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Love and the Problem of Evil

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Abstract The focus of this paper is the virtual certainty that much of what we must prize in loving any human person would not have existed in a world that did not contain much of the evil that has occurred in the history of the actual world. It is argued that the appropriate response to this fact must be some form of ambivalence, but that lovers have reason to prefer an ambivalence that contextualizes regretted evils in the framework of what we welcome in human life.

Keywords evil · love · personal identity · theodicy · Camus, Albert · Leibniz, G W · Parfit, Derek · Woodruff, James

I want to emphasize at the outset that I do not pretend to offer, in this paper, a complete solution to the theological problem of evil. In particular, I shall not address questions, which form the topic of most theodicy, about the justification of God's action in creating and governing a world that contains evils. My aim is rather to explore, in ways that I hope may be theologically fruitful, some philosophical issues about how we should think, and feel, about evils. These are issues for all human beings as such. There is no easy escape from them by becoming an atheist. They are related to a problem of evil that exists for atheists too, though theists have a theological dimension of it to deal with.

The problem concerns human beings as such, including atheists, because it threatens loves that help us to find value in our lives. It is important for all of us to believe that human lives – our own lives and those of other people – are worth living. And if our valuing of human lives is to rise to the level of love, it is important to be glad of our own existence and of other people's existence. If no one is glad of our existence, no amount of conscientious effort to make our lot as comfortable as possible is likely to keep it from being an unhappy existence.

These much needed beliefs and attitudes are tried by the problem of evil in much the same way as theism is. I am particularly interested in a line of argument on this point that is developed, in the context of a theodicy, by Leibniz. To interlocutors imagined as indignant that God did not replace Adam and Eve, as soon as they fell, with better creatures, "so that the stain should not be transmitted to posterity," Leibniz replies that

> if God had thus removed sin, a very different series of things, very different combinations of circumstances and people and marriages, and very different people would have

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> emerged, and hence if sin had been taken away or extinguished, they themselves would not be in the world. And therefore they have no reason to be angry at Adam or Eve for sinning, much less at God for permitting the sin, since they ought rather to set their own existence to the credit of this very toleration of sins.

Leibniz compares the imaginary complainers with someone resenting his own half-noble status who "would be angry at his father for marrying a lower-born wife ... not thinking that if [his father] had married a different wife, he himself would not be in the world but a different person instead." [1]

We do not have to go all the way back to Adam and Eve to make the point that concerns me here. My mother's father served as a chaplain with the US Army in France during the First World War. He survived a mustard gas attack, but it left him with respiratory problems that threatened, after several years, to make preaching impossible for him. This led him to change his work, and the life-situation of his family. When my mother was 14, they moved hundreds of miles from the Midwest to Philadelphia, where my grandfather became the chief editor of a religious publishing house. In Philadelphia my mother completed secondary school and the university, where she met my father, who had lived in the Philadelphia area all his life.

I tell this story to make the point that it is extreme*ly* unlikely that my parents would ever have met and married, and hence extremely unlikely that I would ever have been born, if the First World War had not occurred. How should I and others think and feel about the dependence of my existence on that great evil? Is it wrong for me to be glad that I exist? At least as important, is it wrong for anyone who loves me to be glad that I exist? That expresses the form of the problem of evil on which I want to reflect here.

Of course, it is not a problem about my existence alone. An event as cataclysmic as the First World War has extremely widespread and pervasive effects on human life, affecting not only which people meet, but also the circumstances in which those who do meet relate to each other, and therefore affecting even more pervasively such microscopic matters as which gametes meet. Within a very few years, probably no one being born in any country affected by the war would ever have been born if the war had not been fought. Nor do those born in other countries or in earlier generations have a situation fundamentally different in this respect. What society and what generation has had no war, no injustice, no disaster in its previous history? The coming into this world of any human child depends on a multiplicity of interacting factors, and in each case we surely will find evils small and great in the causal nexus without having to go very far back in time.

Darwinians must think what I have just said applies to all human generations without exception. Those who hold to a traditional interpretation of the story of Adam and Eve will regard our first human ancestors as an exception. I see no need, in my present line of argument, to enter into the debate between these views. What I have said about the evils involved in our coming to be applies at any rate to all the human beings of whom we have any ordinary historical knowledge.

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[1] Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Confessio Philosophi*, edited with German translation and commentary by Otto Saame, (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967), pp. 128–29. This passage from Leibniz, and the example of Helen Keller, discussed below, also figure in my paper, "Existence, Self-Interest, and the Problem of Evil," *Noûs*, 13 (1979), reprinted in more definitive form as chapter 5 of Robert Merrihew Adams, *The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). In that earlier paper, however, they are set in a framework focused much more on ethical issues about God and creating a world.

Those of us that are interested in metaphysics may want to ponder the question *how strong* a dependence on evils is to be ascribed to our coming to be. As I am interested in metaphysics, I hope you will allow me to dwell a while on this question, though I think in the end it will not be of crucial importance for the main line of our investigation. In particular, and as an example, we may ask whether the occurrence of the First World War was a "metaphysically" or absolutely necessary condition for my coming to exist in the world. And that in turn can be approached as equivalent to a question of what is called "counterfactual identity": whether anyone born into a world in which the First World War had not been fought could have been the same person that I am.

That is not an easy question to answer. The cases about which we have the clearest conviction of counterfactual identity are ones in which a person or an object has alternative possible histories branching "forward," as we say, from some decision point in time. I think that my life could have been different in this or that respect, and still have been *mine*, if I had made different choices at certain junctures in the past. In such cases the individual already exists at the decision point, and the history of the world before the decision point is the same in all the possible alternatives under consideration. The intuitions that typically sustain our claims of counterfactual identity in these cases desert us, however, where the history would have been different before the individual began to exist. Or at any rate they desert *me* when the question is whether there is some conceivable way in which someone born where and when I was, in 1937, but in a world in which the First World War had not been fought, could have been precisely and individually *me*. I am inclined to answer that question in the negative, but it is likely to remain controversial. [2]

For present purposes, fortunately, I think we need not answer that difficult question. It might be quite relevant to some treatments of the theological problem of evil, inasmuch as what is metaphysically or absolutely possible is relevant to questions about what God could have done. For reflection about the relation of evils to human love, however, it is enough that in all probability I *would* not have been born if the First World War had not occurred, and in general that probably none of us would in fact have come into the world had it not been for many and great evils preceding us. That we would probably not in fact have existed without those evils is surely true. Even if it would have been metaphysically possible for us (precisely and individually us) to come into existence without the particular causal nexus from which we actually emerged, what reason is there to believe that we would have? [3]

Moreover, our bare individual identity and existence is by no means all that we care about in our lives that is affected by the course of history. The point finds a vivid illustration in the life of Helen Keller (1880–1968), famous in America in my youth. She was only 19 months old when a fever deprived her, totally and permanently, of both sight and hearing. Her handicap bound her in loneliness and frustration until she was almost seven, when a tutor was obtained for her who was able to teach her sign language by touch. From then on her story was one of remarkable success. She learned not only to speak, but to do so in several languages. She graduated from a prestigious college, and became well

[2] The point of view from which I think about issues of counterfactual identity has been expounded in a series of papers: Adams, R. M. (1979). Primitive thisness and primitive identity. *The Journal of Philosophy, 76*, 5–26; Adams, R. M. (1981). Actualism and thisness. *Synthese, 49*, 3–41; Adams, R. M. (1986). Time and thisness. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11*, 315–329.

[3] The role of biological processes in this reasoning does not, in my opinion, depend on a materialist view of the constitution of human persons. I do not hold such a view, and am in fact much inclined to broadly idealist views of the nature of physical objects; but I am confident that the phenomena of the physiology of human reproduction correspond to important features of the causal nexus in which we came to be. I am indebted to Richard Swinburne for alerting me to the need for comment on this point.

known and widely admired. Her life seems on the whole to have been happy and satisfying – which is of course not to say there was no pain or sorrow in it.

Here is my question about Helen Keller. Would it have been reasonable for her, as an adult, to wish, for her own sake, that she had never been blind or deaf? I doubt it. Perhaps she would have had an even better and happier life with sight and hearing; perhaps not. Whatever its advantages might have been, however, such a life would not have had a single day in it that would have been much like any day in her actual life after the first 19 months. The two lives would not only differ at every moment in the sensory qualities of experience. They would differ in what she loved. Her actual life was organized around the fact that she was blind and deaf. That fact was presupposed in all the skills and projects, all the joys and sorrows, all the labors and accomplishments, trials and triumphs, and even the social relationships, of her actual life. Take the blindness and deafness out of her life-history, and most of the concrete content that she actually cared about would go with it. To wish that away would be disturbingly like wishing that she – the person she had *become* – had never existed. Of course you can say it is only wishing that she – the person she *always had been*, even as an infant – had not been deprived of sight and hearing. That is one true description of the wish, but it should not distract us from the fact that what we rightly prize in ourselves, and in other people that we love, is not just our bare metaphysical identity, but a treasure of meaning that is inextricably bound up with details of our actual personal histories.

The point I have been trying to make about Helen Keller applies to any actual human being. To love a person, oneself or anyone else, is not just to care about a bare metaphysical identity. Where no one cares about any particular project or aspiration of yours, where no one sees in any particular action or experience of yours something they want preserved in future fabrics of meaning, you are not loved. But in actual human lives all particular projects and aspirations, all meaningful actions and experiences, presuppose things we rightly regard as evil as well as things we rightly regard as good. What we prize concretely in our loving presupposes evil as well as good.

At least implicitly, love engages attitudes toward the causal structure of human life. No one should want to be someone whose projects and actions are not positively valued. But projects and actions always presuppose a causal nexus – both its general causal laws and some of its particular causal conditions or factors. So do our powers, dispositions, personalities, and characters, in which those who love us must see something of positive value. For powers and dispositions, including personalities and characters, are causal properties and part of a causal nexus. They involve actual causal laws and actual causal conditions. Finding positive value in actual human projects, actions, powers, dispositions, personalities, and characters involves some sort of acceptance of the causal nexus they presuppose, some acceptance of the actual causal structure of human life. Hence that is also involved in loving any particular human being. That should not be a surprising conclusion. How can you love someone who (as far as you can tell) has never been anything but a human being, without seeing positive value in what is and actually has been involved in being a human being? And that is largely a matter of the actual causal structure of human life.

But evil as well as good seems to be involved in the actual causal nexus, the actual causal structure of human life. Earthquakes and deadly viruses are part of the causal nexus to which we belong. So is the difficulty of many of the best human projects, and competition among them for scarce resources. There is and will be suffering and loss, and frustration and failure of good projects, in human life in this causal nexus. It seems also far too predictable that some situations will evoke a lot of bad human behavior, even destructive behavior.

Some would remind me of theologies according to which evil is not involved in the *original* causal structure of human life, but only in a structure of life resulting from

humanity's falling from its original perfection. This is another point that raises issues that my present project does not require me to address, significant as they may be for theology. For no human being that lives with us in the world today, even at a great distance from us, has lived in a state of original, "unfallen" perfection; and I am reflecting on what is involved in loving people, including ourselves, who live in the world today.

Do lovers have to accept the evil as well as the good in the causal conditions and presuppositions of actual human lives? Need our acceptance of the causal nexus be more than making the best of a bad bargain? I doubt that that's enough. One does not *love* the best of a bad bargain. One *makes do* with it, and making do is not love. Of course the suggestion was not that we should make do with *each other* as the best of a bad bargain, but that we should adopt that stance toward *the causal nexus* in which we find ourselves. But can we separate in that way our attitudes toward actual human lives and toward the causal nexus that they presuppose?

What I have said thus far might perhaps be read as arguing for a sort of *amor fati*, for the view that "whatever is, is right," leaving no room for attitudes of horror and indignation toward anything that has actually happened. But that is not my intent. Terrible evils have actually occurred. Much that has happened thoroughly deserves to be regarded with indignation or horror or both. In many cases love itself cries out for indignation or horror – or remorse. What love requires, I believe, is not complacency with whatever is or has been, but a sort of *ambivalence*.

More than one sort of ambivalence can be considered. One alternative might be a *purely particularistic* way of valuing that would refuse to make "all things considered" evaluations, or to set a value on complexes that include both goods and evils. If we adopted this alternative view we would try to evaluate each event in itself, rejoicing and regretting without regard to the causal connections between the goods and the evils. For instance, we would be glad of our own, and each other's, individual existence, and we would regret the First World War, without letting the causal dependence of the former object on the latter qualify in any way our evaluative attitude toward either of them. One might think of this as a *Manichean* way of valuing things. Not that it necessarily involves the view that the world is an arena of conflict between a good and an evil supernatural being; but it shares with that view a refusal to regard either the evils as occurring in the framework of a system that is comprehensively good, or the goods as occurring in the framework of a system that is comprehensively evil.

A contrast with Manichean dualism suggests a further pair of alternatives to be considered. In both of them we would be allowed to make "all things considered" evaluations; we would not be required to turn a blind eye on any causal connections. In one alternative we would be locally glad of particular goods but view them in the framework of a world regarded as comprehensively evil. In the other we would locally regret particular evils but view them in the framework of a world regarded as comprehensively good. I fear that placing all goods in a comprehensively evil framework would spell the end of love. For in such a placement, nothing could be better than the best of a bad bargain; and love, as I have argued, cannot regard the beloved in that way. But placing all evils, with only local regret, in a comprehensively good framework seems worthy at least of careful consideration as an alternative for lovers. We can think of it as a *theistic* way of valuing things. Not that a person could not adopt it without believing in a good supernatural being who is comprehensively responsible for the comprehensive goodness of the world. But those who do believe that a supremely good supernatural agent, acting under no external causal constraints, created the world out of nothing do have an obvious reason for thinking that particular evils, though fit objects of horror, indignation, or remorse, in a local view, must be regarded in a wider view as set in a framework that is comprehensively good.

Both the "Manichean" and the "theistic" alternatives seem to me to deserve further consideration. The Manichean approach, as I conceive of it, requires us to insulate from each other, to some extent, our valuing of causally connected goods and evils. My question about it is how compatible that is with love. First we need to get clear about the type and extent of insulation that is involved.

One of the most interesting discussions of such insulation that I have seen is in an article published in 1986 by James Woodward.[4] Woodward considers the following principle:

> (R) If a state of affairs q is a necessary condition for a state of affairs p, then if one does not (or ought not rationally to) regret that p, one ought not rationally to regret that q.[5]

Woodward is discussing a statement of Derek Parfit's that could be read as presupposing (R). Parfit imagines a nuclear disaster that occurs, predictably enough, to people ("the nuclear people") living 300 years after an earlier generation has chosen a "Risky Policy" of development of nuclear energy. The catastrophic release of radiation causes a disease that, as they discover, will kill them (painlessly) at about 40 years of age. Parfit assumes, plausibly in my opinion, that coming after 300 years of history pervasively influenced by energy policy, none of the nuclear people, individually, would ever have been born if the Risky Policy had not been followed. He suggests that

> These people would regret the fact that they will die young. But [on the assumption that] their lives are worth living, they would not regret the fact that they were ever born. They would therefore not regret our choice of the Risky Policy.[6]

Woodward objects to this suggestion.

For both Parfit and Woodward the discussion of regret is an incident in a larger discussion about what would be wrong with such actions as choosing the Risky Policy. We can ignore that in the present context, in which I have chosen *not* to focus, as most discussions of the theological problem of evil do, on issues of the rightness or wrongness of acts of causing or permitting evils. I want to focus on questions about regret and gladness for their own intrinsic importance.

Woodward is surely right in rejecting the principle (R) in the form in which he states it. We do and rationally should regret, in some way, some things that were necessary conditions of other things of which, in some way, we are glad. Consider an example of Woodward's:

> Suppose that the fact that the Nazis murdered certain people is a necessary condition for M's existence.[7] Does it follow that if M does not (or ought not to) regret his own existence, he ought not regret that the murders took place, or that if he regrets that the murders took place, he must regret his own existence?[8]

Woodward answers the question in the negative, and I agree. His example (not coincidentally, I think) can be regarded as a variant on my self-referential example in

[4] Woodward, J. (1986). The non-identity problem. *Ethics, 96,* 804–31, particularly pp. 822–24.

[5] Woodward, "The Non-Identity Problem," p. 824.

[6] Parfit, D. (1984). *Reasons and Persons* (p. 373). Oxford: Clarendon.

[7] Woodward does not explain why this would be so, but we could suppose M's parents would neither have married nor had children together had it not been for the death of a previous spouse of one of them, who was in fact killed by the Nazis.

[8] Woodward, "The Non-Identity Problem," p. 824.

which I take the First World War to have been a necessary condition of my own existence; [9] and surely I can and should regret the great losses of that immensely destructive conflict, even while I am glad of my own existence. But what we say about regret and gladness needs to be more nuanced if it is to illuminate the issues that engage us here.

That is fairly clear in relation to the other example that Woodward offers us in his argument against the principle (R). He asks us to "suppose that X first (1) assaults someone and that then (2) wishing to make amends, he nurses this person back to health." We can certainly agree that "here 1 is a necessary condition for 2," or at any rate that the nursing would not have happened if the assault had not. And we can also agree with Woodward's obviously intended negative answer to the question, "If X does not regret [the nursing], does it follow that he must not regret his initial assault?" But in answering that question in the negative, we, and Woodward, probably are not supposing that X's favorable attitude to the nursing would or should be unconditional.

Given that X had committed the assault, X is glad that he nursed the victim back to health. That conditional gladness is not only consistent with X's regretting the assault; morally and emotionally the two attitudes are of a piece. Either should lead us to expect the other. But *un*conditional gladness about the nursing is not clearly compatible with thorough regret about the assault. When the alternative in view is a history in which he fails to make amends to a victim he has already injured, we think X should be glad that his history contained his nursing the other person back to health. But Woodward is certainly not supposing that X would or should prefer the history containing his nursing to a history in which he does not make amends because he has not wronged or injured the other person. In relation to that pair of alternatives it would be misleading to say without qualification that X should be glad to have been able to nurse the other person. Reflecting on these considerations, we may well suspect that the favorable attitude that Woodward thinks X should have toward his nursing is not much more than one of making the best of a bad bargain.

Of course, we are supposing that X's nursing is undertaken as a form of making amends, and perhaps we all should think that making amends is a sort of making the best of a bad bargain. The issues may pinch us a bit tighter if we consider the case of a professional nurse who finds much of her life's meaning and satisfaction in caring for suffering people – but not as a way of making amends to them, since she has not caused their ills. Should she not be glad to be able to nurse them? Again there is no problem about a conditional gladness; *given* that they are suffering from injury or disease, she is rightly glad to nurse them. But would she or should she prefer the actual history containing her nursing to a history in which she does no nursing because no one is injured or diseased? This is a harder question. Unlike X, she does not have a bad conscience about the relevant aspect of the actual history, but the compassion that we may suppose to motivate her nursing certainly seems a motive for preferring the history in which there is no need of medical procedures. Perhaps she should be unconditionally glad of the more general fact that she is able to do good, and does so, but only conditionally glad of nursing. On the other hand, the causal structure of life in a disease-free world would be so different from the actual causal structure of human life that we may wonder whether it could contain enough of what she actually, and rightly,

[9] Woo*d*ward ("The Non-Identity Problem," p. 824) explicitly contrasts his verdict on his own example with what he (not implausibly) takes to be my conclusions in a paper (Adams, "Existence, Self-Interest, and the Problem of Evil") in which my example was used. If I am more cautious now, that is partly because I have thought about Woodward's paper [and also about Matthew Hanser, "Harming Future People," *Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19*, (1990): 47–70].

cares about concretely in the actual world, including individual persons in it, to motivate a well considered preference for the disease-free history.

There is a particularized or *localized* type of valuing, as we may call it, in which one certainly can regret one thing and be glad of another, though the former is a necessary condition of the latter. That is, the former can be something one dislikes, and the latter something one likes, about the history to which they both belong. But what is one to do evaluatively with the necessary connection between them? Well, one might regret it. It is certainly possible, and not obviously inappropriate, to regret, or at any rate dislike, a necessary connection. Consider Parfit's nuclear people who "would regret the fact that they will die young ... but would not regret the fact that they were ever born." How are they to put those attitudes together with their knowledge that their being born had a necessary condition (the choice of the Risky Policy) that has their early death as a necessary consequence? I believe it is very plausible to think of them as regretting that pair of necessary connections.

This way of thinking about Parfit's example puts new pressure on his suggestion that the nuclear people would not regret the choice of the Risky Policy. If it is a reason for not regretting the choice, that it is a necessary condition of their existence, which they do not regret, should it not be a reason for regretting the choice, that it has a necessary consequence (their early death) that they do regret? Should they both regret and not regret the choice of the Risky Policy? Certainly they welcome part of its effects and regret another part. Or should they simply regret the necessary connections and raise no issue of regret about the policy choice itself? Probably they think it was morally wrong to make that choice, but that is not theirs to feel remorse about.

Or if the question of regret is raised about the Risky Policy, do they have reason to come down on one side rather than the other? Perhaps so. Suppose they consider as alternatives (1) the actual history in which they are born, but die young as a necessary consequence of a necessary condition of their being born; and (2) a causally possible history in which they neither are born nor die young, because the Risky Policy is not chosen. Of those alternatives, would they or should they prefer a history of the second sort, with neither them nor their early death in it? Parfit's comments clearly suggest a negative answer to that question, and I think a negative answer to it is the most plausible, on Parfit's assumption that the lives of the nuclear people are worth living. And that negative answer suggests in turn that what the nuclear people regret about the choice of the Risky Policy and its effects should be contextualized within the framework of what they welcome, and that what they welcome about the choice of the Risky Policy and its effects should certainly not be contextualized within the framework of what they regret.

These reflections suggest a more nuanced variant of Woodward's formulation of principle (R), in which a non-localized form of regretting that p is understood as wishing, all things considered, that not-p. Consider:

> (R*) If a state of affairs q is a necessary condition for a state of affairs p, then if one does not (or ought not rationally to) wish, all things considered, that not-p, one ought not rationally to wish, all things considered, that not-q.

(R*) is much more plausible than (R). As I understand (R*), indeed, it seems to be a condition of coherence in wishing. For I take it that *wishing, all things considered*, that not-q is wishing away q and everything of which q is a necessary condition, and not wishing, all things considered, that not-p is not wishing away either p or any of its necessary conditions. In these terms we can frame our main issue: is it important, for the fullness of love, *not* to wish, all things considered, that the beloved not have existed?

Am I, and should I be, glad and not regret, all things considered, that you and I exist? I am inclined to say Yes, and I certainly want to say Yes, to that question. But that answer seems to have the consequence that I should not wish, all things considered, that the First World War had not been fought, since I, and probably all or most of you, individually, would not have existed if that war had not occurred. That consequence is hard to swallow. Is it not monstrous to regard our individual existences as more important than the horrors of that conflict, not to mention some of its later repercussions?

On the other hand, we can also ask for whose sake we should regret the First World War. Chiefly for the sake of all the individuals who suffered from it, I should think. If personal substances are the most important objects of love, as I believe, regret over a merely abstract badness of the events of a war would not provide enough reason to wish away the existence of all or most of the individual human persons we know well and love. Arguably, however, it makes little sense to wish away our own existence for the sake of the victims of the First World War if, at the same time, we are wishing away their existence as part of our all-things considered regret about even older catastrophes that were necessary conditions of their being born. Once we start wishing away evils and everything that depends on them, where do we stop?

These considerations argue, I think, for contextualizing regretted evils in the framework of what we welcome in human life. That is consistent, I think, with a localized regret that can be quite intense regarding the First World War and other evils. It is also an attitude that has plausibly been seen as required by theistic belief.

So much the worse for theism, the Manichean may say. If you believe the world as a whole was created out of nothing by an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good god, it is hard to avoid having all-things-considered joys or regrets. But that is exactly what the Manichean thinks we must avoid if we are to do justice to both the goods and the evils in human life. All-things-considered joys and regrets seem to be what Albert Camus is rejecting, for instance, when he denounces as "puerile" the "belief that to love one single day of life amounts to justifying whole centuries of oppression." [10]

I do not believe we can easily dismiss the Manichean view (as I am calling it) that all regret and gladness should be localized, refusing all invitations to form such attitudes on an all-things-considered basis. But I do find it difficult to refuse all invitations of the latter sort, and I suspect that the cost of refusing them all may be high, in blocking integration of our attitudes toward life and the world, and in leaving our loves surrounded with a cloud of attitudes that are consistent with them, not in substance, but only in being kept out of reach in a sort of emotional *apartheid*. I want to have room for ambivalence, but I also want to have room for integration.

It may be hard in the end, however, to see any all-things-considered gladness as justified except in a religious context, and a certain sort of religious context at that. What I have in mind is an eschatology, and a theology of history, that would support us in believing that what is given us to love is so good that the totality of our history with God will provide a framework of gladness in which all our just regrets can be contextualized. What such an eschatology and theology of history would involve is a large subject – too large for the present paper (as one says when one is not prepared, not yet at any rate, to provide what is demanded).

[10] Camus, A. (1957). *The Rebel* [*L'homme révolté*, translated by Anthony Bower] (p. 305). New York: Vintage Books.