in the sense of the Council of Trent.”

Leibniz himself had written quite unfavorably about this view a few years before he penned the *Examination*. In 1681 he wrote to Count Ernst, “I have always extremely approved the sentiment of those who doubt very much that one can be justified by attrition alone with the sacrament without ever making an act of sovereign love for God,” and he seems to favor “those who believe that love for God above all things is necessary for salvation” (A I,iii,261). And Theophile, in the dialogue cited above, thinks the opinion of the sufficiency of attrition, with the sacrament, is astonishingly dangerous; “the Jansenists show its absurdity” (VE 269). If the Jansenist Arnauld was part of the intended audience of the *Examination*, the acceptance of the sufficiency of attrition, as distinct from contrition, in sacramental penance, can hardly have been calculated to please him. For as late as 20 May 1688, writing to Count Ernst, Leibniz instances “the necessity of contrition” as a Jansenist doctrine that Arnauld “cannot disavow so easily” in controversy with the Jesuits (A I,v,148).

Had Leibniz changed his mind on this issue when he wrote the *Examination*? I doubt that I have found all the texts in which Leibniz discusses the subject, but those that I have seen do not exactly speak with one voice. A document perhaps contemporaneous with the *Examination* does not mention the issue, but seems to presuppose the position taken in *Examination*, since it instances a need for “new contrition” when one sins as a hazardous feature of exclusion from the “visible Catholic Church” (VE 2555). In 1685, translating a dialogue by a German Catholic writer who affirms the sufficiency of attrition in conjunction with the sacraments of baptism and confession, Leibniz comments that this would happen “by the infusion of a grace that contains virtually what is necessary to put a man in a state of friendship towards God” (VE 2578), which suggests an attempt to find room for compromise. In 1690 and 1691 Leibniz speaks of the sufficiency of attrition, in sacramental penance, as a doctrine of the Jesuits closely connected with the readiness of many of them (as he believes) to affirm the sufficiency of contrition for the salva-

tion of pagans (A I,vi,82f.,126n; vii,434). In this context Leibniz does not explicitly endorse the sufficiency of attrition, but gives not the slightest hint of disapproval. At the same time, however, in November 1690, he wrote to Count Ernst that "according to me, in order to be saved one must love God" (A I,vi,133). The issue about attrition is not in view in the latter context; but since attrition as such does not involve love for God, one could infer that Leibniz would still consider it insufficient for salvation. Much later, in 1710, speaking in a Protestant voice, Leibniz indicates that contrition, rather than attrition, is "required by our" theologians (Gr 220). I suspect that Leibniz was never personally convinced of the sufficiency of attrition in conjunction with the sacraments, but that he was willing to accept it in the *Examination* because he thought Catholics might see it as forming a natural package with the belief that Protestants, and even pagans, could be saved through contrition, about which he cared much more.

3. Pragmatism in Theology

This is not the only point at which the *Examination* seems to reflect a sensitivity to Roman Catholic ecclesiastical politics rather than personal conviction. The long discussion of the cult of the saints in *Exam* 91-113, for example, contains warnings about dangers of idolatry, but takes a tolerant tone toward popular Catholic practices on which Leibniz had commented quite scathingly to Count Ernst in 1683 (A I,iii,310f.; cf. VE 2621). The *Examination's* discussion of excommunication (p. 169) concludes by stating that the ecclesiastical hierarchy's exercise of this power is "regularly" ratified by God. It makes no mention at all of unjust or erroneous excommunication, though no theme is more frequent in Leibniz's correspondence with Catholics than his comparison of the ecclesiastical situation of Protestants with that of persons unjustly excommunicated (e.g., A I,iv,420).

Similarly, writing to Count Ernst in 1684 about the validity of the sacramental acts of Protestant ministers, Leibniz connects the issue with another, on which he appeals to some statements of Tertullian as an ancient precedent. He grants that "the distinction between Ecclesiastics and Laity is of divine right." But he insists that does not mean that "in case of necessity, a layman cannot perform the functions of a priest, so far as they are necessary for the welfare of souls. For this divine right does not cease to be positive" (A I,iv,335f.; cf. *ibid.*, 357f.; A I,vi,204; VE 2551). A quarter century later, in 1710, he expresses the same view in a similar context: "according to sacred scripture and the primitive Church, any Christian is a priest in case of necessity" (Gr 222; cf. Gr 215,221). In the *Examination*, however, though the question whether any Christian can act as a priest in case of necessity is introduced, Leibniz is much more cautious about it, concluding only that the matter must be left to God's care, since

it seems to me neither necessary nor safe to define these questions privately. . . . In the mean time it is safest not to depart from the line of Ordination that has brought the grace of ministry down to us by continuous propagation through the successors of the Apostles. (VE 2489 = *Exam* 179)

This is surely not, without qualification, Leibniz's own opinion, though the attempt to resolve the matter in terms of what is "safest" is, as we shall see, deeply characteristic of his own approach to theology.³⁷

Leibniz's purpose in writing the *Examination* remains somewhat mysterious to me, inasmuch as the document is not credible either as a personal theological confession or as a platform for reunion of the churches. Perhaps Leibniz wanted to sketch out, for the edification of Catholics, what an enlightened, thoroughly Catholic theology would look like, though it would not be his own personal theology. I am sure, at any rate, that most of the points on which Leibniz simply deferred, in writing it, to prevailing Catholic opinion were genuinely less important to him than those on which he was more assertive.

The mystery of the *Examination's* purpose is akin to another that puzzled Leibniz's Catholic correspondents: why a person who showed so much sympathy for Catholic theology did not simply convert to Catholicism. His response to Count Ernst on this point alluded to "abuses" to which persons joining the Roman Catholic Church might be required to consent, and to "philosophical opinions, of which [he believed he had] a demonstration" and which he feared might not be tolerated in the Roman communion (A I,iv,320f.). Arnauld found it difficult to understand how Leibniz could place so much importance on such "metaphysical speculations" (LA 16,110). But we cannot understand Leibniz's personal religious stance unless we recognize that, and how, he really did regard certain metaphysical speculations as more important than the issues so hotly disputed in the usual controversies between Catholics and Protestants. It is possible that the decline in Leibniz's personal interest in Catholicism after the 1680's, on which I have remarked, was due in significant measure to the intolerance he met in Arnauld's response to some of his metaphysical views.

The structure of the *Examination* provides an important clue here. It begins with about four Latin pages laying out theses of which Leibniz says that "almost all are manifest from the very light of reason." It goes on then in the bulk of the treatise to discuss "the secret economy of the divine plan in restoring Human beings," which "could be learned only from God revealing" it (VE 2415 = *Exam* 11). Belonging to the former category, the doctrines of natural theology, are the being and perfections of God, the creation of the world, the doctrine of love for God above all things and the duties arising from it, and a doctrine of sin and expectation of redemption (*Exam* 3-11). We have already seen that Leibniz held that reason alone, by philosophical

meditation, could teach one enough of the divine perfection to induce one to love God supremely, which is the one thing needful.

The relation between reason and revelation, as Leibniz sees it, must be grounded in reason, which must assure us of the authenticity of the revelation, chiefly relying on two marks: on miracles wrought by the teacher, and on "holiness of the teaching" (Gr 30; cf. *Exam* 11-15). It is of importance for Leibniz's religious thought that these marks will commonly afford us only a *probability* of the authenticity and truth of the revelation, whereas he thought that many of the claims of natural theology could be *demonstrated*. A full understanding of the importance of this point depends on Leibniz's views about probability.

Writing to Thomas Burnett in 1697, Leibniz divided "theological truths and inferences" into those that have "metaphysical certainty" and those that have "moral certainty" (G III,193). Moral certainty is the highest degree of probability, and Leibniz regards it as certainty for practical purposes. Indeed he assigns all probable reasoning as such to the *practical* part of philosophy. Wherever we do not have demonstrations, Leibniz thinks, the most pertinent questions for practical reflection are questions of what it is prudent, or practically wise, to believe or assume; and he applies this view explicitly to theology.³⁸ This affects his approach to theology as regards (1) its mode, (2) the priority assigned to issues within revealed theology, and (3) the priority of metaphysics and natural theology in relation to revealed theology. All of these points shed light on the *Examination*. Let us consider them in order.

(1) Although Leibniz sometimes seems prepared to treat a revelation as "demonstrated" (Gr 30f.), we can also find him stating that "the proofs of the christian religion are only moral, since it is impossible to give any other kind of proof in matters of fact" (A II,i,488/L 260). Only probability, at any rate, could in general be expected on the points in controversy between Protestants and Catholics or within any church. In the *Examination*, accordingly, he repeatedly approaches issues in terms of what view would be *safer* to hold or to follow (pp. 11f.,45f.,119,179). This applies even to such fundamental doctrines as those of the Trinity and Incarnation and the Eucharist (*Exam* 21,127). And with regard to the proposal to admit Protestants to the Roman communion without first settling all the controversial issues, Leibniz would urge Catholics to consider that "the salvation [or well-being, *salus*] of the Christian people is the supreme law of the church" (A I,x,167; cf. F I,28).

We might be tempted to interpret Leibniz's theological pragmatism in an antirealist sense, as an approach in which beliefs are not really adopted and held, but one merely decides to act, in prudence, as if one believed certain things. I am sure this would be a mistaken interpretation. Remember that Leibniz assigned all merely probable reasoning to the practical part of philosophy, so that if practical judgment yields no belief, he will allow us no

beliefs about most topics of ordinary life. I see no adequate ground, in most cases, to doubt Leibniz's sincerity in professing belief in Christian doctrines that he regards as indemonstrable and resting on revelation. His consciously pragmatic methodology does, however, help to make it intelligible that his discussions of controversial topics in theology commonly manifest the political calculations of an aspiring architect of church unity much more than any fervor of personal conviction.

(2) If most of revealed theology, both as merely probable and as concerned with our moral relation to God, belongs for Leibniz to the realm of "practical theology,"³⁹ it is not surprising that he gives a certain priority to issues of practice. From a Protestant point of view, as Leibniz conceives of it, it is not the dogmas but the practices of the Roman Catholic Church that pose the greatest obstacle to church reunion (A I,iv,357). He never saw a fundamental opposition between Lutheran and Catholic dogmas, and therefore believed that reunion was possible *salvis principiis utriusque partis* [preserving the principles of both parties] (A I,iv,386). In this he is indeed in tune with the Augsburg Confession, which, more than most expressions of Protestantism, emphasized its agreements with Catholic doctrines and tried to direct controversial attention to alleged abuses in practice.⁴⁰ Likewise, except for the doctrine of justification, all the nonnegotiable issues of Molanus's *Method* were matters of practice.

A practical issue that receives striking emphasis from Leibniz is that of divorce. In 1692 he declares to Count Ernst that "such a controversy about practice is much more important than speculations about the manner of grace or of justification" (A I,vii,260); and in the *Examination* (pp. 181-87) he is more assertive about divorce than about most other issues, and insists on an interpretation of the Council of Trent that is more permissive, and more acceptable to Protestants, than he might once have found exegetically plausible,⁴¹ though probably still not fully acceptable from his own point of view. The issue is one he had said might be enough of itself to keep a conscientious Protestant from joining the Roman Church (A I,iv,329).

Leibniz understands the function of revealed theology not only as practical, but very largely in terms of a political analogy. He conceives the special relation that God has to intelligent creatures as that of a legislator and monarch ruling a republic of spirits, city of God, or kingdom of grace (DM 36-37, Mon 84-90, *Exam* 11). The *Examination* (p. 11) introduces revelation as a way in which God "as Legislator declares his particular and public [*apertam*] will regarding the acts of minds and the governance of his City."

The church, viewed as a "Sacred City" and "interpreter of [God's] will" (*Exam* 171), has therefore a central place in Leibniz's conception of religion and of the purpose of revelation. Not that the church depends entirely on revelation. According to a text Leibniz wrote in the period 1678-82, the largest "natural community" is

the church of God, which even without revelation could indeed have existed among humans and been maintained and propagated by pious [people] and saints. Its aim is an eternal happiness. And it's no wonder I call it a Natural society, inasmuch as a Natural religion and desire for immortality are also implanted in us. This community of the saints is Catholic or universal and binds the whole human race together. If revelation is added now, the previous bond is not ruptured but strengthened. (VE 448 = Gr 603)

So conceived, the church ought in principle to coincide with the whole republic of spirits or kingdom of grace. This conception underlies Leibniz's interreligious as well as interdenominational ecumenism.

If the church is to interpret God's will, where there is a revelation, it needs a structure of authority. The highly articulated institutional and legal structure of the Roman Catholic Church appealed mightily to the lawyer in Leibniz. There can hardly be any doubt that when he wrote the *Examination*, he thought that the Roman hierarchy had a powerful claim on the allegiance of all Christians—or would have one if it could make its claim consistent with the reasonable demands of their conscience. He declared that the Roman Church is “the Catholic Church, Visible and recognizable by the continual succession of its Hierarchy” (A I,iv,320). This hierarchy's historic claims to legitimacy were pretty clearly the chief attraction that Roman Catholicism held for Leibniz.⁴² Nonetheless, the divine gift of infallibility that Leibniz did accord the church extended only to the decisions of genuine ecumenical councils, and to them only on the most central theological issues.⁴³ His statement about Papal authority in the *Examination* (p. 173) left ample room for conscientious dissent, as we have already seen. It is clear that Leibniz personally approved of an extensive papal authority, but did not believe in papal infallibility.⁴⁴ His attitude to ecclesiastical authority is in fact quite pragmatic. At one point he tells Count Ernst,

I am not entering into the discussion whether the jurisdiction of the Pope is explicitly of divine right; it suffices that the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy in general doubtless is, and must be respected under the State or form in which it is found. (A I,iv,355)

Most of the *Examination* is devoted to an exposition and defense of one way of respecting ecclesiastical authority. If Leibniz himself did not think it in all respects the best way, that was for him in principle a pragmatic judgment, and primarily a judgment about the best means of promoting a love for God above all things.

(3) He recognized, nonetheless, an authority to which all ecclesiastical authority must yield: the authority of rational demonstration. The avoidance of “opinions involving contradictions” is presented in 1679 as a compelling norm for theological interpretation (A II,i,488/L 259). “What contravenes these demonstrations [of geometry and metaphysics] would surely not be the word of God,” he wrote in 1677 (Gr 162); and he held the same in 1710 in

the *Theodicy* (G VI,49-52/T 73-76). Likewise in the *Examination* he acknowledges that philosophical demonstration can force reinterpretation in revealed theology. Specifically, if the Cartesian thesis that extension is the essence of body "could be demonstrated by unconquered arguments of metaphysical necessity," the doctrine of the real presence of Christ's body in the Eucharist would have to be abandoned, and the relevant texts would have to be reinterpreted (*Exam* 127). The fact that for Leibniz alleged revelation must yield to philosophical demonstration should be noted as perhaps the clearest proof that, despite its pragmatic basis, Leibnizian revealed theology has the character of genuine belief, which can come into conflict with other beliefs.

To be sure there is a text, perhaps from the early 1680's, in which Leibniz states that "when reason and revelation seem to conflict, it will be safer to distrust reason than to accommodate revelation to reason by a distorted interpretation." As the text proceeds, however, it becomes clear that Leibniz thinks this depends on how powerful the arguments of reason are, and how distorting the interpretation is that must be imposed on revelation. When there is an "unbreakable demonstration," it seems that something else must yield. The final, cautious, pragmatic conclusion is only that "in doubt, when great reasons do not prevent it, it is safer for a Christian to adhere to the strict meaning of the divine words" (Gr 31f.).

It is quite understandable then that Leibniz would not give up the results of the metaphysical demonstrations he thought he possessed, in order to conform with doctrines to which he granted at best a pragmatic justification. It is the more understandable when we add that some of these demonstrations were in his opinion the surest and *religiously* most satisfactory foundation of the love of God above all things, and capable of giving "here below the foretaste of an eternal life" (Gr 7-10,162). The doctrines of natural or rational, metaphysically demonstrable theology, particularly that of the love of God above all things, were for Leibniz the most important part of religion (Gr 161f.).

Leibniz was not a Deist, and did not think Christianity was merely a *re-publication* of the religion of nature. He accepted, and treated with great seriousness, doctrines that he regarded as peculiar to Christianity and no part of natural theology. But he did think of the revealed part of theology and religion as ordained primarily for the *service* of the religion of nature, in the sense of having as their prime function the fostering of the natural religious virtue of supreme love for God.

4. Conclusion

To those who have worked hardest on theological foundations for reunion of the Christian churches in the twentieth century, Leibniz's interest in the distinctive features of both Protestant and Catholic viewpoints is bound to seem

superficial, despite his prodigious theological learning. Indeed it is superficial, in ways that are doubtless connected with its pragmatic character. Perhaps we should also wonder whether a theology could both be ecumenical and seem profound to us without recourse to some of the ways of thinking about the relation of theology to history that were developed only in the course of the nineteenth century.

Leibniz's interests lay elsewhere: in theology as a structural (he might have said juridical) feature of religious institutions, in religious institutions as necessary for the formation of religious devotion, and in finding both a just God of all peoples and a common core of devotion in different religious traditions—if possible, in all of them. It is possible that these interests may seem more exciting in the twenty-first century than they have in much of the twentieth.

Yale University

NOTES

1. The works of Leibniz will be cited (by page number unless otherwise noted here), using the following abbreviations. Citations of original and English translation of the same texts are separated by a slash.

- | | | |
|------|---|--|
| A | = | <i>Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe</i> , edition of the Berlin Academy (Darmstadt and Berlin, 1923-), cited by series, volume, and page. |
| B | = | Eduard Bodemann, ed., <i>Die Leibniz-Handschriften der Königlichen öffentlichen Bibliothek zu Hannover</i> (Hannover and Leipzig: Hahn'sche Buchhandlung, 1895). |
| DM | = | <i>Discourse on Metaphysics</i> , cited by section number. |
| Exam | = | <i>Examination of the Christian Religion</i> , Latin text in <i>Theologisches System</i> [<i>Systema theologicum</i>], ed. with German trans. by Carl Haas (Tübingen, 1860). Reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1966. A critical text of <i>Exam</i> is due to be published in A VI,iv, and a draft of this text is in VE 2411-99. |
| F | = | <i>Oeuvres de Leibniz</i> , ed. by A. Foucher de Careil, 2nd ed. (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1867ff.) cited by volume and page. |
| G | = | <i>Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz</i> , ed. by C. I. Gerhardt (Berlin, 1875-90; reprint, Hildesheim: Olms, 1965), cited by volume and page. |
| Gr | = | Leibniz, <i>Textes inédits</i> , ed. by Gaston Grua (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948). |
| LA | = | The correspondence between Leibniz and Antoine Arnauld, cited by pages of G II, which are given marginally in <i>The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence</i> , ed. and trans. by H. T. Mason (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1967). |
| Mon | = | <i>Monadology</i> , cited by section number. |
| NE | = | Leibniz, <i>New Essays on Human Understanding</i> , cited by pages of A VI, vi, which are given marginally in the English translation by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). |

- PNG = *The Principles of Nature and of Grace*, cited by section number.
 Rommel = *Leibniz und Landgraf Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels: Ein ungedruckter Briefwechsel über religiöse und politische Gegenstände*, ed. by Chr. von Rommel (Frankfurt am Main: Literarische Anstalt, 1847).
 T = Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Theodicy* (1710), trans. by E.M. Huggard (London, 1951; reprint, La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1985).
 VE = Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Vorausedition zur Reihe VI—Philosophische Schriften—in der Ausgabe der Akademie der Wissenschaften Berlin*, bearbeitet von der Leibniz-Forschungsstelle der Universität Münster. Fascicles 1-10, 1982-1991.
 W = *Leibniz Selections*, ed. by Philip P. Wiener (New York: Scribners, 1951).

Several texts important for this study are found most conveniently in:

- OCB = *Oeuvres complètes de Bossuet*, 2nd ed., vol. IV (Paris: Berche et Tralin, 1887).

2. I am not persuaded by Kiefl's objection that this title is too misleading to be from Leibniz's hand; see Franz Xaver Kiefl, *Der Friedensplan des Leibniz zur Wiedervereinigung der getrennten christlichen Kirchen* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1903; reprinted Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1975), p. 233n. The concept of Christian religion—that is, of practices characteristic of Christianity—is of central importance in the document, for reasons that will be explored in section 3 below.

3. Regarding the early editions and French and German translations, see VE 2411 or Haas's preface in *Exam*, pp. ix-x. English translation: *A System of Theology* by Godfrey William Leibnitz, translated with introduction and notes by Charles William Russell (London: Burns and Lambert, 1850).

4. In understanding the theological context of the *Examination* I have been much helped by Kiefl, *Der Friedensplan des Leibniz*, and by Paul Eisenkopf, *Leibniz und die Einigung der Christenheit* (Munich: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 1975).

5. For good examples of this voice, see VE 243-54; A I,iv,351-59,363f.,389; A I,v,10-21.

6. So Carl Haas, in his introduction to *Exam*, pp. vi-viii. Haas seems to have had in front of him a different version of the 1683 letter; A I,iii does not reproduce variants, let alone alternative drafts. Haas mistook the addressee for Leibniz's patron, Duke Ernst August of Hannover. See also R. C. Sleight, Jr., *Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on Their Correspondence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 21-23. Sleight's discussion of the *Examination* and its background is of great value, though he seems to regard it as more of an ecclesiastical reunion platform than I think it can have been.

7. He was Spanish, but worked for years in Germany. I refer to him as Rojas, following Spanish custom; but readers using indexes should be aware that much of the literature refers to him as Spinola. The original texts normally refer to him by his episcopal sees: Tina until 1686, [Wiener] Neustadt from 1686 to his death in 1695; but in the few cases I have found in which they use a proper name for him, it is recognizably a form of 'Rojas' [so Leibniz, A I,iii,280; F II,100; and Molanus in Heinz Weidemann, *Gerard Wolter Molanus, Abt zu Loccum: Eine Biographie* (two vols., Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1925 and 1929), vol. 2, p. 174].

8. Augsburg Confession, in John H. Leith, ed., *Creeds of the Churches*, third ed. (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1982), p. 67.

9. Weidemann, *Gerard Wolter Molanus*, I,33-35; II,32f.

10. Hermann Schüssler, *Georg Calixt: Theologie und Kirchenpolitik: Eine Studie zur Ökumenizität des Luthertums* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1961), p. 133. This book is the most useful work I have found on Calixt and his influence. But see also Johannes Wallmann, *Der Theologiebegriff bei Johann Gerhard und Georg Calixt* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1961); and W.C. Dowding, *The Life and Correspondence of George Calixtus* (Oxford and London: John Henry and James Parker, 1863), which is focused more on matters of "human interest" than on theology.

11. Schüssler, *Georg Calixt*, pp. 159f.

12. See Weidemann *Gerard Wolter Molanus*, I,6-9,36.

13. Weidemann, *Gerard Wolter Molanus*, II,6-24.

14. For his gently critical tone in relation to Georg Calixt on this point, see A I,iv,504.

15. Weidemann, *Gerard Wolter Molanus*, II,174.

16. In my account of the negotiations in Hannover and their aftermath, particularly in this and the next two paragraphs, I am much indebted to the fullest account I have seen, in Weidemann, *Gerard Wolter Molanus*, II,30-88. See also two articles by Samuel J. T. Miller, "Molanus, Lutheran Irenicist (1633-1722)," *Church History*, 32 (1953): 197-218; and "Spinola and the Lutherans 1674-95" in Erwin Iserloh and Peter Manns, eds., *Festgabe Joseph Lortz, I: Reformation Schicksal und Auftrag* (Baden-Baden: Bruno Grimm, 1958), pp. 419-45.

17. In this he went farther in a Catholic direction than his teacher Calixt, as pointed out by Schüssler, *Georg Calixt*, pp. 158,166.

18. See Weidemann, *Gerard Wolter Molanus*, II,170.

19. Weidemann, *Gerard Wolter Molanus*, II,174.

20. Gaston Grua in his editorial comments in Gr 148f.

21. The intended meaning of this demand is not that Catholics must give up such services, at which only the celebrating priest need be present, but that Protestants are not to be forced to adopt the practice; see OCB IV,472.

22. What Molanus (and Leibniz) envisaged here, more precisely, was apparently a Papal "confirmation" of Protestant ordinations (OCB IV,473) in ceremonies "which according to the Catholics would have everything necessary for a genuine ordination, and according to [the Protestants] could be taken for a confirmation of what they claim to have already" (A I,v,21). Analogous suggestions are frequently heard in twentieth century ecumenical discussions.

23. The summary formulation of the demands that I quote here is taken from the account Leibniz gave Count Ernst in 1687, as it is Leibniz's understanding of the *Method* that particularly concerns us here. Leibniz's formulation agrees substantially with those of Molanus, with two exceptions. (1) Leibniz includes "divine worship in the vernacular language" among the nonnegotiable items. I have ignored this here, as it does not occur in either of the two versions of the list that I have seen from the pen of Molanus (A I,iv,504 and OCB IV,470-473). (2) Molanus speaks of "the marriage of priests and Bishops" in place of Leibniz's vaguer formulation. Leibniz himself, concluding his account of the negotiation, seems prepared to give up the marriage of bishops, if married priests are allowed (A I,v,21).

24. See A I,iv,449-51,503-11; cf. Weidemann, *Gerard Wolter Molanus*, II,63-73.
25. I see little reason to adopt the view that the *Examination* was composed at about the same time as the *Judgment*, as maintained by Kiefl, *Der Friedensplan des Leibniz*, p. 239f., and Weidemann, *Gerard Wolter Molanus*, II,83n.
26. See Sleigh, *Leibniz and Arnauld*, p. 20f., for an extensive translation of this text. Leibniz was already voicing similar concerns in 1679 (A II,i,488/L 259).
27. Cf. Eisenkopf, *Leibniz und die Einigung der Christenheit*, pp. 73-76.
28. Leibniz employed this definition of love (usually in a shorter form) throughout his life. See, e.g., Gr 10; L 137,150,280,421,594; DM 4; W 564; Mon 90.
29. This very Leibnizian assurance is Pauline (Romans 8:28) rather than Stoic, though Leibniz professed to find obscure indications of it in some Stoic writers (G VII,152). Cf. Derk Pereboom, "Stoic Psychotherapy in Descartes and Spinoza," in this issue of *Faith and Philosophy*.
30. See, e.g., Georg Calixt, *Epitome Theologiae* (1619) in his *Werke in Auswahl*, vol. 2: *Dogmatische Schriften*, ed. Inge Mager (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982), p. 218f.
31. Georg Calixt, *Epitome Theologiae*, in *Werke in Auswahl*, II,208f.; Friedrich Ulrich Calixt, *Responsiones ad D. Abrahami Calovi Theses Anti-syncretisticas Editas Wittebergae Anno 1668* (Helmstedt: Typographeum Calixtinum, n.d.), p. 92.
32. F. U. Calixt, *Responsiones*, p. 96f.
33. Schüssler, *Georg Calixt*, p. 22.
34. Cf. Eisenkopf, *Leibniz und die Einigung der Christenheit*, pp. 77-79.
35. Mentioned in his marginal notes are the sixteenth century Portuguese theologian Diego Payva Andradius, unnamed Jesuits and, from the patristic period, Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, and Epiphanius of Salamis (A I,vi,78-80n).
36. Grua rightly emphasizes the presence of this whole line of thought in the *Examination* (Gr 149).
37. Another, more philosophical point on which I doubt Leibniz's sincerity in the *Examination* is the explanation he offers there for the Catholic view that in the Eucharist the accidents of the bread and wine persist without inhering in any substance or subject, a view that is endorsed in the *Examination* though it seems quite contrary to Leibniz's metaphysics of substance. This point is discussed more fully in Robert Merrihew Adams, *Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 389-91.
38. Leibniz's view of the practical character of probable reasoning and its role in theology is extensively documented in Adams, *Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist*, ch. 8, sections 1-2. The most important single text is the 1697 letter to Burnett cited here, but there are many others.
39. See Adams, *Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist*, p. 195f.
40. Augsburg Confession, p. 78f.
41. Writing to Count Ernst in 1684 and 1685 Leibniz seems to ascribe a severer interpretation to Trent, and to condemn it (A I,iv,329,354). A letter of 1688 to Ernst interprets Trent as the *Examination* does on this point (A I,v,75).

42. There is little reason to suppose that sacramental piety was personally important to Leibniz. In November 1687 Count Ernst reported Leibniz as having avowed that for many years he had not received communion in the Lutheran Church. The Count speculated that this was due to imperfections Leibniz saw in both Protestant and Catholic churches, but Leibniz had not explained himself and did not comment on this point in the remarks he appended to this document (Rommel 107-11). For a similar account from Leibniz's last years, see E. J. Aiton, *Leibniz: A Biography* (Bristol and Boston: Adam Hilger Ltd, 1985), p. 349. The account of Aloys Pichler, *Die Theologie des Leibniz*, vol. 2 (Munich, 1870; reprint Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965), p. 435f., must be used with caution.

43. Eisenkopf, *Leibniz und die Einigung der Christenheit*, pp.97-107; cf. A I,iv,320,355.

44. Eisenkopf, *Leibniz und die Einigung der Christenheit*, pp. 201-12.